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Executive Summary 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
The aim of this review was to identify communication challenges associated with the 
expression of uncertainty in the Plant Health Risk Register (PHRR) and inform future Defra 
strategies for addressing these challenges. 
Our starting point is that the communication of uncertainty potentially relates to much more 
than issues of wording, numerical format and presentation.   The effective communication of 
science and associated uncertainties, particularly for high profile / high consequence pests 
and diseases can require more than the application of tools and techniques that simplify and 
demystify complex phenomena.    
First we describe the PHRR itself, its history and the aspirations for it as a risk management 
tool (Section 2).  A working definition of uncertainty and an overview of its various 
manifestations follow in Section 3.  We consider the reasons why uncertainty should be 
communicated, and suggest the particular challenges of doing so within the PHRR (Section 4).  
This leads to a consideration of the reasons that there might be for expert1 risk-assessor 
reluctance to communicate uncertainty (Section 5) – which includes the evidence pertaining 
to media characterisations.  Section 6 considers the way in which lay audiences might make 
sense of uncertainty. The next two sections move to what can be characterised as micro-level 
considerations, first considering evidence, largely from cognitive psychology, about the 
interplay between cognitive biases / recourse to heuristics and the characterisation of 
uncertainty that can impact on how risk is perceived and reacted to by stakeholders (Section 
7) and second, broader social science insights on the accuracy of lay interpretations of 
alternative representations and characterisations of uncertainty (Section 8).   In conclusion, in 
Section 9, we reflect on the main lessons to be drawn for the communication of uncertainty 
relating to the PHRR and, in particular, consider the implications of alternative formats for 
representing and characterising uncertainty in the PHRR. 
 
Section 2: Background to the Plant Health Risk Register 
Developing a PHRR was one of the key recommendations of the Tree Health and Plant 
Biosecurity Expert Task Force which reported in 2013.  The PHRR aimed to provide a single 
repository for drawing together numerous risk assessments pertaining to individual pests and 
pathogens.   As well as serving to prioritise risks, it was charged with ‘enabling systematic and 
                                                     
1 Throughout this document the term ‘expert’ is used to refer to individuals with recognised expertise in assessing plant 
pests and diseases and their propagation. 
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proportionate risk management responses’, including stakeholder engagement.  In response 
to this recommendation the PHRR was developed.  
The inputs to the overall UK Relative Risk Rating score ratings are subject to various forms of 
uncertainty.  The way in which they are combined is also subject to uncertainty.  How can 
these uncertainties best be recognised, captured and represented?   
Three main options are explored: 
1. An uncertainty range referenced to the Risk Register rating  
2. An uncertainty range translated into monetised impacts 
3. Risk Register supplemented by an uncertainty proxy rating derived from published 
findings and related scientific insights. 
 
Section 3: Uncertainty: boundaries, definitions and types 
It is recognised that relevant domains of uncertainty extend beyond the technical properties 
of pests and diseases and options over their mitigation/control.  They extend to the social 
world, and include uncertainty over economic impacts; stakeholder reactions to threats; and, 
the capacity of g/Government and its institutions to influence the behaviour of others, 
notably in the areas of propagation of acceptance and adoption of mitigation measures.  
Definitions of uncertainty and the distinction between risk and uncertainty are outlined.  
Most particularly the distinction is made between uncertainty in risk assessment and policy 
delivery are outlined.   
Headline findings  
 A core challenge is to portray uncertainties in ways that are accessible to target audiences but which, 
at the same time, do not convey the impression that science in the area is fundamentally speculative 
offering no clear way forward.     
 
 The boundaries of uncertainty are not limited to underpinning natural science insights and confidence 
in the results of risk assessment.  Relevant domains of uncertainty extend beyond the technical 
properties of pests and diseases and options over their mitigation/control. 
 
 Principal domains of uncertainty relate to the nature of threat posed by pests or diseases; magnitudes 
of impact; the intrinsic effectiveness of mitigation measures; rates of adoption  of mitigation 
measures; stakeholder reactions to mitigation measures; stakeholder orientations to risk management 
institutions.    
 
 Purist perspectives on risk assessment and risk management cast these as essentially separate 
processes. However, effective policy science rests upon their integration. 
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 Three dimensions of uncertainty - level (scientific to statistical); location (domains in which uncertainty 
can occur); nature (stochastic - inherent indeterminability). 
 
 Recognising the features of risks and institutional reactions to them that are important to stakeholders 
should inform thinking over which uncertainties need to be addressed.  
 
Section 4: Communicating uncertainty  
A framework for considering the communication of uncertainty is presented and the mandate 
to communicate uncertainty is set out. 
Headline findings  
 There are three dimensions to communication  - micro, process and macro. 
 
 The focus of concern / need for information on uncertainty may vary between stakeholders. 
 
 The focus of concern / need for information on uncertainty may vary as threats from pests or diseases 
and institutional reactions to them mature. 
 
 There may be benefits from a layered approach to communicating uncertainties 
 
 Identification of a single policy option may be inconsistent with acknowledgement of uncertainty and 
obscure a clear view of areas of agreement and disagreement and the reasons that lie behind these. 
 
 One of the challenges associated with the communication of uncertainty in relation to a risk register is 
that the  process for identifying uncertainties should be proportionate to the process for 
characterising the risk and congruent with the purpose of the risk register. 
 
 Although it may not be acknowledged, the characterisation of risk and uncertainty is linked to values 
and preferences 
 
Section 5: Reasons for expert reservations about communicating uncertainty  
Reasons for expert concerns about communicating uncertainty are considered within the 
context of insights from the Social Amplification of Risk Framework.  In particular, the role of 
the media in risk amplification is considered.  Triggers to media coverage, criteria of news 
selection around the reporting of risk and environmental issues and journalist views as to 
how they report stories about risk are outlined. Evidence regarding the extent to which the 
media influence lay perception of risk and the implications for communicating risk and 
uncertainty are considered.  
Headline findings 
 Policy officials are sensitised to the scenario that the communication of uncertainty around tree 
disease may cause stakeholder concern and conflict that they believe are unwarranted.  
 
 Distrust and reputational damage may result from obscuring uncertainty 
 
 Given that many risks are not experienced directly, the media are key in re-presenting these 
7 | P a g e  
 
  
 The media are prone to report much more than technical estimates of risk and uncertainty. The 
way in which events are framed may highlight uncertainties that are not part of technical 
estimates – for example uncertainties about how the risk is being managed or regulated.  
 
 A simple view that the media always sensationalise and exaggerate is not backed up by evidence, 
although scientific uncertainty may be depicted as a cause for concern through a focus on social 
aspects of uncertainty.  
 
 The characteristics of risk that attract media attention are well established and the depiction of 
uncertainty around (e.g.) who is to blame, conflict, cover-up, what the implications are likely to 
further consolidate this attention 
 
 An appreciation of journalistic practices will increase policy understandings of what is newsworthy 
and why and of the ways in which the story is likely to be covered 
 
Section 6: What is the evidence about lay responses to uncertainty? 
The mixed evidence around lay reactions to uncertainty and the impact of the presentation 
of uncertainty on estimates of, and concern about, the risk and on the trustworthiness of 
those communicating uncertainty is outlined.   
Headline findings 
 Denial of uncertainty is likely to signal a lack of honesty and accuracy and generate distrust.  
People do not expect certainty although they may dislike uncertainty.  
 Uncertainty may increase perceptions of risk more for some hazards – e.g. those under societal 
rather than personal control.  
 The communication of technical uncertainty may lead to attributions about the communicator 
and their risk management capabilities 
 Lay publics tend to be concerned with a much broader range of uncertainties than experts are 
concerned about communicating 
 The most unacceptable uncertainties tend to be those associated with government inaction 
rather than scientific processes 
 People may infer uncertainty from conflicting perspectives 
 A layering or stepped approach may help communicate uncertainty effectively.  
 
Section 7: What heuristics and biases affect the characterisation and interpretation of 
uncertainty and related decision making?  
This section provides an overview of the extensive literature on recognised sources of bias in 
decision making in the context of uncertainty.   It draws heavily on insights from cognitive 
psychology, but it is informed and elaborated upon through reference to complementary 
insights from social psychology, sociology and social anthropology.  This latter has the effect of 
broadening the perspective, beyond traits exhibited by all individuals (in varying degrees), to 
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elements that reflect social and cultural dispositional and process related influences on 
decision making in the context of uncertainty. 
Headline findings 
 People are disposed to use (heuristics2) when decisions are complex, time consuming or 
contain unknown / unknowable elements. 
 
 High consequence outcomes tend to be viewed as more likely. People are prone to focus more 
on magnitude of outcomes than probability for catastrophic, large scale, irreversible risks. 
 
 Vivid recall of past high consequence events can sponsor over estimate of the likelihood of 
their recurrence, or of analogous events occurring.   
 
 Established beliefs about the nature and probability of harm can act as a filter on how new 
information is reviewed, e.g. hindsight bias. 
 
 Unrealistic optimism bias has been identified as both an individual and a group phenomenon. 
Lack of real-world contextual insight, e.g. into working practices, may foster unreasonably 
optimistic beliefs surrounding the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.   
 
 Under most circumstances people are averse to loss. High uncertainty, makes people reluctant 
to invest even when potential rewards are high. People may become risk seekers when faced 
with a certain loss if they do nothing. 
 
 The scope for large differences in individual expert risk assessments is high - group interaction 
or elicitation can increase consensus but may sponsor other undesirable effects. Group 
deliberative processes have potential to sponsor polarization and choice shift effects, as well 
as 'averaging effects', groups processes can lead to more extreme decisions (risk seeking or 
risk averse). 
 
 Semantic framing of issues or options, e.g. as 'gains' of 'losses' can impact on perceptions and 
choices. 
 
Section 8: How are different presentations of uncertainty interpreted? 
The difficulty in finding effect ways to communicate uncertainty to lay audiences is not always 
appreciated in scientific, technical or policy communities.  A variety of ways of characterising 
uncertainty have been developed, but most were created in scientific, technical or business 
contexts, essentially for internal use, such that not all are easily or appropriately interpreted 
by lay audiences.  The evidence reviewed relates to what is known of lay understandings and 
interpretations of numbers, statistical concepts (e.g. probabilities, proportions, rates, 
percentages), and semantic characterisations and graphical representations of uncertainty.  
                                                     
2 Simplified mental representations that focus on what the perceiver believes to be the most salient features of the 
presenting issue, routinely informed though inferential linkages to previously encountered patterns or relationships. 
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Headline findings 
 It is safe to assume that almost all adults have a general intuitive awareness of chance, 
likelihood, dose-response relationships and trends.  
 
 Lay audiences have been found to perform reasonably well in interpreting numerical 
probabilities attached to discrete events. 
 
 Many people experience difficulty in comprehending the magnitude of low probability events, 
particularly when expressed as a decimal, e.g. .0001.  P values will mean very little to most 
people.  Probability density functions (PDFs) and Cumulative density functions (CDF's) are 
unfamiliar to laypeople and are conceptually unintuitive. 
 
 There has been much interest in verbal (semantic) expressions of uncertainty in risk 
assessment and communication with lay audiences.  Principal limitations relate to different 
interpretations of their meaning and establishing their relationship to numerical expressions 
of probability.  The number and choice of semantic anchors used in some subjective 
judgement scales currently in use in the plant disease risk area do not appear to be closely 
aligned with recommendations on scale design. People (expert and lay) are prone to select 
more serious sounding words as expressions of probability that are 'contaminated' by a 
disposition to focus on the magnitude of potential consequences.  
 
 Familiarity within scientific graphic representations of probabilities can sponsor an under-
appreciation amongst experts of the difficulties laypeople may experience in interpreting 
them. 
 
 Kite diagrams, radar diagrams and pedigree charts are used to express probabilities and 
uncertainties in other risk assessment/management domains.  Box plots offer a simple 
intuitive format  - and should represent a default choice within the limitations of this format.  
Risk maps offer an intuitive spatial display of risk and associated uncertainties.  Types of map 
are characterisable as: difference maps, scenario maps, ensemble maps and grid maps. 
 
 The area of graphics as a measure of uncertainty would benefit for further, more extensive 
and comprehensive, empirical investigation. 
 
Section 9: Consideration of alternative representations of uncertainty surrounding PHRR 
pest/disease ratings 
 
In the final section of the report the relative strengths and weaknesses of the three possible 
representations of uncertainty outlined in Section 2 are outlined 
 
Headline conclusions  
 
Risk Register Point Value plus Uncertainty Proxy Score (all pests in Register) 
Strengths 
 Effort to develop is proportionate to the aims of the Risk Register. 
 Conveys an impression of objectivity through reference to underpinning science 
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 Stakeholder involvement in selecting proxy measures might enhance ownership and 
acceptance. 
 
Weaknesses 
 Assumes weight of knowledge diminishes uncertainty - the converse can also be the case. 
 Risks underplaying unknown and unknowable unknowns 
 Subject to publication bias; funding bias and time lags between empirical work and 
publication date 
 Risks underplaying context, e.g. local conditions / practices 
 Not directly related to the uncertainty around risk point estimates - may inadvertently lend 
more credence to the point estimates than is justifiable.  
Uncertainty Range Based on Estimates of Monetised Impact 
Strengths 
 Reflects potentially strong alignment with decision making criteria applied within the policy 
domain, e.g. intervention choices and research investment 
 May chime with interests of certain stakeholders 
Weaknesses 
 Labour intensive for retrospective application to all pests within the Risk Register - may be 
disproportionate / unnecessary for all pests. 
 Assessment of monetised values requires expertise beyond plant-pest science. 
 Explicit link between cost and priorities invites media attention. 
 May sponsor debate over values and their bases 
 Prone to sponsor public suspicion of partisan interests 
 Calculation of externalities can be unintuitive to non-experts. 
 Cost as a justification for non-intervention may arouse stakeholder concern. 
 
Uncertainty range for Risk Register rating 
Strengths 
 Focus presents as being on scientific estimates of threat. 
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 Emphasis on natural science portrays as more neutral than when based on market costs. 
 Direct relationship to point estimates. 
 Good fit with expertise of assessors. 
Weaknesses 
 Labour intensive for retrospective application to all pests within the Risk Register - may be 
disproportionate / unnecessary for all pests. 
 Post mitigation estimates will tend to be partial where assessor expertise is restricted to 
biological / technical domains - risk of underplaying wider considerations. 
 Potential variability in references applied by assessors to the consideration of mitigated risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this document is to identify communication challenges associated with the 
expression of uncertainty in the Plant Health Risk Register (PHRR) and inform future Defra 
strategies for addressing these challenges.   
 
Plant pests and diseases embody the potential to impact on UK biological, animal and human 
systems in complex and uncertain ways.  In common with other environmental challenges, a 
feature of plant pests and diseases is that early detection can be difficult, combined with high 
levels of uncertainty over their propagation and migration.  This situation is further 
complicated by known and unknown interrelationships between variables, e.g. climatic 
conditions, the range of hosts and other transmission pathways.  Such interactions can at 
times be complex and operate in subtle and adaptive ways, to the extent that future 
outcomes can be sensitive to small changes.   
 
The ever increasing range and number of pests and diseases creates both opportunities and 
challenges for politicians, policy makers, scientists and other stakeholders to play a role in 
deciding over how to prioritise and combat these threats.  In essence, the role of science in 
this is to provide evidence to support decision making, in at least four domains:  
 
1. Horizon scanning - to identify the potential for harm.  
2. Inform government and other stakeholders regarding the nature of arising threats. 
3. Inform (principally) policy delivery decisions over actions which will prevent, or more 
routinely, mitigate the consequences or the pest or  disease, and. 
4. Provision of evidence relating to the effectiveness of mitigation measures.   
 
Each of these processes embodies uncertainties that include: being able to recognise sources 
of harm; the characteristics / circumstances under which they will, or may, become manifest; 
the effectiveness of combined, or alternative, mitigation measures; and the propagation of 
their deployment.  It is important to recognise that the application of science in this context 
embodies more than natural science expertise.  By necessity, it must draw upon insights from 
risk management, social and communication sciences. 
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A key objective is to provide information and knowledge in a form that is accessible and 
actionable by decision makers and other stakeholders.  Distilling what is routinely a large 
quantity of complex information into a form and format that is accessible to decision makers 
and other stakeholders is routinely challenging, particularly where levels of consensus and 
certainty may be limited.  The scientist, in the role of communicator, needs to have clear 
insight into extant understandings (mental models), information needs (and objectives / 
preferences), cognitive capabilities and familiarity with scientific information of the target 
audience.  It is important to recognise that this profile is prone to vary between different 
target audiences and with respect to the characteristics and impacts of different pest / 
diseases.  Throughout this report the term 'lay' is used to refer to all target audiences that lie 
outside formal scientific and technical domains.  This is not to deny that Government 
ministers, policy advisers, policy makers and other stakeholders do not possess relevant 
insight, rather it is based upon the premise that it presence cannot, and should not, be 
assumed.   
 
The focus of this document is on the challenge of communicating uncertainty within the 
PHRR.  Our starting point is that the communication 
of uncertainty potentially relates to much more 
than issues of wording, numerical format and 
presentation.   Good communication practice 
embodies the capacity to present information in 
formats that are accessible and provide lay audiences with the capacity to make well-judged 
decisions informed by scientific insight.  This should not be interpreted as an elaboration of 
traditional perspectives on the communication of science as a one way process of 'seek and 
tell'.  As will be articulated, in later sections of this review, the effective communication of 
science and associated uncertainties, particularly for high profile / high consequence pest 
and diseases can require more than the application of tools and techniques that simplify and 
demystify complex phenomena. A perspective that is restricted to this micro level where the 
focus is simply on finding inventive ways of translating complicated information into lay 
terminology is partial.  Often more fundamental communication challenges lie beyond this, 
requiring thought to be given to the process of communication – what channels are being 
used to convey the information, what is the source of the information – and macro 
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considerations around trust, confidence, institutional accountability, and corporate body 
language of the communicator.  These issues may subsume the micro challenges of 
communicating uncertainty, such that alternative formats for conveying uncertain 
information will be a largely irrelevant focus where, for example, questions of organisational 
accountability or blame become a key focus of attention.    
 
The issue is complicated by the fact that communcator actions at one level can have 
implications for other levels. An example of such, pertinent to our current considerations, 
relates to the manner in which the risk analysis process – which would include the derivation 
and depiction of uncertainty estimates – has implications for trust and confidence in risk 
managers.   Relatedly, as Frewer and Salter (2007) note when attempting to address public 
and stakeholder disquiet around risk issues (increasing the transparency of institutions and 
involving publics and stakeholders in policy development) there is a tendency to maintain a 
functional separation between risk assessment from risk management.  In so doing, the risk 
analysis process is portrayed as ‘immune from values, preferences or investigation by different 
methodological variants’ and, hence, not open to question.  In reality, in risk assessment, 
value and preference based choices that are made about, for example, which hazards should 
be the focus for action, or which unwanted consequences should be considered.  Thus, 
assessments of risk and uncertainty are not simply the results of a scientific process (see too 
Jensen & Sandøe, 2002). 
 
Frewer and Salter (2007) conclude that,  
 
“The discounting of societal considerations as having any influence on risk assessment 
by institutions has become more problematic with increased transparency.  This is 
because the (unacknowledged) application of values to risk assessment practices and 
processes become more obvious to citizens in general, but is systematically denied by 
other influential actors involved in risk analysis” 
 
Having set the scene, this review will unfold as follows.  First we will describe the Plant Health 
Risk register itself, its history and the institutional aspirations for it as a risk management tool 
(Section 2).  A working definition of uncertainty and an overview of various types of 
15 | P a g e  
 
uncertainty will follow (Section 3).  We will consider the reasons why uncertainty should be 
communicated, and suggest the particular challenges of doing so within the PHRR (Section 4).  
This will lead to a consideration of the reasons that there might be for expert reluctance to 
communicate uncertainty (Section 5) – which includes evidence pertaining to media 
presentations of uncertainty.  Section 6 considers the way in which lay audiences might make 
sense of uncertainty. These sections, therefore, principally focus on the broader contexts for 
communication as depicted in the diagram above.  The next two sections move to more 
micro-level considerations and first consider evidence, largely from cognitive psychology, 
about the heuristics and biases that affect the characterisation and interpretation of 
uncertainty and related decision making (Section 7) and second about the way in which 
different presentations of uncertainty are likely to be interpreted (Section 8).   In conclusion, 
(Section 9) we will reflect on the main lessons to be learned for the communication of 
uncertainty in the PHRR and, in particular, will consider the implications for the potential 
formats for capturing and representing uncertainty in the PHRR.  Throughout the report, in 
each Section, we have sought to distil the main points as a set of ‘Headline Findings’  
 
2. Background to the Plant Health Risk Register 
 
Developing a Plant Health Risk Register was one of the key recommendations of the Tree 
Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Task Force which reported in 2013.  The Task Force was 
set up in line with an ongoing commitment to addressing threats to tree health and 
biosecurity and an awareness of the heightened risk of transmission or importing disease 
from elsewhere in Europe, but was particularly triggered by the discovery in 2012 of Chalara 
fraxinea in native ash trees in the UK.  
 
The remit of the Task Force when considering these issues was to “make recommendations 
on how the UK should strengthen its responsiveness and preparedness in order to strengthen 
plant biosecurity and support tree health” (p. 10).    
 
One of the key recommendations of the Final Report of the Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity 
Expert Taskforce was the development of a prioritised Plant Health Risk Register (PHRR).  The 
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stated purpose of this was to “identify and prioritise the risks of those pests and pathogens 
that pose the greatest threat, including the probability of entry of exotics or the occurrence of 
new strains of indigenous species”(p. 7) .  Alongside this, a Chief Plant Health Officer was 
appointed, “to own the UK Plant Health Risk Register and to provide strategic and tactical 
leadership for managing those risks” (p. 5).    
 
The aim of the Plant Health Risk Register  
 
The PHRR was to form a single repository for drawing together risk assessments pertaining to 
individual pests and pathogens.   As well as serving to prioritise risks it was charged with 
‘enabling systematic and proportionate risk management responses’, including stakeholder 
engagement.  In response to this recommendation the Plant Health Risk Register was 
developed (Baker & Anderson 2014).   
 
Who are the users of the Plant Health Risk Register? 
 
The PHRR is publically available but the intended users and envisaged use are ‘government, 
industry and stakeholders’… ‘to prioritise action against pests and diseases which threaten 
our crops, trees, gardens and countryside’.  Along similar lines, ‘it will (..) help a range of 
groups, including nurseries and woodland managers, to consider and manage risk effectively’.  
 
The structure of Risk Registers 
 
Risk Registers are a tool for risk management often used by companies and organisations 
(Breakwell, 2014).  Typically, they delineate the risks associated with their main objectives 
and rate each of these in relation to their likelihood and impact.  Multiplying these provides a 
‘gross risk’ figure which has limited meaning insofar it can be derived from various 
combinations of impact and likelihood scores.  Alongside this gross risk figure ‘improvement 
actions’ may be noted, along with the timescale for delivering these.  The impact of the 
planned mitigating actions may be noted, thus giving rise to an estimate of the residual risk 
(remaining after mitigation has been effected) and there may be some indication of the 
acceptability of that risk.   
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To some extent, the Plant Health Risk Register is constructed along these lines although it is 
more complex, insofar as there are several dimensions underlying impact (social, economic 
and environmental impact) and likelihood (of both entry and establishment).  Each of these 
dimensions and, in turn, the overall impact and likelihood are assigned a score of 1 – 5.  
There is also a rating of the ‘value of the host plants in the UK’ – similarly using a 1-5 scale.  
The UK Relative Risk Rating, which ranges from 1-125, - is derived by multiplying the impact x 
likelihood score with the value at risk score.  There are two sets of these ratings – one 
representing the unmitigated risk and the other the mitigated risk3.   
 
It is, thus, clear that this method of compiling the PHRR does not currently include any way of 
capturing the uncertainty that might exist about any of these judgements.  
 
The Plant Health Risk Register and Uncertainty 
 
In the course of developing the PHRR, the potential value of developing and testing 
approaches to capturing and expressing uncertainty was noted by the Expert Task Force; 
distinguishing uncertainties from ambiguities and ignorance in assessing risk (Stirling, 2014) 
and in stakeholder workshops.  In the first phase of the PHRR uncertainties were noted in the 
form of free text.  Work to develop and test more systematic approaches to capture and 
express uncertainty within the PHRR is ongoing4.   This document is an adjunct to this, 
focusing, as it does, upon challenges that arise when communicating uncertainty5.   
 
Options for characterising uncertainty in the PHRR 
 
The options developed for characterising uncertainty9 are set in the context of an 
acknowledgement that the inputs to the overall UK Relative Risk Rating score ratings are 
subject to a range of domains of uncertainty.  The way in which they are combined is also 
                                                     
3 For a full explanation of the composition of these ratings see https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/phiw/riskRegister/Summary-
of-Guidance-for-phase-1-Public-Ver2.pdf  
4 Fera project A2HE1000 
5 A communication strategy for tree health issues has also been explored in a project on stakeholder mapping but this does 
not include a focus on the challenges of communicating uncertainty (Defra project TH0104)  
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subject to uncertainty.  How can these uncertainties best be recognised, captured and 
represented?   
 
An approach that has been suggested is to directly assess the uncertainty associated with 
each of the inputs.  A variant of this is to translate the uncertainty estimates into quantifiable 
estimates of financial valuation of impact.  A third, rather different approach is, not to 
reassess individual scores but rather, to seek to characterise how well known a pest is, and to 
use this as a proxy for the extent to which the characterisation of the pest in the PHRR is 
likely to be based on sound evidence.    
 
The first of these alternatives could be achieved in several ways.  One that has been 
suggested is to quantify the uncertainty of the risk ratings using the Direct Method. Under 
this method expert judgement is used to assign a probability to each point on the (1-5) scale 
rather than selecting a single value.  The product of this is combined, with the output being a 
range or distribution.   An alternative, the Holt method6, translates an expert rating of high, 
medium or low uncertainty into a set of probabilities, for each rating on each parameter.  
Given the size of the task, deriving uncertainty in relation to the 800+ plant diseases included 
in the PHRR, a further variation in characterising uncertainty for each of these approaches is 
introduced by rating more parameters early on in the process or fewer at a later point. 
Testing all four options (Direct Early, Direct Late and Holt Early and Holt Late) revealed 
differences required in analyst time and in the width of the distributions produced.  A hybrid 
method was recommended for further consideration.   
 
The third alternative – assigning proxy values indicative of the ‘known-ness’ of each disease 
can, in large part, be automated although some indicators (such as the number of references 
to the pest in a literature search of scientific databases require manual input.  Early work 
focusing on a sample of 12 pest explored the relationship between the extent of uncertainty 
using the proxy method and the Direct Early method (above).  This revealed a weak 
relationship and sponsored the conclusion that more work needs to be done to understand 
the reasons for this and its implications. 
                                                     
6 Named after the scientist who developed it  
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We now turn to addressing, more directly, the challenge of how to communicate uncertainty.  
In the next section, we considering the issue of representation of uncertainty with reference 
to the different domains of uncertainty.   
  
 
3. Uncertainty: boundaries, definitions and types  
 
"In contrast to general [scientific] practice, it is not enough to analyze uncertainty as a 
technical problem or merely seek for consensus interpretations of inconclusive 
evidence." 
(van der Sluijs et al, 2008). 
 
 
Headline findings 
 
 A core challenge is to portray uncertainties in ways that are accessible to target audiences but 
which, at the same time, do not convey the impression that science in the area is fundamentally 
speculative offering no clear way forward.     
 
 The boundaries of uncertainty are not limited to underpinning natural science insights and 
confidence in the results of risk assessment.  Relevant domains of uncertainty extend beyond the 
technical properties of pests and diseases and options over their mitigation/control. 
 
 Principal domains of uncertainty relate to the nature of threat posed by pests or diseases; 
magnitudes of impact; the intrinsic effectiveness of mitigation measures; rates of adoption  of 
mitigation measures; stakeholder reactions to mitigation measures; stakeholder orientations to risk 
management institutions.    
 
 Purist perspectives on risk assessment and risk management cast these as essentially separate 
processes. However, effective policy science rests upon their integration. 
 
 Three dimensions of uncertainty - level (scientific to statistical); location (domains in which 
uncertainty can occur); nature (stochastic - inherent indeterminability). 
 
 Recognising the features of risks and institutional reactions to them that are important to 
stakeholders should inform thinking over which uncertainties need to be addressed.   
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Boundaries of Uncertainty 
 
Relevant domains of uncertainty extend beyond the technical properties of pests and 
diseases and options over their mitigation/control.  They extend to the social world, and 
include uncertainty over economic impacts; stakeholder reactions to threats; and, the 
capacity of g/Government and its institutions to influence the behaviour of others, notably in 
the areas of propagation of acceptance and adoption of mitigation measures.  
 
Increasing recognition of threats to society, combined with an increasing desire to manage 
and control sources of harm, and associated likelihoods, has sponsored an unprecedented 
focus on the capacity to predict and quantify impacts of the potential for harm, to the extent 
that there are accepted and recognised systems designed to quantify elements that were, in 
previous eras, regarded as unquantifiable (Power 2006).  
 
"In the modern view of scientific policy advice, science produces objective, valid and 
reliable knowledge." (van der Sluijs et al (2008).   
 
The use of expert judgement has become a key component in this process.  The widespread 
adoption of formal systems to identify and manage potential threats, based on theoretical 
analysis, is a relatively new phenomenon.  It has been suggested that this anticipatory 
perspective should be more appropriately cast as trans-scientific (Weinberg, 1972) than 
scientific in the text book sense, due to the paradox that the most urgent public policy need 
for scientific evidence routinely occurs in areas in which evidence is least complete, lacking, 
or uncertain, i.e. it is characterised by problems that can be expressed in scientific terms, 
which established scientific method could, in theory, be used to address, but in practice are 
not amenable to empirical investigation (Otway and von Winterfeldt 1992).  Of the published 
material that is available, a notable challenge with respect to its application is that it is rarely 
of close fit with policy needs, i.e. it was not configured to answer specific policy questions, 
such that in many instances there is a need to extrapolate from the general to the specific, in 
varying degrees.  A proportion of residual uncertainty is resolvable through commissioning 
dedicated research, but frequently certain elements will remain unknowable.  In some 
21 | P a g e  
 
instances, deep uncertainty may constitute the dominant characteristic.  
 
"...in the real world...Scientific assessments of complex policy issues have to integrate 
information covering the entire spectrum from well-established scientific knowledge to 
educated guesses, preliminary models and tentative assumptions." (van der Sluijs. et al 
(2008).  
 
The institutional reaction to this has been to openly acknowledge increasing reliance on 
expert judgement, while seeking to avert accusations of subjectivity and bias through publicly 
disclosing the nature of underpinning, ostensibly rigorous, formal procedures, suitably 
caveated through the articulation of sources and magnitudes of uncertainty.  An observation 
might be that the procedures for assessment represent a closer approximation to traditional 
science practice than their product.  This intense focus on procedural rigour mirrors 
contemporary public policy perspectives on the status of review evidence, notably the 
primacy ascribed to randomised control trials; an arising risk being that other knowledge may 
be overlooked or underplayed.  Issues characterised by deep uncertainty are problematic 
from an evidence-based perspective.  
    
Purist perspectives on risk assessment and risk management cast these as complementary 
but essentially separate processes (see, for example, EFSA, 2014). The rationale here is that 
risk assessment falls within the scientific and technical domain, whereas the latter, although 
informed by the former, reflects broader political, economic and social considerations, e.g. 
cost-benefit trade-offs and subjective judgements of tolerability (HSE 2001; van der Sluijs et 
al, 2008).  However, experience has demonstrated that, when dealing with potentially high 
profile emotive sources of harm, a failure by risk assessors to recognise and take account of 
stakeholders' concerns can sponsor the development of quite different world views (Waage 
and Mumford, 2008).  Recognising what is important to stakeholders is important with 
respect to the nature of information communicated on risk and uncertainty over threats, but 
also from the perspective of uncertainty amongst policy makers over reactions to proposed 
mitigation measures and rates of take-up (adoption), in instances where achieving control 
rests upon motivating behavioural change among stakeholders, e.g. land owners, producers, 
suppliers and importers.    
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Defining Uncertainty 
 
“Uncertainty is essentially the absence of information, information that may or not be 
obtainable” 
 
This definition makes it clear that uncertainty is not necessarily related to risk.  Uncertainty is 
only about risk insofar as it is about negative outcomes or loss.  Much early work on 
uncertainty was in the context of decision making, where there were possibilities of gain or 
loss.  Here, though, we are dealing with the communication of uncertainty in the context of 
risk.   
 
There are many definitions of uncertainty and similarly many more or less detailed ways of 
categorising the sources of uncertainty.   The recent Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s 
annual report focused on risk in the context of innovation neatly locates uncertainty in 
relation to other relevant concepts (Government Office for Science, 2014).  Thus, risk is a 
product of hazard and exposure to it (no exposure to a hazard equals no risk). Some people 
(or plants) may be more vulnerable through greater sensitivity to the hazard or greater 
exposure to it.  “Uncertainty is then concerned with the degree to which we are confident in 
our knowledge of hazard, exposure and vulnerability” (p. 6) 
 
The terms risk and uncertainty are not synonymous and explicit distinctions are made.  Cook 
et al, for example, use risk to "...designate situations where [the range of] possible outcomes 
and their probabilities are both known".  Whereas uncertainty is cast as "...situations when we 
know the possible outcomes, but not the probabilities of these outcomes." (Cook et al, 2012).  
However, as these authors go on to note, the concept of probability is integral to risk 
assessment, and essentially treated as a state that can be known, or at least judged.  Citing 
Millner et al, (2010), Cook et al view this as problematic when dealing with unprecedented 
events, such as climate change and biological invasions.  While this is true, and it represents a 
core challenge, it is not a unique feature of environmental issues, being no less true of the 
challenges surrounding assessment of the potential for catastrophic failure in complex 
engineering systems, e.g. power generation, mineral extraction, contexts in which the 
estimation of unknown quantities is treated as routine (see, for example, Turner et al, 2002; 
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2004).   
 
There are however important differences in perspective and volition.  Institutionally, the 
process of risk assessment in the major hazards sectors is essentially about mitigating the 
chances of failure to avoid injury to employees, the public, the environment and collateral 
losses, and convincing others that levels of control are suitable and sufficient.  By contrast, 
environmental risk assessment might be characterised as the production of evidence to 
convince others that we are not in control, and action needs to be taken (see Power, 2006). 
    
As alluded to at the beginning of this section, an important issue to acknowledge is that the 
boundaries of uncertainty are not limited to underpinning natural science insights and 
confidence in the results of risk assessment.  Central to risk assessment is the concept of 
control.  Specifically, measures that might be adopted to mitigate the consequences of the 
threat. Mitigation, under almost all circumstances, requires some level of action on the part 
of g/Government and its Agencies.  In this context, notable uncertainty surrounds the impact 
of alternative courses of mitigation; associated costs and benefits; the capacity to propagate 
mitigation measures and the reactions of stakeholders to this endeavour.  In the interests of 
clarity the following sections make a distinction between uncertainty in risk assessment 
arising from natural science insights and policy strategy / delivery uncertainties, e.g. capacity 
to manage stakeholder concerns; and capacity to propagate the adoption of mitigation 
measures. 
 
Types of uncertainty 
 
Uncertainties arising from risk assessment 
 
In the context of formal risk assessment systems and conveying the results of such activity to 
stakeholders, the range of elements over which there may be a need to convey information 
on uncertainty can be extensive.  Table 1 provides a list of domains of uncertainty cited in the 
literature (but should not be considered exhaustive).   
 
Evidence informed public policy involves the translation of scientific and technical information 
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into forms and formats which are accessible to non-technical audiences.  Even in instances 
where data is plentiful, where relationships are well understood with high levels of certainty, 
this can be challenging.  More routinely, a range of uncertainties proliferate, which can range 
from deep uncertainty (unknown to science) regarding the nature of threat; to uncertainty 
surrounding the magnitude of impact; uncertainty over the technical effectiveness of 
identified mitigation measures; to uncertainty over the capacity to motivate others to adopt 
them, and more (see Table 1).    
Table 1: Domains of uncertainty in risk assessment 
 
 Unknown to science - novel but potentially knowable.  
 Unknowable to science - phenomena or variable that cannot be measured. 
 Sources of uncertainty. 
 Nature of uncertainties. 
 Magnitude of uncertainties. 
 Statistical uncertainty. 
 Scenario uncertainty - magnitude and probability of impacts.  
 Effectiveness of mitigation measures. 
 Interactions between variables. 
 Reliability of data / evidence / indicators of infestation. 
 Lack of unity amongst scientists over nature of pest / disease, causation or impacts. 
 Profile of stakeholder and public concern. 
 Economic impacts. 
 Institutional impacts - e.g. reputational damage. 
 Legal implications. 
 
 
 
In situations of deep uncertainty and / or situations where published findings require a high 
degree of distillation and interpretation, the role of scientists and technical specialists places 
a strong reliance on expert judgement.  Critically, expert judgement in such contexts 
embodies, not only providing informed opinion over key variables and how they operate but, 
providing an appreciation of aspects over which there is uncertainty and any arising 
implications.  For the scientist, a core challenge is to portray uncertainties in ways that are 
accessible to target audiences but which, at the same time, do not convey the impression 
that science in the area is fundamentally speculative offering no clear way forward.     
 
In the context of evidence based public policy, it is widely recognised that there is an inherent 
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tension between the desire for clarity, certainty and lack of ambiguity within policy strategy 
and delivery functions and the ambiguity, uncertainty and associated debate that routinely 
characterises the practical applications of scientific insight (see, for example, Solesbury 2001).  
"However, effective communication of uncertainties to policy makers and other 
stakeholders is important, uncertainties have implications, influence policy strategy, 
what is claimed and [has] real world impacts" (Wardekker et al, 2008).  
 
Policy delivery uncertainties  
 
Evidence based public policy is more than the identification of sources of harm, determining 
measures for its control and caveating conclusions through acknowledging uncertainties in 
the underpinning (biological) science.   
 
From the perspective of propagating the adoption of mitigation measures to address the 
threats posed by pests and diseases, significant uncertainties surrounds the capacity of 
g/Government and its Agencies to achieve this.  Issues of behaviour change are central to this 
process, particularly where there is a desire to motivate others e.g. landowners, growers, 
importers, suppliers and the general public to behave differently; most acutely in the absence 
of dedicated legislation.  A number of sources of uncertainty surrounding policy delivery are 
summarised in Table 2 below. 
 
An appreciation of uncertainties of this nature is potentially of high relevance to policy 
makers, in addition to their appreciation of uncertainty over natural science components.  
There have been extensive evidence reviews in other public policy domains that address 
issues relating to (i) - (vi) in Table 2.  Their findings will not be discussed here as, while 
complementary, they lie outside the scope of this review.  
 
The purpose of highlighting uncertainties surrounding policy delivery is that such 
considerations are of relevance to assumptions made in the risk assessment regarding 
mitigation measures and their impact.  This distinction also serves to highlight the fact that 
the boundaries of uncertainty over risk control extend beyond the process of risk assessment. 
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Table 2  Examples of sources of uncertainty in policy delivery 
 
        
i. Reactions / orientations of stakeholders to the pest or disease. 
ii. Reactions / orientations of stakeholders to the proposed measures. 
iii. The extent of variability in stakeholder perspectives (referenced to i and ii). 
iv. The most appropriate methods for engaging with stakeholders. 
v. The most effective models / techniques for influencing stakeholder attitudes and 
behaviour e.g. motivating adoption of engineering controls / good practice.  
vi. The capacity of government bodies and surrogates to realise the necessary metrics of 
impact on target populations to render mitigation measure effectiveness. 
vii. And more... 
 
 
 
4. Communicating uncertainty  
 
“Historically, the most common approach to uncertainty in policy analysis has been to 
ignore it” (Morgan and Herrion, p.43)   
 
We will first establish a framework for considering the communication of risk and uncertainty 
within which to explicitly consider the communication of uncertainty within the PHRR.   
 
Communication is a process of exchange of information.  A seminal National Research 
Council publication (1989) notes that this consists of the transfer of risk information often 
from experts to non-experts and back again.  These risk messages consist of ‘(1) facts or 
hypotheses about the level of risk that exists within a system; (2) the significance or meaning 
of the risk relative to other issues of concern; or (3) decisions, actions or policies that may be 
undertaken to control it”. It is important to note here that, when we refer to the risk 
information that is exchanged – we are talking much more broadly than elements relating to 
the hazard / vector.  As NRC make clear, relevant exchanges also, “express concerns, opinions 
or reactions to risk messages or to legal or institutional arrangements for risk management” 
(p.21).     
 
In fact, to characterise communication as a two way exchange is at risk of over simplification.  
Information about uncertainty takes place in multiple, simultaneous and asynchronous 
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exchanges between non-experts and between experts as well as between experts and non-
experts.  So for example, in the context of the risk register, on the one hand we are 
considering the way in which (e.g.) policy officials make sense of the way in which uncertainty 
around plant health and disease is communicated to them by scientists but of course policy 
officials in turn are often required in turn to communicate risk and uncertainty both to 
ministers and possibly to concerned stakeholders and publics – and in anticipation of doing 
so are often highly sensitised to their potential responses. 
 
 
Headline findings 
 
 There are three dimensions of communication - micro, process and macro. 
 
 The focus of concern / need for information on uncertainty may vary between stakeholders. 
 
 The focus of concern / need for information on uncertainty may vary as threats from pests or 
diseases and institutional reactions to them mature. 
 
 There may be benefits from a layered approach to communicating uncertainties 
 
 Identification of a single policy option may be inconsistent with acknowledgement of uncertainty  
and   obscure a clear view of areas of agreement and disagreement and the reasons that lie behind 
these. 
 
 One of the challenges for  communication of uncertainty in relation to a risk register is that the  
process for identifying uncertainties should be proportionate to the process for characterising  
the risk and congruent  with the purpose of the risk register. 
 
 Although it may not be acknowledged, the characterisation of risk and uncertainty is linked to values 
and preferences 
 
 
A communication framework 
 
"Effective risk communication is important.  Without it the most carefully performed risk 
analysis may be useless... Effective risk communication involves a variety of questions, some 
fairly narrow and technical others ...broad." (Ibeckk and Morgan, 1987). 
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Before proceeding, it is worth considering in more detail what is meant by communication in 
the context of risk and uncertainty; in particular with respect to defining parameters and 
boundaries.   
 
Mere mention of the words stakeholder and communication in a room full or policy makers 
and technical specialists is prone to elicit a range of foci.  Variously: complexity of language, 
font size, presentation medium, interactive display, trust in source and similar will all likely be 
cited.  All, and more, are relevant.  Because the word communication means different things 
to different people, and can bring different elements to mind when mentioned, it is perhaps 
useful to think of communication elements as requiring consideration at three levels (refer to 
Figure 1): 
 
 At the most basic (micro) level communication is about simplifying complex 
information to increase comprehension, extending issues of format etc.  An, 
essentially, technical process on which there is extensive textbook guidance and other 
published insight (see section 8). 
 Beyond this lie elements relating to characterising the target audience(s) and ensuring 
that messages are of good fit with their informational needs, combined with mapping 
the most effective transmission mode(s) / pathway(s).  This can, and necessarily 
should, involve more than standard stakeholder mapping; and may benefit from 
commissioning a modest amount of empirical research with stakeholders.  The mental 
models approach summarised in section 7 represents a useful technique in this 
respect. 
 At a macro level lie elements relating to stakeholder perceptions of the relationship 
between the source (communicator) and the issue under consideration, i.e. the 
impact of even the best technically crafted and delivered message will be of limited 
impact if the source is not viewed as credible or trustworthy.   
 
All three components are not relevant to all communications.  However, judgement over 
scope needs to take place at an early stage.   
 A focus on micro elements alone may prove sufficient when dealing with a simple, 
non-controversial issue, where the information preferences and needs of the target 
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audience(s) are already well mapped.   
 Where there are gaps in communicator knowledge regarding: the information needs 
of the target audience(s) (e.g. extant mental models of the issue), effective 
communication channel(s) and projected metrics of impact, process elements need to 
be considered.    
 When dealing with complex issues, and / or multiple target audiences with different 
needs / understandings (mental models), using different communication channels, 
particularly for emotive high profile issues, all three components may need to be 
considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Concentric Model of Communication 
 
The mandate to communicate uncertainty 
 
It is useful to briefly consider the mandate to communicate and to be transparent about 
uncertainty.  Being transparent about uncertainty contributes to several of the desirable 
principles involved in assessing risk  (Grey et al., 1998).  The increasing requirement for 
transparency in risk management (House of Lords, 2000) is arguably rooted in the 
examination and interrogation of the science and policy interface following the BSE crisis.   
The government responses to the BSE Inquiry itself was explicit about this, noting, ‘the need 
to be open about uncertainty and to make the level of uncertainly clear when communicating 
with the public’ (HM Government, 2001).   
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The work of Stirling (2010) is explicit regarding the value of characterising and 
communicating scientific uncertainty.  However, the focus of his thesis is not on the process 
of communication per se, rather it is on the process of producing what will then form the 
contents of that communication.   His influential framework is explicit about the importance 
of acknowledging incomplete knowledge and of avoiding “the temptation to treat every 
problem as a risk nail, to be reduced by a probabilistic hammer” (p.1030).  When knowledge 
of probabilities is problematic (as it is under uncertainty) Stirling argues that the plural and 
conditional nature of knowledge should be met with plural and conditional methods of 
science-based advice.  A single interpretation masks the uncertainty and also renders invisible 
the assumptions that have been made in order to arrive at that interpretation, as well as 
other equally plausible interpretations.  In essence, the case that Stirling makes is that the 
development and communication of policy options should reflect the completeness of our 
knowledge.  It is also argued that, although of course not ruling out conflict between 
stakeholders, presenting uncertainty in a way that discourages single conclusive policy 
interpretations, reconfigures the inter group dynamics away from a ‘winner takes it all’ 
scenario.  More recently, a more traditional risk analysis scholar has concurred with this view.  
Morgan disagreed with the view expressed by Bolger and Rowe (2015) that, “for policy 
making a single representation of the uncertain quantity and related probability is needed” – 
noting that, it may be desired, but that such a representation will be likely to obscure what 
might be important disagreements, the reasoning behind which it is important for policy 
makers to know about.   
 
Fischhoff (2015) is another risk scholar that is explicit about the value of communicating 
uncertainty: ‘…conveying uncertainty is essential to science communication’ (p.13664).  He 
argues that working out what do first means deciding what the decision to be made is about.  
Is it a decision about whether it is time to act? About which of several fixed options is the 
best? Or is it about which potential options are possible?  For all of these types of decision 
though uncertainty needs to be dealt with in the same way: 
 
“(i) Characterizing uncertainty, by identifying the issues most relevant to the choice; 
(ii) assessing uncertainty, by summarising that information in a useful form; and (iii) 
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conveying uncertainty by creating messages that afford decision makers the detail 
that their choices warrant” (p.13664) 
 
The decisions in the Plant Health Risk Register are essentially about deciding whether and 
when to act.  He suggests a process for characterising and assessing uncertainty that enables 
a communication along the following lines:  
 
‘Considering the variability of the evidence and my assessments of the internal validity 
of the studies that collected it, their relevance to the decision making domain and the 
strength of the underlying science, I am 95% certain that the true value of the critical 
outcome is between Y and Z 
 
What are the challenges of communicating uncertainty within the risk register? 
 
No matter what method or combination of methods is used to characterise uncertainty 
within the risk register, as we move on to consider the challenges in communicating 
uncertainty, it is important to note the possible benefits - in theory at least - of incorporating 
uncertainty assessment within the risk register.  These might at least include the potential for 
highlighting uncertainties that are relevant to decisions around prioritisation of mitigation 
actions, or help identify uncertainties where there would be value from further investigation.  
 
This draws on the work of Levin (2006) who argues that to enable well founded regulatory 
decision making, decision makers should be informed about all ‘decision relevant uncertainty’ 
which means specifying, ‘(1) the character and degree of uncertainty about the assessment 
variables, (2) the possibility of reducing the uncertainty, and (3) the degree of agreement 
among experts. Furthermore, it is required that (4) the information covered by the previous 
conditions is presented in a clear and comprehensible way.”.   
 
However risk registers have some particular characteristics that arguably constrain the 
options that there are for depicting uncertainty.  Note, for example, the observation of 
Breakwell (2014) about risk registers: 
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“the message here to managers must be to keep the treatment of these ratings 
simple. They are not engaged in a statistical exercise.  Risk mapping should be used as 
a tool for raising awareness and improving foresight” (p.224)  
 
The take home point here is that risk registers are a simple tool.  The process by which risks 
are characterised is relatively simple – certainly much more than is the case for a pest risk 
analysis. Additionally the process of deriving uncertainty should be cost effective and fit for 
purpose.  The process for identifying and characterising uncertainty should be proportionate 
to the process for characterising the risk and congruent with the prioritisation purpose of the 
PHRR – and, of course, with the number of pest diseases in the PHRR.   
The ‘congruence principle’ (Wallsten & Budescu, 1995) suggests that this sense of 
proportionality is rather important: people are more likely to value and accept expressions of 
uncertainty, the precision of which are in line with their expectations of the uncertainty in 
the domain.  Thus, a format for expressing uncertainty that matches the expectations for the 
domain should be chosen.  However, we can extend this point and suggest that it is 
important that any expressions of uncertainty that are to become embedded in the PHRR are 
not seen as incongruent either with the  simplicity of a risk register, with the process of 
deriving uncertainty estimates, or its prioritisation purposes.  
 
5. Reasons for (expert) reservations about communicating 
uncertainty 
 
The changing profile of public and stakeholder concern about tree disease has recently been 
articulated within a consideration of the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) 
(Pidgeon & Barnett, 2013).  Here, SARF was used to situate an exploration of the transition – 
in a relatively short space of time - from a scenario where the need to increase public 
concern was noted, to one where there was political concern about heightened levels of 
public concern.  The authors argued that this changing pattern of concern was explicable in 
the context of a range of factors shaping public perceptions:  
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“an apparently novel pathogen posing an inevitability of disease spread and 
irreversibility once a site has been infected, a threat to a highly valued part of the 
British landscape and symbol of identity, and uncertainty about the outbreak causes 
and underlying science”.    
 
It is against this backdrop that we can consider possible grounds for expert reluctance and 
reservation around communicating uncertainty.  
 
In the wake of the post BSE Phillips Report, experts are well aware of the expectation that 
uncertainty should be communicated.  As noted earlier, Frewer and Salter (2007) argued that 
increased transparency lays bare uncertainties and variability in risk assessment but insofar 
they are not articulated within the risk communication process, this has the potential to 
increase distrust and concern.  Paradoxically, one reason for expert reluctance to 
communicate uncertainty is that it is the articulation of uncertainty that will cause distrust 
and disquiet of publics and stakeholders to increase with the possibility of this translating into 
even more tangible political pressures. Wynne (1992) characterises those concerns as 
follows: 
 
“In addition, public distrust in science and scientific institutions would increase and 
panic and confusion regarding the impact of a given hazard on human health and the 
environment result”  
 
Certainly there is evidence that expert reluctance to be explicit about uncertainty, in part, 
stems from the belief that the public require assurance or that this will undermine expertise.  
When expert views about the public reception of uncertainty were explored, the dominant 
characterisation of the public was one where they were vast as unable to understand the 
process of science.  Experts also made a link between increased exposure to information 
about risk uncertainty and a decline in public confidence in science.  It was concluded that 
the remedy to this was simply to be to produce more, better and clearer information aimed 
at lay stakeholder – a further manifestation of the intuitive, but widely discredited, 
knowledge-deficit assumption.   
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Headline findings 
 Policy officials are sensitised to the scenario that the communication of uncertainty 
around tree disease may cause concern and conflict that they believe are 
unwarranted.  
 Distrust and reputational damage may result from obscuring uncertainty 
 Given that many risks are not experienced directly, the media are key in re-presenting 
these  
 The media report much more than technical estimates of risk and uncertainty. The 
way in which events are framed may highlight uncertainties that are not part of 
technical estimates – for example uncertainties about how the risk is being managed.  
 A simple view that the media always sensationalise and exaggerate is not backed up 
by evidence although scientific uncertainty may be depicted as a cause for concern 
through a focus on social aspects of uncertainty.  
 The characteristics of risk that attract media attention are well established and the 
depiction of uncertainty around (e.g.) who is to blame, conflict, cover up, what the 
implications are likely to further consolidate this attention 
 An appreciation of journalistic practices will increase policy understandings of what is 
newsworthy and why and of the ways in which the story is likely to be covered  
 
Given that the perception of uncertainty is, indeed, one of the conditions that can be linked 
to an escalation of public concern, this may sponsor concern amongst scientists and policy 
makers that the communication of acknowledged uncertainty may act as a pivot point, 
triggering unwanted intensification of the perceived risk (Breakwell & Barnett, 2001).  There 
may be particular apprehension, or indeed the incomprehension on the part of experts 
where these initial concerns are linked to further ‘ripple effects’ such as:  
 
“market impacts (perhaps through consumer avoidance of a product, country or area), 
calls for regulatory constraints, litigation, community opposition, loss of credibility and 
trust, stigmatisation of a facility or community, and investor flight”. (p.8)  
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One of the escalations that experts may fear is that being explicit about uncertainty may 
bring an increased likelihood of conflict with stakeholders.  Arguably, however, conflict and 
reputational damage is as least as likely to result from obscuring uncertainty.  Secondly, it 
should not be assumed that increased public or stakeholder concern – or the conflict that can 
be linked to this - is always undesirable.  Lay action and concern can be desirable where, for 
example, experts are seeking to increase appreciations of risk and encourage preventative 
actions.  Thirdly, a historical perspective makes it clear that the actions of interest groups and 
stakeholders may be generative of important social change.  Pidgeon and Barnett provide 
examples of this in relation to workplace safety regulations and right to know legislation 
around sex offenders.   
 
The role of the media 
 
Both scientific experts and policy officials may have particular concerns around media 
reporting of risk and uncertainty, in particular that the media plays a key role in affecting 
public perceptions of risk - by intensifying concern in a way that is disproportionate and 
unwarranted in the eyes of experts.  We will, thus, consider the evidence for media portrayal 
of risk as well as considering how best to communicate risk and uncertainty to the media.    
 
SARF makes it clear that our experiences of risk and the ways in which we makes sense of it 
are a product of how societies, institutions, organisations and individuals (in SARF terms, 
‘stations of amplification’) process assessments of the risk as well as a product of any direct 
experiences that we may have.  Given that many risks are not experienced directly, the 
indirect experiences that we have through being exposed to and making sense of information 
about them - are crucial.  Unsurprisingly then, within SARF the media are considered as a key 
station of social amplification.    
 
“Particularly important in shaping group and individual views of risk are the extent of 
media coverage; the volume of information provided; the ways in which the risk is 
framed; interpretations of messages concerning the risk; and the symbols, metaphors, 
and discourse enlisted in depicting and characterizing the risk” Kasperson & Kasperson 
(1996). 
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When using SARF as a framework within which to consider public concern around Chalara 
and tree disease more generally, Pidgeon and Barnett (2013) note that media coverage could 
not be dismissed as uninformed or sensationalist, although the tone of many headlines were 
redolent of an impending crisis linked to questions as to who was responsible for this state of 
affairs.   
 
There are two main themes to be considered here:  (a) How the media report risk and 
uncertainty and why, and (b) the relationship between media coverage and non-expert/lay 
views of risk and uncertainty  
 
How do the media report risk? 
 
It should be made clear at the outset that, although we are talking about ‘the media’ - as is 
the norm within SARF – in fact there are many versions of the media – local, national, 
newspapers – tabloid and broadsheet – TV, radio and of course increasingly there are myriad 
ways in which people interact with media online, a proliferation of user generated content; 
increasing numbers of both sources and channels.  This online media has, thus far, received 
extremely limited consideration in the risk literature and no doubt this, and the way it is used 
alongside offline sources – is likely to be a focus of future research activity.  
 
Technical and expert estimates of risk, at best, are only one part of what the media report.  
Where they are reported it is likely to be done in the context of conflicting political goals 
(Nelkin, 1991) and a range of competing stakeholder economic, political and social values. 
Coverage of events is woven into an established set of narratives around science, the 
management of risk and of accountability.   
 
In terms of how media practices affect the way in which risk is dealt with, the concept of 
‘framing’ is important.  This refers to the ways in which, ‘news coverage draws boundaries 
around an event or issue, classifying it as an instance of “X” rather than “Y” (Murdock et al., 
2003)’.  The framing of an event is achieved through links to similar past events, where 
images and metaphors play a key role in constructing that similarity.  This similarity may bear 
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little relation to expert interpretations of the event.  For example, early reporting of 
genetically modified foods and whether or not they may be linked to unanticipated health 
impacts often anchored such questions to the BSE crisis (Marris, 2001).  Where there is 
significant uncertainty, this also means that the framing of the issue is open to contestation 
between interested parties.  As we will see in the next section, the uncertainties that non 
experts are interested in tend not to mirror the narrower technical definitions of uncertainty 
considered by experts, but concern broader uncertainties around (e.g.) the cause, or what 
the best ways of managing the risk are.  
 
Media coverage is not simply text based and may crystallise around symbols, or visual images 
that exert a strong positioning power on public attention (Joffe, 2008), triggering a range of 
powerful connotations that capture public sentiment.  The form this takes may vary, ranging 
from humour through to images of a holocaust.  Sometimes, metaphors intentionally used as 
part of risk communication strategies can assume a level of significance that is unwanted, 
extending far beyond the intentions of the communicator.  For example, the metaphor of 
fighting a war was used as part of the call to action in relation to foot and mouth disease in 
the UK; later this became associated with images resonant of a war zone.  In relation to tree 
disease, Pidgeon and Barnett (2013) suggest that “given the strong symbolic meanings of 
woods and trees that are linked to iconic landscapes it would be advisable for Defra to be 
attentive to any defining images that emerge around Chalara or tree disease more generally 
as they may come to embody defining views of what is at risk and who is responsible for 
this”.  
 
When considering the role of the media in social amplification of risk, the general picture is 
unsurprisingly that – ‘it’s complicated’. However Freudenburg (1996) suggests that the view 
of scientific experts on the matter is rather simple – there is widespread agreement that ‘the 
media often distort or exaggerate’ and that a myriad of media created ‘scares’ shape public 
perceptions of risk.  Some risk scholars have also concurred with the view that media 
reporting is sensationalist and exaggerated (see an overview in Wahberg and Sjoberg, 2000).    
Less extreme variants of this position are that a media focus on balance has the effect of 
undermining evidence for safety or that even though the text may be proportionate the 
nature of the photos and headlines undermines this (Mazhur, 1984).    
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The early findings of Combs and Slovic (1979) were that media coverage is largely unrelated 
to numbers of fatalities but to other characteristics of the situation (see Table 2 below).  Even 
within the trajectory of a particular event there are discrepancies between the incidence and 
the media coverage  (Miller & Reilly, 1995) i.e. increasing incidence of salmonella and 
decreasing media coverage of the outbreak.  
 
However other studies have argued that media coverage has been arguably more low-key 
than the experts might suggest was warranted.  For example, in a study of Chernobyl, it was 
concluded that there was a lack of risk information but what was reported was proportionate 
and even-handed (Friedman, 1987). In empirical examinations of media reporting some 
support has been found for the hypothesis that in fact the media ‘de-emphasise the severity 
of hazard events’ (Freudenberg, 1996).  Media reporting of ‘the pill scare’ (Barnett & 
Breakwell, 2003) suggests that journalists were aware of the impact of previous reporting on 
the birth control pill and women’s contraceptive practices and tailored subsequent reporting 
to avoid any repeat of this.  
 
The fact that, generally, the volume of media coverage does not parallel expert assessments 
of risk is neither surprising nor perverse, given both the agenda of the media (to provide 
‘infotainment’) and the focus on aspects of the risk other than probability and consequence.  
Media reporting of risk, like public perceptions of risk, can often reflect values, identities and 
assessments of institutional competence.  Alongside this, reporting technical uncertainties is 
just one part of the story.  The focus may often be on other, more social, dimensions of 
uncertainty – who is responsible? what is being done about the situation? and so on.  This 
was the case in a study of chronic wasting disease where the uncertainties that were 
highlighted concerned how it came about, how it was transmitted and its possible effects 
(Heberlein & Stedman, 2009).  These authors suggest that various strategies, such as 
personalising the responses of scientists, were used to translate ‘normal’ scientific 
uncertainty into a cause for concern.  
 
Other work on media effects has sought to identify the characteristics of an issue which 
attract the greatest media attention - see Table 3 below  
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Table 3: Media triggers - adapted from Department of Health (1999) 
 
A possible risk to public health is more likely to become a major story if the following are 
prominent or can readily be made to become so: 
 
• Questions of blame 
• Alleged secrets and attempted cover-ups 
• Human interest through identifiable heroes, villains, dupes etc. (as well as victims) 
• Links with existing high-profile issues or personalities 
• Conflict 
• Signal value: the story as a portent of further ills (‘what next?’) 
• Many people exposed to the risk, even if at low levels (‘it could be you!’) 
• Strong visual impact (e.g. pictures of suffering) 
• Links to sex and/or crime 
 
 
The Pidgeon & Barnett (2013) report on Chalara and the social amplification of risk suggested 
that several of these factors were applicable:  
 
‘widespread exposure of the tree population, visual impact (images of both healthy and 
infected trees), the possibility of blame for allowing a known risk to enter the UK, 
potential conflict along ideologically significant lines (e.g. between the UK and other 
EU governments regarding risk control measures), and high signal value (what does 
this episode portend about other threats to tree health and plant biosecurity, or about 
the risks from the systems for managing the natural environment?). (p.7)  
  
In line with this, early work by Frewer et al.  (1993) depicts the way in which media risk 
reporting tends to be different for hazards (and perpetrators) with different characteristics.  
It was also the case that where numbers and probabilities were mentioned, conflict, 
uncertainty and pressure group activities were not – and vice versa.  Research has 
demonstrated that the presentation of risk in local media are sensitive to qualities of the 
community in which they are located (Griffin et al. 1995). 
 
Petts et al. (2001) note three key developments in the media landscape: the increase in 
number of NGO’s and their increasing professionalization; the increased visibility of the 
concept of ‘spin’ and associated growth of the public relations industry, and; the rapid rise of 
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the internet.  In terms of the significance for the consideration of the communication of risk 
and uncertainty in the media, since the time of Petts’ analysis this has arguably been eclipsed 
by the risk in user generated content in social media.   
 
Underlying these developments however, Petts et al. (2001) there are a series of consistent 
criteria for news selection (see Table 4)  
 
Table 4: Criteria of news selection around the reporting of risk and environmental issues 
• An orientation to events. News focuses on interruptions to the normal flow of activity (an 
accident, a protest, a political speech, a new piece of research) not on underlying processes or 
continually unfolding conditions. As a consequence, the media may fail to report on risks until 
some dramatic event occurs, leaving accidents and illnesses that kill people every day of the 
year unreported  
• Novelty. There is a preference for material that introduces new issues or moves an existing 
story on. This produces relatively compressed issue-attention cycles. Stories die quickly and 
reappear only if another newsworthy event breaks, producing a pattern of peaks and troughs. 
• Scale. Events are more newsworthy if they involve or affect large numbers of people or have 
wide ranging implications for the way people conduct their everyday lives. 
• Conflict and drama. News trades in material that involves controversy and /or dramatises the 
seriousness of actual or potential risks. Journalists themselves talk about the attractions of 
scientific controversy. As media coverage of controversy increases so does public opposition. 
However, as media reporting tails off so do public risk perceptions, regardless of whether the 
reporting is positive or negative. Research also suggests that by drawing attention to 
disagreements amongst experts and providing space for different accounts, media may convey 
the impression that there is no agreed view on a particular risk, leading the public to ‘err on the 
side of safety’. 
• Resonance. News taps into existing public anxieties and frames stories in terms of already 
familiar events and scenarios. The coverage of GM foods, for example, consistently drew on 
pre-existing templates and public concern over BSE.  
• Personalisation. News seeks to invest public issues with human faces by focussing on key actors 
or presenting ideal typical consumers or victims. 
• Domestication. News often looks into the immediate consequences for everyday life in 
households and families. A study of the BBC looking at news bulletins and what provides an 
item’s appeal and what prevents it being effective, found that stories on genetics, medicine, 
and the environment that established their relevance to individual lives roused particular 
interest - ‘pure science’ did not. 
• Visualisation. News organisations are continually searching for images that crystallise their 
interpretation of an event or issue. The Daily Mirror’s front page, published at the peak of the 
initial controversy over GM foods early in 1999, showing the Prime Minister as Frankenstein’s 
monster is a particularly vivid example. 
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Journalistic practices 
 
In considering how the media communicate uncertainty, it is important to consider the way 
in which this is shaped by journalistic practices and norms (Bakir, 2010).  The way in which 
information is provided to the media about uncertainty should take account of these 
processes.  It is also useful in understanding how journalists are likely to depict uncertainty 
and explain why what is reported may bear little relationship to the hazard landscape as seen 
by risk assessors (Hughes et al. 2006).   De Loe (1999) considers the characteristics of the 
newspapers to include difficulty in maintaining a focus on both positive and negative aspects 
of an issue, simplification of complex issues to increase accessibility, a focus on 
newsworthiness for a season until attention shifts to new issues.  Long term continuous 
complex or multi-causal risks tend to be ignored - rather the preference is for a focus on 
events.  
 
Breakwell (2014) summarises the results of an interview study with journalists about the way 
in which they report risk issues.  The main findings from this are summarised in Table 5 
 
Table 5: Journalist perceptions as to how they report stories about hazards and risks 
 
• ‘Scare stories’ are a particular category of reporting that involve the possibility of harm to 
many/vulnerable people where that harm is largely invisible/long term/possibly fatal.  They are 
good for audience figures. They may be a by-product of media re-presentation facts and 
figures.  Commercial pressures make it likely that scare stories will always be part of the media 
landscape 
• What experts may refer to as sensationalism is considered to be infotainment – providing 
information in an entertaining manner.  Thus stories with no/minimal risk are less likely to be 
covered  
• Generally journalists said that they tended to avoid real science in their risk stories – and they 
did not see their lack of expertise in this area as a problem 
• Individual journalists and editors have preferences for particular types of stories and a history 
of examples to call upon to frame new stories 
• Journalists valued proactive information delivery (see also Table 5)  
• When asked about reporting events where there is little certainty, journalists said that 
uncertainly per se was not considered newsworthy nor was it seen as particularly difficult to 
handle.  There was some cynicism about motives for reporting uncertainty but there was 
complete agreement that uncertainty should be communicated to them early on 
 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
It is useful to consider insights of the evaluation of how well uncertainty was communicated 
to the media in the very challenging context of the 2009 influenza pandemic.  (See Table 6 
below)  
 
Table 6: Insights about communicating with the media about uncertainty from the 
Independent review of the UK response to the 2009 influenza pandemic 
 
• Maintaining public, professional and media confidence in the government’s response was 
crucial to actually delivering the response itself 
• CMO (England) took great care in his media briefings to explain that numbers represented 
reasonable worst-case estimates against which to plan, and not predictions, and a number 
of journalists did report the figures responsibly. However, this was not always the case, and 
the impression emerged that the government was ‘predicting’ 65,000 deaths. This figure 
was then revised down significantly in the subsequent revisions. 
• The concept of reasonable worst case estimates was difficult to communicate 
• The Science Media Centre could be a useful partner in developing public understanding of 
pandemics in normal times – i.e. not during a pandemic 
• Discussions with journalists demonstrated that they believed that the public were 
comfortable with the idea of there being uncertainty over the development of the 
pandemic. However use of the planning assumption figures (in the absence of any others) 
led to the Chief Medical Officer in England citing the ‘reasonable worst case’ planning 
assumption being ‘widely reported in headlines in somewhat alarmist terms’.  This also 
contrasted with what could be observed on the ground in terms of severity and could have 
risked damaging government credibility 
• The Science Media Centre played an important role in helping to facilitate engagement 
between the media and independent expert scientists.  More generally, the role that such 
organisations can play in creating a more informed debate that can help the government 
better communicate the level of risk and uncertainty was noted. 
• Stronger horizon-scanning of media reporting to identify emerging themes and issues of 
concern may have helped DH to more proactively challenge misunderstandings and public 
concerns. 
• Journalists across the UK praised the regular media briefings that took place – saying the 
levels of information given were unprecedented in a public health emergency. For their 
part, ministers and officials considered most media coverage to have been responsible and 
balanced. 
• There is a clear lesson that treating the media as being responsible, and taking the time to 
explain and contextualise information, encouraged responsible reporting. 
• Much depended on journalists being able to physically attend the briefings, as information 
was not proactively sent to those not able to do so. In the future new ways  of proactively 
engaging with journalists should be considered e.g. podcasts and transcriptions of media 
briefings 
 
 
 
Petts et al (2001) draw together a range of evidence to persuasively make the case that 
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“The media are not transmitters of official information on risk but active interpreters 
and mediators, middle-men on the field of play, who seek to resonate with social 
preferences and concerns and in so doing stake and maintain their position.  They are 
entrepreneurs of meaning converting the raw material of official information and 
events into products which bear their particular market ‘badges’ and presentational 
styles”. (p.94)  
 
What are lay responses to reporting of risk and uncertainty? 
 
Moving on to consider the topic that perhaps receives the most attention, by volume, – does 
the media influence public responses to risk and uncertainty or simply reflect such?  
 
“That the public appear concerned about a risk that risk managers and decision-
makers are not concerned about is often viewed as the fault of the media”. (Petts et al. 
2001)  
 
Early work suggested that this was indeed the case, although considerable media research 
refutes this interpretation.  It has been suggested that the volume of coverage (saturation) is 
important in affecting public opinion in a negative direction – independently of whether the 
content of risk reporting is negative or not (Mazhur & Lee, 1993).  This is explainable in terms 
of innate cognitive bias, specifically a manifestation of availability bias (see Section 7 below), 
i.e. more frequent coverage renders risk information more easily brought to mind.  On a 
methodological point however, it is important to note that much of the research linking risk 
perception and media coverage is correlational, i.e. it may also be the case that media 
coverage picks up on and is in tune with (likely) public sensibilities around an issue.  This, 
indeed, is one conclusion of the study of the media and social amplification of risk by Petts et 
al. who conlcude that, “the media can only amplify or attenuate risk if they capture or 
resonate with an existing public mood, and even then the media are not alone in this 
function”.  The media may play an important role in setting agendas for public concern - that 
is, that the media don’t tell us what to think rather they tell us what to think about 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972)  
 
Alongside this there has been considerable work over recent years that undermines the 
model of people being susceptible to a dominant media.  This perspective point to how active 
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people are in their interpretation and use of the media.  This does not mean that the media is 
not influential, or that a different interpretation from that offered by the media will 
necessarily result, but it does mean that influence of the media is mediated by people’s 
everyday experiences, social interactions and the cultural resources that they possess 
(Kitzinger, 1999)  
 
The research by Petts et al. shows that people actively interrogate risk information, they are 
not passive recipients and they frequently draw on multiple sources in order to make sense 
of risk information, seeking to take control - interpreting information in ways that allow them 
to do this where possible and (ideally) defaulting to filtering what they are presented with 
through frequently rather vague and impressionistic evaluations trust in the source, where it 
is not possible.   
 
Implications for communicating risk and uncertainty 
 
In the first instance here, it is instructive to view the BBC editorial guidelines to guide 
journalistic practice for reporting risk and to consider what implications these may have for 
the communication of uncertainty7. 
 
BBC Editorial Guidelines for Reporting Risk 
 
Using the following checklist can help ensure the context is clear and avoid distortion of the 
risk. 
 
• What exactly is the risk, how big is it, and who does it affect? 
• Can the audience judge the significance of any statistics or other research? Is the reporting 
clear about how any risk has been measured - for example the size of any research sample, 
margin of error, the source of any figures and the sponsor of the research? 
• If you are reporting a change in the level of risk, have you clearly stated the baseline 
figure? (A 100% increase or doubling of a problem that affects one person in two million 
will still only affect one in a million.) 
• Is it more appropriate and measured to ask "How safe is this?", rather than "Is this 100% 
safe?" 
• If a contributor's view runs contrary to majority expert opinion, is that clear in our report, 
questions and casting of any discussion? 
                                                     
7 BBC (2010) Reporting Risk Guidelines, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/advice/reportingrisk/reportingriskch.shtml (accessed 21 Feb 2013) 
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• We should consider the impact on public perceptions of risk if we feature emotional 
pictures and personal testimony. 
• Is there an everyday comparison that may make the size of the reported risk easier to 
understand? (For example, "it's as risky as crossing the road once a day") 
• Would information about comparative risks help the audience to put the risk in context 
and make properly informed choices? Consider for example, causing undue worry about 
safety of the railways could lead audiences to migrate to the roads unaware that the safety 
risk is many times greater. 
• Can the audience be given sources of further information? 
 
 
From the material we have considered, it is possible to consider some of the implications of 
this for communicating risk and uncertainty.  These particularly draw on the work of 
Breakwell (2014) and Petts et al. (2001).  
 
• Media coverage of risk and any attendant uncertainties is not simply about that 
particular event – rather its coverage is set within and intertwined with an established 
set of narratives around science, management of risk and accountability and 
alongside other - possibly unrelated events – also being covered at that time.  This 
perspective should constrain any expert ambitions as to how they might be able to 
shape the coverage of any particular event - still less affect the impact that this has.   
 
• As elsewhere – for organisations designing communications to communicate 
uncertainty, it is vital to consider what it is that stakeholders and public(s) want to 
know rather than keeping the focus on what it is that experts think they should be 
told.  Work is needed to discover what it is that people want to know and how this is 
different for different groups of people.  The importance of understanding lay mental 
models of risk are thus important.  This should be done on an ongoing – not one off – 
basis.  
 
• This is also important in making decisions about the language that will be used.  For 
example within the Hine report on the evaluation of the swine flu pandemic it was 
noted that some of the terms used in the communication were not clear:  ‘pandemic’ 
was taken to mean a very severe disease, rather than referring to the geographical 
nature of its spread.  ‘Planning assumptions’ was often taken to mean ‘likely events’.  
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Early empirical work would help identify these issues which can lead to reputational 
damage.    
 
• Provide relatively concise accurate lay descriptions alongside more detailed 
information – bearing in mind that media sources may (a) produce the more concise 
summary themselves if you don’t and (b) tend to be reticent about including detailed 
scientific information.  
 
• Where it is desirable to maintain coverage of a story - new information, commentary 
or interpretation will need to be fed to the media. 
 
• Managing the representation of a controversy is likely to mean active involvement 
rather than silence. 
 
• A spokesperson for scientists or policy officials should ideally be someone who can 
tell a story in way that commands attention and appeals to a wide audience.  Media 
sources should also have access to someone that can explain scientific information in 
a way they can relate to 
 
• Identify the frames that are being used to report particular stories by particular 
journalists.  This is necessary in order to refine a relevant refutation and to anticipate 
the most likely direction of subsequent coverage.  
 
• Be proactive in providing information to the media – this is valued - and avoids an 
information vacuum – which will be filled.  
 
• Take advantage of resources like the Science Media Centre 
 
• Provide the media with regular information about uncertainty on key risk issues and 
link the uncertainties with a description of what is being done (both in response to 
the risk and to resolve the uncertainty)  
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• Be proactive in use of the images and symbols which are important to, and resonate 
with, lay publics and use visual resources to express key points. 
 
 
6. What is the evidence about lay responses to uncertainty? 
 
There are a number of challenges that arise when communicating uncertainty to non-expert 
audiences.  Certainly, policy officials will prefer to receive unambiguous messages that 
provide clear evidence for particular courses of action.  However, what do we know, more 
generally, about non expert perceptions and preferences for receiving information about 
uncertainty?  Following the BSE crisis, there is evidence to suggest that people believe that 
uncertainty is unavoidable – and that denying or withholding uncertainty information is both 
unlikely to be an accurate representation and also signals a lack of honesty.  Additionally any 
denial of uncertainty arguably contributes to increased distrust in risk managers and 
institutions responsible for science policy (Eldridge et al. 1998; O’Brien, 2000)).  Work by 
Wynne (1989) illustrates how British sheep farmers distrusted experts because the 
information that they provided ignored uncertainties.  In fact, the farming community knew 
from their own experience that there were uncertainties; it was the fact that these were not 
articulated by experts occasioned their distrust. Similarly, others draw attention to the ways 
in which it is claims of safety that are mistrusted  (Grove White et al., 1997) and that denial of 
uncertainty fuels public distrust in risk regulators (O’Brien, 2000).  
 
Headline findings 
 Denial of uncertainty is likely to signal a lack of honesty and accuracy and generate 
distrust.  People do not expect certainty although they may dislike uncertainty.  
 Uncertainty may increase perceptions of risk more for some hazards – e.g. those 
under societal rather than personal control.  
 The communication of technical uncertainty may lead to attributions about the 
communicator and their risk management capabilities 
 Lay publics are concerned with a much broader range of uncertainties than experts 
are concerned about communicating 
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 The most unacceptable uncertainties are those associated with government inaction 
rather than scientific processes 
 People may infer uncertainty from conflicting perspectives 
 A layering or stepped approach may help communicate uncertainty effectively.  
 
The early work looking at the reception of uncertainty information can be found in the 
literature around decision making under uncertainty – that is, not specifically relating to risk 
but to decisions relating to, the possibility of both positive and negative outcomes.  Research 
investigating ambiguity about probabilities documents both preferences for, and aversions 
to, ambiguity.  Generally however, greater ambiguity is associated with risk aversion (Viscusi, 
et al, 1991).  Much of the work specifically concerned with the communication of uncertainty 
focuses on phenomena such as the ways in which verbal and numerical expressions of 
probability map on to each other (see Section 7 below) and has tended to consider the 
communication of uncertainty independently of the context in which such communication 
occurs (Fox & Irwin, 1998). Other research exploring how uncertainty relates to risk 
appreciation incorporates a greater consideration of context.  The work of Slovic has clearly 
indicated the qualitative dimensions of a risk that people are most likely to attend to (dread, 
familiarity and so on) and uncertainty is likely to be considered differently depending on the 
nature of the hazard.  For example, it seems that information about uncertainty increases 
perceptions of risk to a greater extent for hazards under societal rather than personal control 
(Miles & Frewer, 2003).  
 
Uncertainty and perceptions of risk and trustworthiness 
 
There is some evidence that uncertainty may cause people to perceive greater risk (Slovic, 
1987) although the evidence is equivocal.   Others (Bord & O’Connor, 1992 ) suggested no 
such relationship.  Johnson and Slovic (1995) found that presentations of uncertainty did not 
have clear effects on the way in which environmental problems were viewed and certainly 
less of an effect than did attitudes toward risk and to government.  In later work, the same 
authors (Johnson and Slovic, 1988) explored people’s ‘desire for certainty’ with such items as, 
‘I would prefer a single concrete number rather than a range of numbers for the 
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environmental health risks I face’ and ‘ I would prefer that government tell me that they’re 
just not sure about the size of an environmental health risk, if that’s the case rather than 
giving me a range of risk numbers’  Overall, contrary to the authors hypothesis,  a desire for 
certainty was not dominant – about 35% of respondents were above the midpoint where 
higher scores indicated more desire for certainty.   
 
Johnston and Slovic (1995, 1998) note that for some communication of uncertainty will 
increase information source credibility, the public’s trust of regulatory institutions and their 
ability to make informed decisions which in turn is likely to affect the behavioural response to 
the risk information.  This was not always the case though – others questioned the 
presentation of uncertainty, suggesting that it brought the competence of the communicator 
into question and could lead to confusion and anger.  It has been suggested that uncertainty 
negatively affects intention to get the problem solved, can be used to discount the 
seriousness of the threat, to excuse complacency, can easily be misinterpreted and lead to 
confusion (Kuhn, 1997). There is a suggestion that communicating uncertainty information 
can be used as a justification for inaction (Johnson and Slovic, 1998)   
 
Interpretations of uncertainty are related both to the prior beliefs of the recipient of 
uncertainty information and the type of uncertainty. In relation to the first of these 
dimensions, Kuhn (1997) notes that the reception of uncertainty different depending on 
initial levels of environmental concern.  For those whose initial concern was high, receiving 
information about uncertainty occasioned a decrease in concern.  The opposite was found 
where initial environmental concern levels were low. Here, the communication of uncertainty 
was linked with an increase in concern.  Similar individual differences were noted by 
Rabinovich and Morton (2012). Messages that communicated high uncertainty proved more 
persuasive and more motivating for those individuals who had a model of science-as-debate.  
In contrast, where science was seen as a search for absolute truth, uncertainty was less 
persuasive.  Clearly, uncertainty does not always undermine how motivational a message can 
be nor how meaningful it is.  One of the implications of this research is that, in order to 
encourage acceptance of uncertainty, there is value in encouraging engagement exemplifying 
that debate is key to science.   
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Types of uncertainty from a lay perspective 
  
The possibility that communication of uncertainty is received differently depending on the 
type of uncertainty has also been explored.  Here the focus is not on the types of uncertainty 
noted in Section 3, that are the result of expert categorisations, rather the focus is on 
uncertainties that might be encountered in people’s lives.  One such categorisation identified 
uncertainty about who is affected, temporal uncertainty (uncertainty about past and future 
states), measurement uncertainty, uncertainty due to scientific disagreement, uncertainty 
about the risk to humans after measurements with animals, uncertainty about the extent (or 
‘size’) of the risk, and uncertainty about how to deal with (specifically, how to reduce) the risk 
(Miles & Frewer, 2003). Interestingly, it was not the case that some types of uncertainty were 
associated with greater concern.  However, it was the case that the different types of 
uncertainty were associated with greater ratings of risk seriousness for some hazards (such as 
genetically modified foods and pesticides), than for others (BSE, high fat diets and 
salmonella).  The authors surmise that uncertainties may be more problematic for hazards 
low on personal control and high on societal control.   
 
In a linked study focusing on food risk (Frewer et al., 2002) qualitative work was used to 
derive the possible meanings of uncertainty from the perspective of the non-expert 
participants (see Table 7) 
 
Table 7: Non-expert perspectives on sources of uncertainty 
1. The government lacks definite knowledge about the topic 
2. It is not possible for scientists to have all the answers 
3. The government’s statement is based on conflicting information 
4. The information provided is the best available at present, but things may change in 
the future 
5. The government is unsure about the extent of the problem 
6. Scientists disagree with each other on the subject 
7. The government is unsure whether there is a problem or not 
8. More scientific work needs to be done on the topic 
9. The government is withholding information from the public 
10. There really is a major food safety problem 
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The study then explored the acceptability of each of these types of uncertainty, as well as 
how likely it was that where there was uncertainty it was due to each of these things.  The 
study found that participants claimed that information about uncertainty around food 
problems was wanted as soon as it was identified (rather than when there was less 
uncertainty, complete uncertainty or not at all).  The ten types of uncertainty listed in table 6 
were rated similarly in terms of their likelihood, but rather differently in terms of their 
acceptability.  Least acceptable were statements related to government inaction (9, 10, 7, 5, 
1, 6 – in order from least acceptable) and most acceptable were those related to scientific 
processes in risk assessment (8, 2, 4, 6 – in order from most acceptable).  Clearly, some types 
of uncertainty are more acceptable than others.  This chimes with the more sociological 
perspective provided by Freudenberg (1993) who, moving away from a focus on individual 
perceptions of risk, considers the significant explanatory power afforded by concerns about 
institutional recreancy, “the failure of institutional actors to carry out their responsibilities 
with the degree of vigour necessary to merit the societal trust they enjoy” (p. 909).  
 
Breakwell and Barnett (2002) suggest that there are four prime types of uncertainty that 
those communicating risks might acknowledge: uncertainty with regard to (a) who will be 
harmed (b) what harm is involved (c) when the harm will occur, and (d) why the possibility of 
harm exists.  Each of these can engender the further uncertainty as to how the hazard can be 
controlled.  This study found that different types of uncertainty did have different effects 
upon risk estimates; specifically that uncertainty about who was at risk resulted in higher risk 
ratings than did uncertainty about when the harm might occur.  Notably, little attention has 
been given within the literature to the possible effects of moving between different types (or 
degrees) of uncertainty across the lifetime of the hazard.   
 
It is also worthwhile to consider the distinction Breakwell and Barnett (2002) make between 
acknowledged uncertainty and ‘inferred uncertainty’.  This refers to the additional level of 
uncertainty that is introduced when alternate sources of risk communication provide 
conflicting risk estimates. Bearing in mind the interests of industry, of the regulator, the 
consumer and of a range of pressure groups, it is likely that g/Government communications 
(whether or not they acknowledge uncertainty) will take place in a context of dissenting 
voices.  Indeed, interest groups may employ their own scientific experts which add both 
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science and uncertainty to the debate. Johnston and Slovic (1988) also explored the scenario 
where they consider disagreement among scientists as a form of uncertainty – they found 
that most scientists agreeing was not persuasive – questioning of the motives and allegiances 
of scientists lay behind this scepticism.  It seems to be the case that, even if scientists choose 
not to communicate uncertainty, given the media focus on balancing information from one 
source from another source (see above) and given the increased opportunities for 
stakeholders from a range of positions to comment, as well as the increased range of 
channels through which these views can be shared, disagreements (and the consequent 
inferences of uncertainty) are likely to be highly visible.   
 
Breakwell (2014) provides an overview of the ways in which uncertainty can become public 
 
Proactive 
Explanation 
The institution managing the hazard chooses spontaneously, without duress or 
prompting to explain the uncertainty associated with their risk estimates 
Reactive 
Explanation 
The institution responsible for the hazard explains the uncertainty after some 
event or action on the part of others calls for further clarification of the risk 
estimate 
Revealed The uncertainty can be disclosed or proclaimed by sources other than the 
institution managing the hazard (e.g. the media can run stories of the ‘hidden 
facts’ or ‘hidden ignorance’ 
Emergent The uncertainty can be inferred by the public rather than stated by any sources 
(this can happen when there are conflicting expert sources offering different risk 
estimates to the public; the mere existence of alternative representations can 
suggest uncertainty) 
 
 
Trust is particularly important and is the default reference point for interpreting information 
about risk and uncertainty where there is an absence of knowledge. This has clear 
implications for the communication of risk and uncertainty.  When events have triggered 
heightened public concern, according to the Trust, Confidence and Cooperation Model (Earle 
& Siegrist, 2006) it is vital to appreciate the difference between trust – which is based on 
‘morality information’ that is  it is adjudged with reference to values – and confidence, which 
is based on performance information.  ‘Trust dominates confidence’, thus in anticipation of 
non-expert sensitivities around the communication of uncertainty it is vital to be aware of the 
values held by those to whom communications of risk and uncertainty are being targeted.  
One method for doing this and that easily allows values to be tracked over time is explained 
in Section 8.  Another implication of the dominance of trust is that simply providing 
53 | P a g e  
 
information about indicators of confidence, i.e. evidence, ability, experience, competence is 
not effective in producing cooperation where trust is lacking.  
 
As we have seen, we have some knowledge as to the situations in which the reception of 
information about uncertainty will be more or less acceptable.  It is not just a question of the 
content of that communication.  There is much we do not know about how the vehicle within 
with the uncertainty estimate is delivered matters (i.e. in terms of our current consideration - 
the risk register.  Does the timing and rate of repetition of uncertainty messages matter? 
(Breakwell, 2014).   There is much we still do not know. 
 
Uncertainty is always about something, and communicators of uncertainty need to take 
account of different types of uncertainty, and make distinctions between them, and reference 
this to the broader context of the object of uncertainty.  As Frewer (2004) notes, lay people 
routinely make distinctions between lack of knowledge, that presents as ignorance, and lack 
of knowledge due to unknowable elements, as well as uncertainty over differences of 
scientific upon option (the latter being complicated by the scope for inferences of partisan 
perspectives e.g. MMR vaccine).  Similarly, official declarations of certainty / high confidence, 
tend to sponsor scepticism where the inherent uncertainty of the issue is transparent, e.g. 
BSE. 
 
A challenge for communicators is that the assessment of complex high impact issues routinely 
embodies an array of uncertainties, the breadth of which is prone to increase beyond aspects 
relating to environmental impacts, to elements relating to institutional (in)action and the 
effectiveness of mitigation measures as the issue matures, i.e. the focus of stakeholder 
concern is prone to evolve as risks and institutional reactions to them evolve  / become 
manifest.  Moreover, the nature and relative salience of uncertainties that are relevant to 
different lay audiences can be predicted to vary as a product of the threat identification / 
mitigation8 maturation process.   
 
Assuming that a pest or disease arouses concern amongst stakeholders, a predictable threat 
                                                     
8 Including instances where the policy decision is not to introduce mitigation measures.  
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maturation profile might be characterised as follows:  
 During the initial period, following 'discovery', the focus will likely be on the nature 
and magnitude of potential impacts (losses).   
 As the threat manifest, attention will foreseeably evolve to debates surrounding the 
choice and projected effectiveness of mitigation measures (including secondary 
impacts).   
 Once mitigation measures have been applied, and evidence of their impact begins to 
emerge, the focus may shift to debates over their suitability and sufficiency.  
 
Additionally, institutionally, there may be a need to refer to uncertainties post-hoc, in the 
context of justifying choices, (in)action taken and resources dedicated to managing the threat, 
e.g. where these prove insufficient / ineffective in the case of profound impacts or are 
deemed by others to be overly cautions where impacts turn out to have been over-estimated.   
 
Layering - a strategy for effective communication? 
 
In view of the multifaceted and time-sensitive nature of communicating uncertainty, a 
number of authors advocate a layered9 (stepped) approach of progressive disclosure (see 
Table 8).  "A great deal of research in psychology shows that when people receive too much 
information at one time, or information that too seriously conflicts with their pre-existing 
beliefs, they will be inclined to ignore, reject or simply not act on the whole package of 
information" (Hinkel et al, 2011; also see Guimaraes and Quintana, 2002, Klopprogge, 2007; 
Wardekker et al 2008).   
 
It is not quite clear from the accounts provided whether what is envisaged is limited to a 
layering of material, in the manner of a web-site, such that headline information appears on 
'page one' and individuals, so motivated, have the opportunity to investigate 'deeper' (page 2 
and beyond) or whether the idea of layering generalises to sequential disclosure, over time, 
i.e. a planned, phased approach to disclosure.  However, if sequential disclosure is intended, 
this will need to be performed with some skill and care to avoid fostering the perception that 
                                                     
9 A concept borrowed from human computer interaction, widely encountered in web-site design. 
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access to knowledge over uncertainties is being rationed, given the potential for this to 
sponsor suspicions regarding the motives of the source.  
 
The authors make no reference to layering of uncertainty information as a means of 
managing structural evolutionary elements, characterised as risk / threat maturation above.  
However, the concept would appear to reflect alignment with meeting a need to shift the 
focus of communication content sponsored by this.   
 
Table 8: Progressive disclosure - Source Kloprogge et al, 2007 
 
 Outer PD layers Inner PD layers 
Contents Uncertainties integrated in the message 
(implicit in semantics e.g. 'may' or 
'might') 
Uncertainties mentioned separately and 
explicitly 
Uncertainties as essential contextual 
information referenced to assessment 
results 
Uncertainties as part of scientific account of 
the approach used in research and 
assessment results  
Uncertainties translated to the political 
and social context 
Account of the 'bare' uncertainties form a 
scientific perspective. 
Evidence of policy relevance of 
uncertainties 
Balanced account of uncertainties in all 
parts of the assessment 
Emphasis on implications of 
uncertainties 
Emphasis on the nature, extent and sources 
of uncertainties 
Implications of uncertainties for the 
assessment results and arising policy 
advice given 
Implications of uncertainties for 
representativeness of a study, value of the 
results and further research 
Style Scientific information translated into 
'common language' 
Scientific information with a high level of 
technical sophistication  
Use of jargon to be avoided Use of jargon allowed 
Degree of detail Details only if considered policy relevant Highly detailed (each layer offers more 
detailed information than the previous PDI 
layer) 
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7. What heuristics and biases affect the characterisation and 
interpretation of uncertainty and related decision making? 
 
Recognised sources of decision bias 
This section provides an overview of the extensive literature on recognised sources of bias in 
decision making in the context of uncertainty.   It draws heavily on insights from cognitive 
psychology, but it is informed and elaborated upon through reference to complementary 
insights from social psychology, sociology and social anthropology.  This latter has the effect of 
broadening the perspective, beyond traits exhibited by all individuals (in varying degrees), to 
elements that reflect social and cultural dispositional and process related influences on 
decision making in the context of uncertainty.  
 
A central assumption of neoclassical economics is that human decision making represents a 
fundamentally rational process, where individuals select options that generate maximal 
expected utility (essentially gain / benefit / value).  However, while remaining a core 
assumption within mainstream economists', common experience is that under conditions of 
uncertainty people are prone to choosing options which deviate from rational-actor 
assumptions.  This phenomenon is widely recognised amongst cognitive, social and cultural 
scientists, and represents a core focus of the contemporary influential public policy 
orientated texts Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; and Think (Kahenman, 2011).   
 
It would be misleading to interpret the substantial research base highlighting lapses from 
rational decision making as implying that this is a dominant characteristic of human decision 
making.  Most decision making is essentially rational, or at least reflects internally consistent 
processes.  What follows relates to the interplay between situations and cognitive processing 
that can lead to deviations from rational choice in the context of uncertainty.   
 
The largest contribution to insights in this area, by volume, comes from cognitive science10.  A 
central finding here is that the interaction between the manner in which options are 
                                                     
10 There are complementary insights from social psychology, sociology and social anthropology 
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presented and cognitive processing characteristics can produce a range of predictable choice 
biases (or at least deviations from rational choice in the terms defined by neoclassical 
economics). 
 
The relevance of these findings to the current endeavour is that they offer insight into how 
people process information and make choices, based on their intuitions and inferential sense-
making.  This insight can be used to inform thinking regarding the formulation and 
presentation of communication material in ways take account known sources of bias.   
 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the more fruitful perspective here is not one of 'how do we find 
ways to make people more rational?', or 'how do we educate people to improve their 
understanding of expressions of risk and probability?', rather it is 'how should we use an 
appreciation of known decision-making characteristics (in particularly fallibilities) to inform 
how we communicate over issues of 'uncertainty?', in order to avoid / mitigate sponsoring 
decisions that result in poor (sub-optimal) or inappropriate choices (Royal Society 1992; 
Fischhoff, 1995). This is reflects the core perspective of the influential policy orientated text 
'Nudge' (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
 
There is extensive evidence that human beings are prone to exhibit an array of lapses, biases, 
and other deviations, from formal logic in decision making in situations of uncertainty.  They 
are also prone to taking mental short-cuts, (applying simple heuristic rules of thumb) rather 
than adopting a systematic approach to the consideration of relevant variables.  By extension, 
this can embody affective / emotional elements and / or draw upon, socially derived, shared 
understandings, values and norms. 
 
"Uncertainty is never expressed in a vacuum, it is always about something" (Rowe, 2010. 
p.33).  Uncertainty has a context when it relates real world issues and people's contemplation 
is not necessarily limited to their prior knowledge understandings and associated intuitions, 
rather, 'filtered' through underpinning beliefs, dispositions and orientations.  In this they may 
draw upon references broader than the technical properties of the issue under consideration, 
e.g. beliefs regarding the motives of key stakeholders, attitudes to regulation and relative 
primacy ascribed to environmental issues and economic objectives.  In essence, people 
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construct mental models to make sense of their world, and which make sense to them.  
Mental models11 amount to characterisations and mappings of causal linkages between 
variables (physical, social and environmental).  Education, past experience, general 
intelligence and cognitive style (and more) sponsor differences between individuals in the 
degree of competences and sophistication of understandings of phenomena and associated 
interactions.   
 
However, the world is a complex place, and one in which human beings are adapted to using 
cognitively economically ways to characterise salient variables to meet their needs.  While 
there are differences in the completeness and sophistication of people’s mental models, 
particularly in the area of specialist technical knowledge, all individuals exhibit a tendency to 
apply heuristic (rules of thumb, educated guesses and intuitive judgement) as an integral part 
of their sense-making / decision making process, particularly when dealing with complex, 
unfamiliar or uncertain phenomena.   
 
It is also, perhaps, worth keeping in mind that environment science, in common with other 
science and engineering disciplines, adopts an analogous strategy when selecting a sub-set of 
variables for manipulation in models designed to predict uncertain future outcomes, e.g. 
rates of migration, or infestation referenced to background rises in average temperature.   
 
Heuristics - mental short cuts and rules of thumb 
 
 
Key findings: 
 
 People are disposed to use (heuristics) when decisions are complex, time consuming 
or contain unknown / unknowable elements. 
 
 Heuristics relate to the process of dealing with a cognitively difficult problem (or time 
sensitive issue) by selecting and answering a simpler question. 
  
 Heuristics can provide a useful focus and sponsor new insight but they can also lead 
to important omissions. 
  
 Heuristics relate to 'pattern cognition' - but can sponsor classification error, e.g. 
failure to take account of novel features of new situations. 
                                                     
11 The concept of a mental model is a heuristic 
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 Heuristics and cognitive biases operate in a symbiotic manner in information 
processing and are exhibited by all individuals (lay and expert), particularly when at 
the fringes of their knowledge on an issue. 
 
 
Recourse to heuristics can be both habitual and a conscious process used in the evaluation of 
information to inform decision making.  People make extensive use of heuristics in everyday 
situations.  They are an essential tool for dealing with a complex world.  Put simply, they are 
short-hand inferences based on a sub-set of what individuals consider to be the most salient 
variables in a given situation.  Arising inferential sense-making draws, in large part, on prior 
experience and pattern recognition, allowing to people economically (in a cognitive sense) 
navigate their way around their world.  Experienced car drivers, for example, automatically 
apply a range of heuristics; less experienced drivers less so, or at least tend to have a smaller 
and less sophisticated repertoire in this respect (Hale and Glendon, 1987).  Under most 
circumstances heuristics provide a sufficient, if not always optimal, solution.   
 
A notable feature is the tendency to over-apply heuristics, e.g. failing to take account of novel 
differences when encountering what, at first sight, presents as a familiar situation - to which a 
familiar solution might be applied.   
 
People also tend to apply heuristics as a means of saving time and effort. When faced with a 
car that won't start the experienced recovery patrol officer will likely first check the fuel 
supply, then look for a loose ignition lead, before adopting a more methodical approach; for 
two reasons (i) this strategy has worked well on previous occasions; (ii) if it works there will be 
a time (and effort) saving.  They may also fruitlessly spend considerable time applying a series 
of such heuristics (essentially hypotheses in this instance), before reluctantly adopting a more 
methodical approach.   
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A significant challenge when attempting to predict future impacts of plant pests and diseases 
and the effectiveness of mitigation measures can be the, complexity and unknown properties 
of interactions between multiple variables.  The application of heuristics when faced with 
complex problems is perhaps best characterised as a coping strategy, whereby a cognitively 
difficult problem, or time sensitive issue, is dealt with by selecting and answering a simpler 
question, based upon a sub-set of (what are inferred to be) the more salient criteria.   
 
In such saturations, recourse to heuristics can represent a strength. Under most 
circumstances, they serve us well (see Ross, 1980).  Simplifying complex problems can 
sponsor the recognition of linkages and solutions that might have taken longer or remained 
undiscovered had a more systematic approach been adopted (assuming it was a viable 
option).  However, because heuristics are approximations they have the potential to embody 
a range of recognised biases and errors.  For example, people are prone to inductive errors, 
apparent in the tendency to apply old (successful tried and tested) solutions to new contexts 
(while omitting to take account of important differences), or infer familiar patterns, or trends 
from small, but consistent, samples (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, and others).   
 
People (lay and expert) routinely use heuristics in order to estimate and describe probabilities 
(formally and informally).  When asked to judge the likelihood of an event matching a pattern 
of phenomena they are attempting to assess the degree of fit with the wider classification.  In 
doing so, in addition to their appreciation of relevant scientific insights, assessors are drawing 
upon memory and prior experience, in particular making linkages to what they believe to be 
equivalent situations, which may include making adjustments to what they view as the more 
salient features, some of which may be new or novel.  In this sense heuristics might be 
construed as a personal library of mapped associations that are applied to inform inferential 
sense making.  Heuristics are not just a personal coping strategy.  Scientific and technical 
communities also tend to share certain heuristics with respect to beliefs about how 
phenomena operate and interact; some heuristics may simply reflect the limits of the science 
of the day. 
 
The concept of cognitive bias is linked with evidence of heuristic reasoning.  Human beings 
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can (some would suggest are prone to) exhibit an array of identifiable and predictable biases 
in decision making in situations of uncertainty.  Heuristics and cognitive biases operate in a 
symbiotic manner in information processing and are exhibited by all individuals to varying 
degrees.  This is not an area where there are marked distinctions between lay and expert 
groups, in fact both are susceptible to decision bias effects and prone to apply heuristics 
when dealing with unknown and uncertain issues that lie at, or beyond, the boundaries of 
their destabilised knowledge base (see Kunreuther and Gupta et al, 2010). 
 
A significant array of biases and related effects have been identified, the most widely 
evidenced, and most pertinent to the current endeavour, are:   
 
Availability bias 
 
 The ease with which outcomes can be brought to mind (recalled and visualised) increases 
their subjective salience and perceived livelihood (probability) of occurrence.   
 
 
Key findings 
 
 High consequence outcomes tend to be viewed as more likely. 
 
 People are prone to focus on more magnitude of outcomes than probability for 
catastrophic, large scale, irreversible risks. 
 
 In the absence of issue specific knowledge people are prone to draw analogies with 
earlier high profile risks and failures of control. 
 
 Vivid recall of past high consequence events can sponsor over estimate of the 
likelihood of their recurrence, or of analogous events occurring.   
 
 Readily imagined personal and institutional consequences can cause people to focus 
on issues of secondary risk management. 
 
 
Effects relate to the framing of risk, consequences and solutions.  The ease with which 
consequences can be visualised, particularly if they are widespread, catastrophic or enduring, 
e.g. extinction of a species, can sponsor a myopic response, such that the magnitude of 
consequences comes into sharp focus, to the extent that this outweighs, or diverts attention 
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from issues of probability; which may be low (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1974, Lichtebstein 
et al, 1978).  There are linkages with the concept dread (see, in particular, Slovic et al, 1982).   
 
In the case of expert risk assessors, where an individual has a large amount of relevant 
experience, applying heuristics in the context of availability bias may result in a positive 
outcome, e.g. they may be quick to recognise a threat or identify effective mitigation 
measures.  However, prior experience of similar events and outcomes may also have the 
effect of focusing on the magnitude of potential loss, and under-consideration of contextual 
variables, e.g. the effect of different climatic conditions, or working practices between 
countries.  A strong focus on loss (see loss aversion and framing effects) risks a 
disproportionately cautious orientation, which sponsor over-provision in the area of risk 
control.   
 
The availability heuristic appears to be sensitive to base-rate effects.  For example when 
people are asked to assess a probability, such as the likelihood of rain in London described in 
the forecast as 'slight' their rating will very likely be higher than for an equivalent forecast (of 
'slight') in Madrid.  The reason for this being that they are drawing upon a heuristic that 
characterises perceived base rates for the two cities (see Wallsten, et al 1987).  In this 
instance their intuition is likely substantially correct.   
 
However, sensitivity to perceived base rates can constitute a source of bias.  Windshtil and 
Weber, for example highlight a tendency to overestimate base rates for a specific disease due 
to broader perceptions of certain geographical locations being a 'hot spots' for multiple 
diseases, or poor infection control standards (Windshtil and Weber, 1999) (also refer to 
representativeness bias and framing effects).   
 
In the context of risk management, availability effects are relevant beyond the technical 
properties plant pests and diseases.  The ease with which outrage and dissatisfaction with 
g/Government and its Agencies, e.g. amongst land owners, producers, the public and other 
stakeholder can be brought to mind by specialists, policy makers and ministers can play a role.  
A central claim here, is that uncertainty over vulnerability in this area may sponsor excessive 
caution / risk aversion, and may divert the focus to issues of secondary risk management 
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(personal & institutional consequences, e.g. eroded trust reputational damage), rather than 
primary risk (pest or disease) management (see Power, 2006; Slottje et al, 2008). 
 
In short, heuristics subject to availability bias may yield positive results in instances where an 
individuals' memory (personal and / or mediated) of previous events corresponds well with 
the objective properties and trajectory of actual events.  But they may lead to overestimates 
if recall is amplified by strong imagery of high magnitude (catastrophic, large scale, 
irreversible) undesired consequences or, plausibly, underestimates if recall of analogous 
events is limited, e.g. no personal experience or historical precedents.   
 
An absence of pest / disease specific knowledge has the potential to increase propensity to 
draw analogies with other high consequence risks that are believed to share one or more 
features.  Unsurprisingly more recent events tend to be of greatest salience, by extension a 
number of closely-coupled events of a similar type tend to amplify recency bias (see Marx et 
al, 2007).  Such effects have been widely cited as sponsoring inappropriate 'read-across' from 
one risk agenda to another,  e.g. concern over MMR sponsoring a general reluctance to 
inoculate the young (see Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013).  BSE impacting on beliefs regarding risks 
associated with veterinary medicines (Weyman & Williamson, 2007).  Read-across effects 
probably more prevalent within lay populations, but experts are also potentially susceptible, 
although likely in more sophisticated ways. 
 
In the context of expert assessment, the EFSA recommends "It is therefore important for 
experts to review all relevant evidence so that it is all equally available when they are 
responding to questions" (EFSA, 2014; p.23).  Beyond the challenges of configuring this, this 
statement casts availability as an issue of knowledge management.  This presents as a 
misinterpretation of evidence on cognitive availability and its effects, i.e. availability relates to 
broader, essentially affective, reactions to risk and uncertainty referenced to the 
characteristics of the threat, notably magnitude of consequences, and the salience of extant 
understandings and intuitions.  Importantly, availability effects can extend to issue beyond 
perceptions of threats posed by pests and diseases, to secondary risk management 
components, e.g. the ease with which the consequences of previous institutional / regulatory 
failure can be brought to mind (see Power, 2006). 
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Anchoring and adjustment bias  
 
Relates to the tendency to consider an options referenced to a known or established value, i.e. 
the tendency to focus on relative rather than an absolute values in options appraisal, 
generally expressed in the form of statistical probabilities or gambles  
 
Key findings 
 
 People are prone to select a reference value against which they compare or estimate 
other values. 
 
 New information tends to be reviewed with reference to a preselected anchor, rather 
than in absolute terms. 
 
 Where knowledge is limited (to the decision maker and / or science) emotive issues 
and perspectives may sponsor the section of a high or low anchor. 
 
 
Anchoring tends to take the form of individuals selecting a reference value against which they 
compare or estimate other values.  Anchoring can impact on their appraisal of how much 
they should revise and adjust their original estimate to take account of new insight or 
additional information, e.g. new knowledge, additional data, or changes in the ratio of cases 
relative to sample base (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).   
 
The nature of bias here is that the degree of adjustment tends to be insufficient, such that 
the revised judgement is biased towards the original anchor, i.e. reference to and acceptance 
of the anchor influences subsequent assessments.  For example, assuming that a risk assessor 
originally estimated the impact of a risk as 'Very likely' using the scale depicted in Table 8, new 
information is more likely to elicit to a minor revision to their original estimate 'Extremely 
likely' or 'Likely'), even where the new evidence would support a more fundamental 
adjustment.  A net result of anchoring and adjustment is overconfidence in the ascribed 
rating range (Morgan, cited in IPCC, 2010). 
 
Both experts and lay assessors appear to be subject to anchoring and adjustment effects.  It 
has been suggested that selecting or providing the initial rating sponsors a sense of ownership 
or, perhaps more plausibly, a reluctance to admit that you got it wrong, particularly if this is in 
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the presence of peers (see Simmons et al, 2010).  There is modest consensus over the causes 
of anchoring bias; however, evidence relating to its effects is robust (see, for example, 
Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler and Strack, 1998). 
 
Table 8  
Example Likelihood Judgement Scale 
Likelihood of the occurrence / outcome 
Virtually certain 99% probability  
Extremely likely 95% 
Very likely 90% 
Likely 66% 
More likely than not 50% 
About as likely as not 33-66% 
Unlikely 33% 
Very unlikely  10% 
Extremely unlikely 5% 
Exceptionally unlikely 1% 
Source IPCC 2010 
 
 
With regard to the selection of anchors, some sources cast this in terms of being the first item 
assessors alight upon or are presented with (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  However it seems 
likely that other variables are at play.  The following is not considered exhaustive:  In some 
instances ratings may reflect reference (which may range from substantially accurate to 
intuitive guestimate) to some known quality or value (which may range from highly 
appropriate to highly inappropriate) ascribed to what judges consider to be an analogous risk 
issue (see Mussweiler and Strack, 1998).  Where the issue sponsors emotive responses, a 
corresponding high or a low anchor may be selected (see availability).  Additionally, in 
instances where people feel that they lack knowledge and or confidence when using a 
subjective rating scale they tend to engage in hedging, reflected in the selection of a rating 
nearer the mid-range (Oppenheim, 1966).   
 
In the context of expert risk assessment, EFSA guidance recommends that the "Choice of the 
sequence of questions in an elicitation procedure should aim to minimise anchoring, and 
66 | P a g e  
 
should avoid introducing numerical values which might then serve as anchors." (EFSA, 2014; 
p.23)  This is useful from the perspective of how information on risk and uncertainty is 
presented in the form of risk assessment procedures, but represents a partial solution from 
the broader perspective of anchoring effects, i.e. anchors that assessors may refer to, derived 
from their broader knowledge and insight.  This issue is recognised by McLeod (2010).  The 
literature makes modest reference to such effects, possibly due to the nature of the empirical 
studies, most of which have not involved individuals making judgements in a context in which 
they have established expertise.  Redress of assessor reference to broader anchors is not 
readily resolvable. 
 
Representativeness bias  
 
The tendency to over-infer patterns and linkages relating to the future from a restricted 
sample, e.g. a small number of cases of a common type, a single or sub-set of attributes or 
traits, a sub-set of interactions between variables.  
 
Key findings 
 
 People are prone to infer patterns from insufficient data / evidence. 
 
 People tend to focus on frequencies of similar events, and underplay base rates or 
probability inconsideration. 
 
 The time frame over which the occurrence of a small number of ostensibly consistent 
events can impact on perceptions of patterns in data. 
 
  People can be insensitive to changes in predictive inferences that arise from changes 
in sample size  
 
 
In its most basic form representativeness relates to the process of inductive inference, i.e. 
judging the likelihood that a given object (or phenomena) relates to a particular class of 
objects, or that an event is the product of a recognised process.  Some authors suggest that 
human beings are hard-wired in their disposition to seek pattern recognition.   
 
The contiguous occurrence of a small number of sequential / related (which may in 
probabilistic terms be random or rare), particularly over a short time frame, tends to give rise 
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to what Tversky and Kahneman term 'belief in the law of small numbers'.  These authors go on 
to conclude that the phenomenon is amongst individuals with formal training in science, 
engineering and probability theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972).  A recent high profile example may be detectable in the 'string' of large scale railway 
accidents (Southall 1997, Paddington 1999, Hatfield 2000 and Potters Bar 2002), which led to 
much speculation of a trend associated with rail privatisation.  Statistically, the small number 
of cases makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions; however the arising structural and 
regulatory impacts have undeniably been far reaching and enduring.   
 
A number of studies have demonstrated that people can be insensitive to changes in base 
rates and base values (see, in particular, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  Typical findings from 
experimental work in this area are that people tend to focus on the frequency of cases 
(numerator) rather than denominator values (see Yamagishi, 1997).  This can be particularity 
problematic when making comparisons between two or more pieces of evidence based on 
different size samples.  Other findings arising from a failure to take account of base rates, 
highlight a tendency to focus on frequencies, or proportions of increase, e.g. a 100% increase 
in cases of Ebola in the UK (currently, at least) will only affect a very small number of 
individuals.   
 
Where people recognise changes in base rate, the issue tends to be not so much that they 
ignore this (most people have some grasp of the implications of the ratio of cases, to sample 
size) but that they fail to make sufficient adjustment, i.e. people can be insensitive to changes 
in predictive inferences that arise from changes in sample size (Fischhoff, et al, 1979).  
 
Confirmation bias  
 
Failure to adequately appraise new or contradictory information.  
 
 
Key findings 
 
 Established beliefs about the nature and probability of harm can act as a filter on 
how new information is reviewed. 
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 When considering causality and impacts of past events people are prone to exhibit 
hindsight bias. 
 
 Both individuals and groups appear to be susceptible to confirmation bias. 
 
 
Relates to situations where a widely held or dominant view has been formed leading to a 
tendency to make new evidence fit with the established view.  Effects relate to individual 
reluctance to abandon their own internal model (see anchoring and adjustment) and a 
reluctance in individuals to challenge an established consensus (see Group decision biases).  
Once an accepted model or scenario becomes established (individually or shared) there can 
be a tendency to dismiss contrary information as erroneous, peripheral or unrepresentative, 
such that it may be disregarded or filtered out.  Relatedly, there is a risk that evidence that fits 
the established model may assume a higher status than it should (Klorogge et al, 2007; also 
see Kuhn, 1972).  
 
A further facet of confirmation bias, that may serve as a salient, or even primary, reference for 
new challenges is hindsight bias, or what has been termed the illusion of retrospective 
determinism (Bergson, cited in Garton Ash, 1996).  Specifically, the tendency to exaggerate 
the predictability and inevitability of the course of past events in the light of hindsight.  A 
situation in which there is a risk of failing to adequately consider how events could have 
turned out differently. 
 
Unrealistic optimism bias 
 
Overconfidence in the ability to manage, avoid or avert harm 
   
Key findings 
 
 Has been identified as both an individual and a group phenomenon. 
 
 Lack of real-world contextual insight, e.g. into working practices, may foster 
unreasonably optimistic beliefs surrounding the effectiveness of risk mitigation 
measures.   
 
 The absence of a 1:1 ratio between risk and harm, e.g. due to chance related 
elements, can sponsor perceptions of invulnerability. 
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 People tend to rate their capacity to avoid harm as above average. 
 
 People tend to rate themselves at below average risk compared with peers. 
 
 More information can have the effect of reducing overconfidence. 
 
 
Unrealistic optimism has traditionally been cast as one of a range of biases of attribution over 
issues of cause and effect (see, in particular, Weinstein, 1980, 1984), but can also arise as a 
product of group deliberation and decision-making processes (see Group decision biases).  As 
elsewhere, findings highlight susceptibility amongst scientists and specialists as well as lay 
people (see Kloprogge, et al, 2007).  A notable and paradoxical finding with respect to expert 
risk assessors is the claim that the more information they are provided with on an unknown 
quantity, the less likely they are to exhibit overconfidence (Slottje et al, 2008). 
 
By volume, the largest contribution to insights on unrealistic optimism relate to individual 
decision making and perceptions of personal vulnerability, notably in the lifestyle health 
domain (see, for example, Weinstein, 1980; 1984), supplemented by a smaller number of 
workplace risk (see, for example, McKenna, 1993; Rawlinson, 2004) and driver behaviour 
studies (see, for example, McKenna, et al, 1991).  A notable contrast with the current 
endeavour is that these studies focus on individual volition as the basis for exposure, i.e. in 
contrast to exposure resulting from essentially external influences, as is the case for plant 
pests and diseases, and impacts that extend beyond the individual.  However, the adoption of 
cautionary behaviour, for example on the part of importers, growers and producers, is 
potentially relevant in the context of risk control and mitigation.     
 
Headline findings highlight a tendency for individuals to view themselves to be at less risk 
than others exposed to equivalent sources and levels of harm.  Typically when asked to 
estimate relative vulnerability, individuals rate themselves at below average risk on a given 
criterion (Weinstein, 1980; 1984).  A number of studies point to a related tendency towards 
overconfidence in the ability to recognise sources of harm and manage associated risks 
(Weyman & Clarke, 2003; Weyman et al, 1995).   
 
In part, this seems likely to be attributable to the more common experience for most 
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individuals that exposure, does not result in negative outcomes, i.e. on most occasions many 
people are lucky, salient variables do not align in ways that provide a pathway for harm (see 
Reason, 1997) or the world does not turn out to be as risky as the experts had led us to 
believe.  Levels of expressed optimism can also be time sensitive, i.e. perceived risk tends to 
be diminished when the consequences are distant rather than in the near future (see 
Bjorkman, 1984). 
 
From the perspective of motivating cautionary behaviour in others, further sources of 
attribution bias are of potential relevance, notably self-serving and self-other biases.  A 
general finding is that victims (including potential victims) are disposed to externalise 
causality, such that they are disposed to blame others, e.g. g/Government, other Nation 
States; other growers, producers and importers.  Externalising in this way tends to inhibit 
motivation to adopt cautionary behaviour (see Jones & Nisbett,1971; Ross, 1977).  
Conversely, when confronted with positive outcomes people are prone to attribute this to 
their capacity and skill to avoid harm (whereas it may owe much good fortune), which may 
sponsor unrealistic optimism in their capacity to manage equivalent risks effectively in the 
future.  Interventions to highlight and increase the salience of personal vulnerability and 
enhance self-efficacy represent a core assumptions of a number of psychology behaviour 
change models, e.g. Theory of Planned Behaviour, (Ajzen, 1991) Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974).   
 
Although the evidence base on overconfidence is dominated by findings from research 
involving lay people, Morgan implies that  IPCC's conclusion that scientists may be less 
susceptible due to ".... the[ir] greater amount of substantive knowledge they have to fall back 
on"  may be overly-optimistic (Morgan, cited in (IPCC 2010; p.68).    
 
There are examples of a dislocation between the assumptions of risk assessors over effective 
risk control / mitigation measures and their practicability and workability in workplace 
contexts.  This can sponsor unreasonably optimistic beliefs amongst risk assessors and risk 
managers regarding the effectiveness of identified controls (see, for example Weyman et al, 
1995; 2005). 
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Loss aversion bias  
 
Under most circumstances people are averse to loss, which can also generalise to aversion to 
risk and uncertainty.  
  
 
Key findings 
 
 Under most circumstances people are averse to loss. 
 
 High uncertainty, makes people reluctant to invest even when potential rewards are 
high. 
 
 People may become risk seekers when faced with a certain loss if they do nothing. 
 
 People exhibit aversion to losses that extend beyond threats such as those posed by 
plant pests and diseases, e.g. loss of reputation in managing sources of harm. 
 
 
Evidence from studies of investment decision making reveal that high uncertainty, makes 
people reluctant to invest even when potential rewards are high (see, for example, Greene et 
al, 2009).  People generally prefer a modest sure thing / sure win if it is available, as opposed 
to a long-odds probability of a larger win, i.e. they seek certainty.  As with other forms of bias, 
there is evidence that experts as well as laypeople are prone to exhibit loss aversion bias (see, 
for example, Haigh and List, 2005).  However, when faced with a certain loss, e.g. species 
extinction, in the event that no action is taken, people are prone to select a long-odds (low 
probability of success) option.  An analogy would be the gambler having had a bad day at the 
races putting his last £5 on a 100:1 outsider in the last race (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).   
 
Although the literature in this area is dominated by choice-based studies of financial loss and 
lifestyle health behaviour, in the current context, as in other public policy domains, the range 
and manifestation of losses to which stakeholders may be sensitive extends beyond the 
impacts on plants and trees.  Loss aversions can operate with reference to a wide range of 
variables that embody uncertainty, the profile and relative emphasis of which will likely vary 
between stakeholders.  
 
Of particular  relevance to Government, policy delivery and regulatory functions is the 
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potential for aversion to losses associated with costs of expenditure on mitigation measures 
(absolute and relative to benefits; which may also be time sensitive) and justification of these 
to others; uncertainty over the effectiveness of mitigation measures, potentially extending to 
worry over justifying associated costs in the event of failure (poor or unmeasurable impacts); 
loss of trust, credibility and support from stakeholders, reputational damage (personal and 
corporate) (for a discussion of the impacts these secondary uncertainties on priorities and 
management style see Power, 2006). 
 
Time frame biases  
People prefer certain short-run to potential long run gains 
   
 
Key findings 
 
 Subjective perceptions of the relationship between costs and benefits can be time 
sensitive. 
 
 Options that lead to delay are generally less attractive and people engage in 
discounting. 
 
 People tend to discount future costs and benefits more sharply, at a non-constant rate 
- hyperbolic discounting. 
 
 People are prone to discount exponentially at a constant rate that relates to the 
length of the delay between investment and return. 
 
 
People generally want rewards sooner rather than later.  People exhibit a general preference 
for certain-gains in the 'here and now', over future benefits, particularly where the future is 
uncertain (see anchoring and adjustment biases).  Complementary findings highlight an 
inhibition of caution where negative outcomes are delayed (see Bjorkman, 1984).  Options 
that lead to delay are generally less attractive and people engage in discounting.  Neoclassical 
economists argue that ‘rational’ individuals will discount future costs and benefits at a 
constant rate over time (exponential discounting).   However, behavioural economists have 
shown that subjective perceptions of the relationship between costs and benefits can be time 
sensitive.  Choosing short run gains over a larger reward later may not be irrational.  People 
may prefer a sure win, or they may have an urgent need for gain.  However, people do exhibit 
inconsistencies in their choices over gains in relation to time. 
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Behavioural findings indicate that individuals discount future costs and benefits at a much 
higher rate in the short run than in the long run.  For example, an individual might prefer to 
receive £100 now, over £200 next year and (at the same time) the individual might prefer 
£200 in three years time over £100 in two years (Ainslie and Haslam, 1992).  A key finding is 
that people tend to discount future costs and benefits more sharply, at a non-constant rate 
(i.e. hyperbolically).  Other studies claim a more general effect, cast as quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting (Lowensteing and Elster, 1992. Loewenstein, G. & O’Donoghue, T. (2002) that 
people discount distant gains at a constant rate to reflect the presence of a delay.  
Additionally, they discount exponentially at a constant rate that relates to the length of the 
delay.  In sum, the global finding is that people are disposed to greater impulsivity in the 
short-term. 
 
Cultural biases  
 
Shared disposition 'world view'.  
 
Key findings 
 
 People are disposed filter information on risk uncertainty over high profile issues with 
reference to alignment with a range of characterizable world views. 
 
 Different target audiences may have different orientations and informational needs / 
preferences with regard to risk and uncertainty. 
 
 The mental models perspective on risk communication offers a means of charactering 
the perspectives of different stakeholders / different population segments. 
 
 
Although not strictly a cognitive bias, in the sense that insights arise from social anthropology 
and sociology rather than cognitive or behavioural science, cultural biases have been 
characterised as cognitive filters (Kasperson et al, 1988).  The cultural theory of risk advances 
a typology of essentially socio-political orientations ('World views') hierarchist, egalitarian, 
collectivist, individualist, and hermit onto which different social groups (and by extension 
individuals and sectional interest groups) with different characterisable perspectives on risk 
and uncertainty can be segmented and mapped (Douglas, 1966 1982 1992; Douglas and 
74 | P a g e  
 
Wildavsky, 1982; also see Dake, 1992).  Environmentalists, for example, are cast as 
'egalitarian collectivists'; characterisable as pessimistic and prone to focus on the 
consequences of threats to the environment and in favour of strong regulation.  By contrast. 
individualists and hierarchists are claimed to align themselves with free market perspectives.   
 
Detractors have essentially argued that Douglas' central thesis "...people select certain risks 
for attention to defend their preferred lifestyles and as a forensic resource to place blame on 
other [interest] groups." Royal Society, 1992; P.7) aligns with common experience of a strategy 
people are prone to adopt when debating contentious issues (Weyman and Kelly, 1999).  
Other criticisms surround claims that it offers an unreasonably rigid characterisation of social 
differences (Pidgeon, 1996; Maris et al, 1998).  Empirical evaluation of the concept has been 
modest but there has been notable enthusiasm for the concept (see Dake, 1991; Jenkins and 
Smith, 1993, Slovic et al, 1994; Slovic and Peters, 1995).  Linkages to cognitive insights have 
been made, in which world views are cast as prepositional effects operating as cognitive 
filters (see Kasperson et al, 1988). 
 
Other authors offer a more organic perspective, pointing to normative influences derived 
from shared experience and motivational elements, e.g. when an individual (or organisation) 
is motivated by factors such as moral or professional responsibility or legal liability.  There are 
claims that the latter may sponsor under-confidence (and overly conservative, or risk averse 
judgements) because individuals (or organisations) find it difficult, or are unwilling to divorce 
their moral, professional and personal liability qualms from the assessment task (Slottje et al, 
2008).  It is not difficult to envisage situations in which scientific and technical risk assessors 
may expedience such effects when faced uncertainty.  Complementary findings highlight 
instances where shared experience and world view (in the sense of bounded rationality - see 
Simon, 1957; 1996) within the scientific community can limit perspectives on casual 
relationships (see, for example Wynne, 1989, 1992).   
 
Arguably a primary contribution of the world views concept contribution is that it highlights 
the need to consider a segmented approach to characterising stakeholder orientations on an 
issue and associated uncertainties, with the potential to inform thinking over engagement 
strategy when dealing with emotive issues.  A caveat to its application is that perspectives on 
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harm, uncertainty and concern tend to interact with the risk issue under consideration.  
 
There is increasing interest across government Departments and Agencies in the adoption of 
a segmented approach engaging with stakeholders including the public(s), particularly with 
respect to characterising profiles of concern, and levels of take-up of mitigation measures. 
 
The adoption of a segmented approach rests upon the capacity to characterise extant 
knowledge (accurate and inaccurate), knowledge needs, and orientating predispositions of 
different stakeholders (including the degree to which each can be considered to possess a 
homogeneous perspective).  
 
 
Group decision making bias  
 
Collective perspectives on risk and uncertainty can result in more than the sum of individual 
perspectives.   
 
Key findings 
 
 The configuration of risk assessment procedures may impact on the ratings / 
estimates of risk and uncertainty produced by experts.  
  
 The scope for large differences in individual expert risk assessments is high - group 
interaction or elicitation can increase consensus but may sponsor other undesirable 
effects. 
 
 Group deliberative processes have potential to sponsor polarization and choice shift 
effects. 
 
 Rather than producing 'averaging effects', groups processes can lead to more 
extreme decisions (risk seeking or risk averse). 
 
 Goal centred, isolated, highly cohesive groups that share a common world view can 
be prone to Group think. 
 
 Group-based deliberative techniques aimed at producing consensus, e.g. Delphi, can 
attenuate / mask the articulation and expression of uncertainties. 
 
 
Group process insights provide a number of insights that are of potential relevance to the 
elicitation (and combination) of estimates of risk and uncertainty derived from the 
judgements by multiple experts risk assessors.  There are a range of permutations with regard 
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to how ratings may be elicited from multiple experts, and how they might be combined.  The 
primary focus in this section is on the former, but will have implications for the latter.  
Elicitation options include variations on: 
i. individual appraisal and rating in camera;  
ii. interactive group appraisal12 - followed and individual rating in camera;  
iii. interactive group appraisal - followed and individual rating in public; 
iv. individual rating - followed by interactive group appraisal - followed by individual 
reappraisal in camera;  
v. individual rating - followed by interactive group appraisal - followed by individual 
reappraisal in public;  
vi. interactive group appraisal - leading to whole group (consensus) rating, (possibly using 
formal techniques such as e.g. Delphi). 
 
Choices over the approach to elicitation have to impact on ratings of risk and uncertainty.  
Relevant insights here relates to the effects of social conformity, the effects of which are 
prone to vary with strength of (social) situation.  Social conformity effects relate to the extent 
to which an individuals’ behaviour is influenced by the attitudes and behaviour of overs, i.e. a 
social comparison effect.  Under most situations people seek social approval and alignment 
with the pack (see Asch 1951).  The costs of not conforming (e.g. to reputation, potential for 
embarrassment and similar) can be such that individuals adjust their behaviour (or expressed 
opinion) to avoid such losses. From the perspective of risk assessment, where individuals are 
required to publicly express (and likely justify) their ratings they may be inhibited from doing 
so.  Some might view this as a welcome feature form the perspective of achieving consensus.  
However, it brings with it the risk of suppressing dissent from the dominant view, which may 
diminish articulation of important elements.  
 
Of the above configurations, only option (i) is free from the possibility of group conformity 
effects.  However, option (ii) may reflect a more desirable strategy in instances were experts 
need to share and articulate technical insights through active debate, for example, where 
                                                     
12     Face to face discussion, on-line forum, or similar 
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there is a need to take account of multiple perspectives and multidisciplinary insights.   
 
Group deliberative processes can sponsor both polarization and choice shift effects.  
Polarization relates to deliberative processes leading to individuals changing their view. By 
contrast choice shift relates to deliberative processes producing a shift (change) in the group 
perspective on an issue.   
 
Of relevance to both expert and policy maker deliberations over risk and uncertainty are 
findings that relate to how group processes can impact on the characterisation of harm and 
the selection of intervention options, particularity where there is a strong drive to achieve 
consensus.  Variously, in the area of group decision making, findings highlight a tendency for 
deliberative groups (e.g. committees) to select more-extreme high risk options (Janis, 1972); 
more conservative choices (White, 1956), or averaging effects (Schachter, 1951; Cartwright 
and Zander, 1960) than would be the product of the sum of individual assessments (for a 
review see Isenberg, 1986).  It seems likely that findings reflect differences in group 
composition, intent and features of the issues under consideration.  Perhaps of note, a recent 
study has reported stronger group polarisation effects arising from an online dissuasion 
format than face to face meetings (Sia et al. in 2002).   
 
The more fundamental, and not unintuitive, conclusion is that groups with a shared objective, 
such as committees, are prone produce different results than the sum of individual 
assessments.  But clearly this does not necessarily mean that group decisions are poor 
decisions; rather it highlights that it can be important to consider how different configurations 
of eliciting risk assessment / mitigation decisions and associated judgements of uncertainty 
have the potential to impact on what emerges from the process. 
 
Janis in his seminal work Group think (Janis, 1972; for a review of subsequent related findings 
see Turner and Pratkanis, 1998) provides an account of how deliberative processes, in highly 
focused, isolated groups, whose members share a common world view, can sponsor both 
over-confidence in (shared) mental models of key variables and unrealistic optimism 
regarding the effectiveness of chosen mitigation measure(s) (Janis, 1972).   
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Headline characteristics of groups that are prone to exhibit Group think are said to be: high 
cohesiveness; isolation form external influence / perspectives, e.g. re: evidence; low 
motivation to engage with systematic appraisal of evidence, strong and highly directive 
leadership, self-censorship; shared social identify / world view; social marginalisation or 
exclusion of (within group) dissenters; high stress/time pressure for results; strong external 
pressure to achieve results; and stereotyped negative images of non-group members (e.g. 
other stakeholders).  Widely cited examples that are claimed to reflect the consequences of 
group think include: the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster and the failed CIA-sponsored 
counter-coup in Cuban - 'Bay of Pigs invasion' (1961).    
 
Strategies for reducing the propensity for group think to develop as a characteristic of 
organisational decision making surround being institutionally aware of its potential, and 
introducing formal procedural checks and balances that operate as a challenge function; 
where this is possible.  Strategies such as rotation of Chair responsibilities and / or a 
programme of limited tenure for group members may also help to reduce undesirable effects.  
Strategically, there may also be value in giving consideration to the potential for group think 
to occur amongst other stakeholders involved in the risk assessment / control process. 
 
The EFSA (2014) Guidance on Expert Knowledge Elicitation makes a number of 
recommendations for managing undesirable group process effects amongst expert assessors.  
Specifically, rather than self-managed groups, they advocate the use of a facilitator ('elicitor') 
to manage proceedings in order to "...encourage the sharing of knowledge without allowing 
the group to be dominated by the most confident and outspoken experts,..".  Facilitators 
should also  "Define seed variables in a way that triggers in the experts the same heuristics as 
the target variables and such that they are representative of the variables of interest." and ... 
"...recognise and correct potential biases." (EFSA P.33).   All three of these recommendations 
appear desirable, however the second and third are notably more challenging, but are not 
group process issues per se, and it would be misleading to interpret them as such, i.e. they 
relate to issues of calibration and their configuration to decision architecture / anchoring 
effects, that can be relevant in group assessment situations, but they are not limited to or a 
product group process; they are also relevant to individuals as assessors.  Although worthy, 
the EFSA recommendations on group process represent only a partial solution, in so far as, 
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they are limited to a sub-set of relevant group dynamics, i.e. (dominant voices), facilitation of 
knowledge sharing.  It is important that their adoption should not sponsor overconfidence in 
resolution of undesirable group process effects.  This issue and the effects of cognitive biases, 
is recognised  "...they can never be entirely removed."  in the RR1 evaluation report (Hart, 
2014). 
 
Framing effects and bias  
 
The manner in which issues are presented can impact upon the range of variables considered 
and choices in the context of uncertainty.   
 
Key findings 
 Semantic framing of issues or options as 'gains' of 'losses' can impact on perceptions 
and choices. 
 
 Decision architecture can impact on choices. Little is known about 'natural' 
(unintended) framing effects. 
 
 Deep framing of choices e.g. the configuration scenarios, can impact on variables 
considered when making choices. 
 
 
A large body of evidence highlights how the manner in choices are framed (how risks and 
uncertainties are portrayed, and who portrays them) can impact upon the choices that 
people make.   
 
Framing issues are relevant to the context of risk assessment performed by experts and 
evidence summaries submitted to minsters and policy makers. They have further relevance in 
the context of discourse with stakeholders, in particular, organised interest groups and 
motivating adoption of risk mitigation measures by landowners, growers, the public and 
others.    
 
Semantic framing  
 
Prospect theory highlights how manipulating the reference points in uncertainty scenarios 
80 | P a g e  
 
can impact on decisions.  Of the array of framing effects identified13 the most widely 
evidenced are 'domain effects', i.e. the semantics of framing an option as the probability of a 
'gain' or a 'loss'. When people are presented with uncertain choices of equal outcome value, 
casting them as a ‘gain’ or a ‘loss’ can impact upon their preferences in predictable ways (see, 
in particular, Kahneman and Tversky, & 1979; Kahneman and Miller, 1986).  
  
In one of the classic framing experiments participants were asked to make a choice between 
two differentially framed uncertain options (one gain one loss of equivalent objective value) 
for curing a life threatening disease.  Respondents showed a greater preference for the option 
that emphasised the ‘number of lives saved’ (positive frame), compared with the alternative, 
‘number of lives lost’ (negative frame) Tversky & Kahneman (1981).    
 
Similarly, framing options relating to forecasts of the effectiveness of pest or disease 
mitigation measures in a loss frame "the adoption of mitigation measure X will still result in 
the loss of 75% of species Y, might be predicted to elicit a different response, from "the 
adoption of mitigation measures X will result in 25% of species Y being saved".   
 
Cognitive framing insights are widely used in marketing and public policy domains with the 
overt aim of influencing the behaviour of target audiences. e.g. for  smoking cessation a gain 
frame, such as 'having more healthy years to spend with your grandchildren' , has been found 
to be more effective than the more traditional loss frame.  Similarly, but perhaps less 
positively, in commercial advertising for labelling of foodstuffs we can observe a tendency for 
producers to frame products as 'X% fat free'; rather than containing 'Y% fat', etc.  More recent 
insights on framing biases have shown that sensitivity to gains and losses can vary with the 
issue under consideration, see Ferguson et al, 2003).   
 
Application of framing insights are predominantly restricted to communication media, 
although more fundamental re-configurations of choice architecture have been attempted 
(see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  The central claim here is that configuring information in 
ways that take account of loss and gain decision biases can nudge people to select the 
                                                     
13  See for example Kahneman & Miller 1986; Linville et al, 1987; Fagley & Miller, 1990; Lindberg & Frost, 1992. 
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uncertain option preferred by the communicator.  Notice, that the perspective here is not one 
of providing neutral or objective information, but intentionally configuring the semantics in 
ways that play on people’s propensity to make mistakes.  While effects have been 
demonstrated in laboratory settings, the overriding picture is one of modest impacts when 
applied in isolation, rather than as component of a comprehensive multi-faced or layered 
approach (Weyman and Kelly, 1999).  Semantic framing is not a silver bullet. 
 
In instances where there is little scope for a positive frame, e.g. a choice between two 
unattractive options, gains are perhaps at best construed as a minimisation of losses (see 
Whyte, 1989).  
 
Deep Framing   
 
At a fundamental level the content of accounts and scenarios provided to experts (and other 
primary stakeholders) to characterise a pest or disease and associated risks and uncertainties, 
e.g. rates and manner of migration; effectiveness of mitigation measures;   and may bound 
the range of variables that are considered.  In essence, deep framing relates to a more 
profound level of choice architecture (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  Its configuration will 
likely focus attention on the authors characterisation which, if partial or incomplete, risks the 
omission or under-consideration of other insights.  By extension, if insufficient detail or scope 
is provided, this may encourage assessors to draw their wider knowledge and inferences, the 
quality and completeness of which may be variable.  The latter may reduce levels of 
agreement between assessors, particularly where there are marked differences in expertise 
and background knowledge.   
 
Significantly less is known about how natural framing (unintended man-made, or naturally 
occurring choice architecture) effects impact on decision making and behaviour in the 
context of uncertainty.  However, it seems likely that configurations will be context specific, 
e.g. variable depending on types of pests and associated regulatory arrangements etc.  
Where attempts are made to map the choice architecture relating to a specific issue, in 
addition recognising structural elements, it can be important to gain insight into people's 
beliefs and misunderstandings (mental models) about the choice architecture, in particular 
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aspects relating to uncertainty over consequences, as beliefs can be an important driver of 
decision behaviour.   
 
While it can be important to consider how information on uncertainty is framed and how this 
may impact on its interpretation by others, a caveat to the overt use of message framing, 
with the intention of sponsoring a desired interpretation, is that if it is too transparent there 
is a risk that it may "...lead to suspicions of manipulation." (Fischhoff, 1995).   
 
From the perspective of communication, message source can also operate as a framing 
effect, in so far as some sources may be viewed as more credible, reliable, informed or more 
trusted than others, and this may vary depending on the orientations of the target audience 
and characteristics of the issue over which there is uncertainty (see Trust and Cultural bias). 
 
 
Techniques for characterising stakeholder perspectives on risk and uncertainty    
 
It can be important to establish the extent to which the risk and uncertainty information 
needs, priorities and orientations of different stakeholders overlap or reflect discrete profiles.  
A challenge here is that this is prone to vary with respect to the pest / disease under 
consideration (although a categorisation of pests and diseases by shared characteristics may 
be possible).  
 
Segmentation analysis permits a mapping of impacts on stakeholders as well as the role of 
stakeholders in the adoption of mitigation measures. This should, ideally, extend to some 
empirical verification / characterisation of extant knowledge, and underpinning orientations.  
Expert and policy maker institutions (mental models) regarding the information needs of 
target audiences are often found to be inaccurate (Wynne, 1989, 1992; Weyman & 
Williamson 2007).  
 
Approaches aligned with the mental models approach to risk communication, developed at 
Carnegie Mellon University (see Morgan, 2001), have been demonstrated to offer an 
economical means of charactering the knowledge and understandings of different 
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stockholder groups, and endorsed by, amongst others the Royal Society (1992) and the HSE 
(2000) (a schematic summary of the general approach is provided in Figure 2).   
 
For (known and foreseeably) contentious issues it may be useful to extend the range of 
variables addressed beyond technical properties of the pest or disease, to capture broader 
contextual elements, e.g. trust in relevant government bodies, sufficiency of regulatory 
arrangements, confidence in mitigation measures, and similar (Weyman and Bibby, 2005; 
Weyman and Williamson, 2007).   
 
Issues of trust and credibility are of particular salience, as the impact of even the best crafted 
message is likely to be blunted, rejected or misinterpreted if the source has a negative profile.  
Again, who (institutionally) is trusted and for what types of information is likely to vary with 
the pest / disease under consideration, due to associations with the context in which is 
emerges (Pidgeon et al, 2003).  Again - it may be possible to consider this issue in terms of 
clusters of pests or deceases with shared (physical and contextual) characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Characterisation of Mental Models approach for developing communication content 
on risk & uncertainty - after Morgan et al 1992 
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stakeholder information needs and orientations, once characterised, are unlikely to be set in 
stone, rather they are prone to evolve as the threat and institutional reactions to it unfolds 
(including threats that turn out to be benign).  For example, during the initial identification 
phase the focus of concern will tend to be on uncertainties surrounding the nature and 
magnitude of potential consensuses.  Where mitigation measures are identified, this may 
change to uncertainty regarding the associated costs and their effectiveness.  As the issue 
unfolds the focus may shift to actions of government, the sufficiency of regulatory and 
institutional arrangements,   
 
From the perspective of communication over uncertainty (and broader aspects) of high 
profile issues, there are potential gains from periodic monitoring of the profile of stakeholder 
orientations.  Reasons for doing this are: 
 To understand and recognise change in the profile of concern of key stakeholders to 
inform decisions over future communication strategy. 
 To provide corroborative evidence of the effectiveness of communication activity with 
key stakeholders.    
 
Techniques for characterising and profiling stakeholder concern have been developed and 
used in HSE and FSA research (Weyman and Bibby, 2005; Weyman and Williamson, 2007).  
Reflecting findings in the public perception of risk literature the 'Public concerns gauging tool' 
was designed to profile public perspectives on a wide range of issues14.   
 
It is presented here as illustrative of the general approach, i.e. the issues measured could 
have a different focus, such as different of facets of uncertainty.   Similarly, the choice of 
population segments will depend on the purpose of the endeavour and the contrasts of 
interest. 
 
In the form it appears here, it has been applied to a range of issues, including passenger 
safety on the railways, hospital acquired infection, asbestos and veterinary medicines.  The 
variables addressed reflect a set of headline findings from the risk literature: dread 
                                                     
14 Point estimates are generated from mean scores on subjective rating scales.  In the example cited these values 
were derived from samples of the public (urban and rural) and DeFRA veterinary specialists.    
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(magnitude of consequences), outrage, trust, non-disclosure, and regulation.  Each variable is 
a psychometric scale comprised of a set of statements, against which respondents are asked 
to indicate their level of agreement.  Responses are aggregated to produce a fixed point value 
for each scale; for each group.  Repeat sampling has the capacity to capture change in the 
profile of concern over time.  Decisions over the size of the sample relate to the issue under 
consideration and what is to be claimed on the basis of it.  Under most circumstances 
relatively small samples will yield useful results.  Figure 3 illustrates a snapshot of differences 
in the profile of public concern regarding risks posed by veterinary medicines, for urban and 
rural samples, using radar diagrams (for a discussion of this type of display see section 9).  
Additionally, a panel of government veterinary experts was asked what they believed the 
profile of public concern to be.  Notable differences are apparent between the urban and 
rural profiles, and both show a marked difference to the experts' mental model of public 
concern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Characterisation of public perspectives on veterinary medicine risks 
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Note:  Segmented v's whole population approaches to engagement  
 
From the perspective of engagement and intervention with stakeholders arguments in favour 
of a segmented approach can be summarised as: 
i. Tailoring engagement strategy and information to the different perspectives and 
needs of different groups of individuals15 is likely to be more effective than using a 
one-size fits all approach. 
ii. In the context of adoption of mitigation measures identifying and targeting groups 
that are most malleable / amenable to influence can lead to a higher return for a 
given level of investment. 
iii. In the context of adoption of mitigation measures identification of high risk16 groups, 
e.g. by commercial activity or geographical location/region may represent the 
highest return on a given level of investment. 
iv. Avoiding wastage of resources though the provision of redundant information. 
(Adams & White 2004) 
 
However, knowing that different social groups or typologies of individual have different levels 
of knowledge, concern and information needs with respect to risk and uncertainty is of little 
value in itself, unless this can be mapped onto pathways to engagement and influence.  For 
example an analysis that creates a typology based on individual differences, e.g. personality 
profile, or trait typologies such as 'chancers' and 'conformists' is of little value from the 
perspective of intervention (see, for example Mc Nair et al, 2004).  A bespoke approach to 
intervention rests upon the capacity to locate relevant populations and organised interest 
groups geographically and / or socially, e.g. growers in the south east, and to take account of 
established and configurable pathways to influence17.  An observation is that segmentation 
analyses in public policy contexts tend to lack this level of sophistication (Karanika-Murray 
and Weyman, 2013). 
 
 
  
                                                     
15 Including common types of organisation e.g. importers, growers, landowners. 
16 A caveat is that high risk may also be hard to reach / influence, which may justify a focus on other segments that 
would yield higher rates of return. 
17 Pathways to influence may be direct e.g. between government departments or agencies, or indirect, via 
surrogates, e.g. trade associations. 
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8. How are different presentations of uncertainty interpreted? 
Numbers, Numbers versus Words, Number and Words 
 
 
Headline findings 
 
 It is safe to assume that almost all adults have a general intuitive awareness of chance, likelihood, 
dose-response relationships and trends.  
 
 Lay audiences have been found to perform reasonably well in interpreting numerical probabilities 
attached to discrete events. 
 
 Many people experience difficulty in comprehending the magnitude of low probability events, 
particularly when expressed as a decimal, e.g. .0001. 
 
 P values will mean very little to most people.  
 
 Reference criteria, e.g. time frame, size of base population can impact on how probabilities are 
interpreted. 
 
 There has been much interest in verbal (semantic) expressions of uncertainty in risk assessment and 
communication with lay audiences.  Principal limitations relate to different interpretations of their 
meaning and establishing their relationship to numerical expressions of probability. 
 
 The number and choice of semantic anchors used in some subjective judgement scales do not 
appear to be closely aligned with recommendations on scale design. 
 
 There is scope for misunderstanding where semantic anchors used in risk assessment scale deviate 
from the semantics used to express risk and uncertainty in everyday language. 
 
 People (expert and lay) are prone to select more serious sounding words as expressions of 
probability that are 'contaminated' by their perceptions of the seriousness of consequences.  
 
 The lack of precision in semantic characterisations may make the process of risk assessment appear 
vague and subjective to outsiders. 
 
 
The difficulty in finding effect ways to communicate uncertainty to lay audiences is not always 
appreciated in scientific, technical or policy communities.  A variety of ways of characterising 
uncertainty have been developed, but most were created in scientific, technical or business 
contexts, essentially for internal use, such that not all are easily or appropriately interpreted 
by lay audiences.   
 
A fundamental distinction, with far reaching implications for communication strategy, relates 
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to differences between frequentist and Bayesian perspectives.  Frequentist perspectives, or 
perhaps more pertinently, communication material that lends itself to expression in these 
terms, is arguably the more straight-forward to deal with.  Frequentist evidence benefits from 
the fact that it relates to historical data.  Hence, at least at a superficial level, the focus for 
communication is on presenting this information in a manner that is accessible and pertinent 
to the target audience(s).  Where Bayesian approaches and expert judgement are the norm, 
an additional challenge for communicators relates to the need for transparency over the 
process that underpins the estimates they produce, as well as the inherent uncertainty over 
these estimates, the sources of which tend to be multiple.  In this context, the scope for 
perceptions of the credibility and trust in the source, including the potential for accusations 
of bias and excessive risk aversion is significantly greater, as is the scope for debate over 
interpretation / extrapolation from evidence.    
 
Numerical characterisations of uncertainty 
 
Historically, much faith has been put in numbers as a means of conveying information on 
environmental and technological risk and uncertainty to lay audiences, variously, as a means 
of allying or stimulating concern over threats, or justifying institutional action, or inaction, 
associated with mitigation / control.   
 
There is a tendency amongst scientists and technical specialists to believe that 'the numbers 
speak for themselves', to the extent that they are prone to hand over evidence in formats 
close to the form in which they were produced.  However, where target audiences experience 
difficulty in their interpretation this not only undermines the impact of the data, but tends to 
bring with it the unhelpful effect of increasing the distance between analysts and their 
audience.  Commentating on this Fischhoff concludes "...experts clearly do not realise how 
poorly they are communicating." (Fischhoff, 1995).  More charitably perhaps, experts can 
experience difficulty in appreciating the needs of target audiences and in expressing their 
findings in accessible formats. The relevant science here is, after all, not their area of 
expertise. This can be very frustrating for analysts who will likely have invested a large amount 
of time and resource deliberating over the values presented.   
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An intuitive solution to the numbers issue can be charactered as if-only target audiences had 
a better grasp of basic statistics, probability and related concepts the problems would go 
away (Fischhoff, 1995).  However, the reality is that most people possess only a limited, rather 
impressionistic, understanding and this is unlikely to change (Linville et al, 1987).  Moreover, 
even the minority able to draw upon rusty statistical knowledge, from formal exposure in 
higher education, tend to perform little better than the wider population (Ibrekk and Morgan, 
1987).  Recognition of this has led to significant interest in finding ways to simplify numerical 
representations (and the language that might complement their interpretation) to enhance 
lay understanding. 
 
Note: It should be kept in mind that success in this respect in no way guarantees that the 
message the numbers convey will be relevant to recipients; accepted; acted upon or 
appropriately cited.  The prize is a modest one, i.e. people correctly interpreting the 
information they are presented with.  
 
It is safe to assume that almost all adults have a general intuitive awareness of chance, 
likelihood, dose-response relationships and trends (that are also susceptible to an array of 
decision biases - see section 8).  Additionally, lay audiences have been found to perform 
reasonably well in interpreting numerical probabilities attached to discrete events, e.g. the 
likelihood of rainfall (e.g. Murphey et al, 1980) although the format in which they are 
presented is likely to be important.   
  
Many people experience difficulty in comprehending the magnitude of low probability events, 
particularly when expressed as a decimal, e.g. .0001.  P values will mean very little to most 
people.  A partial solution is to translate such expressions into a more intuitive format, e.g. 1 
out of 10,000.  However, people are less likely to accurately interpret the difference, or 
degree of change, between 1 out of 10,000 compared with 1 out of 100,000.  Expressing 
probability as a percentage, e.g. a 10% chance of rainfall has strong intuitive appeal and is 
widely applied.  However, there is evidence that a notable portion of lay people demonstrate 
limited grasp of percentages (Duff et al, 1999).   
 
The time frame to which risk or uncertainty is anchored can also impact on how people 
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perceive the likelihood of harm, e.g. the chance of being injured in a car accident on any one 
day has been calculated to around 1 out of 10,000, whereas the chance of being injured at 
least twice during a lifetime of driving rises to about 1 out of 3 (Fischhoff et al, 1978).  A 
complementary findings is that variations in the size of the reference group operates as a 
framing effect, e.g. 3:10 compared with 300:10,000,  MacFarland and Miller (1994) conclude 
that people tend to focus on chance in frequency components (numerator) rather than the 
denominator (also see Yamagashi, 1997).   
 
Additionally, where issues are framed as a loss, increases in the size of the reference group 
can increase perceptions of likelihood, such that people are prone to become increasingly 
pessimistic about the magnitude of impacts.  However, for gain frames the reverse appears to 
be the case.  Denes-Ray and Epstein (1994), for example, report a stronger preferences for a 
9:100 chance of winning than a 1:10 chance.  Such examples highlight how judgement cues 
from the way options are characterised can trigger framing and anchoring effects (see section 
8). 
 
Further issues arising from framing effects should be considered when charactering relative 
risk, particularly for dealing with low probability issues.  For example, a rise in threat from 
0.5% to 1%, while reflecting a 100% increase, quoting the relative magnitude of change 
(100% - which may represent 'hot copy' as a media headline) is misleading in so far, as 
subjectively, it conveys the message of a large and significant change, whereas the probability 
of the event remains very low. 
 
A widely encountered approach to representing probability is to reference an unfamiliar to a 
more familiar (i.e. 'known') entity.  The appeal of using comparative risk or uncertainty 
estimates is that the known entity can provide an anchor against which the unknown can be 
compared.   
 
However, care needs to be taken in the selection of comparisons, because, as has been 
discussed elsewhere, people are prone to make reference to contextual components of 
different threats, e.g. voluntariness of exposure, trust in regulatory arrangements, magnitude 
of consequences.  Citing the substantially lower probability of death or injury arising from rail 
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travel compared with travel by car did little to assuage public and institutional or concern 
over safety on the railways following the spate of serious train accidents between 1997 and 
2003.  This was not because the public did not recognise differences in the probability of 
harm.  Their rejection of the comparison was referenced to the scope for controlling exposure 
and perspectives on corporate responsibility (Dyball and King, 2003 and see Fischhoff, 1995). 
 
A number of recommendations on the configuration of risk comparisons are provided by 
Covello et al, (1988).  However, there are claims that the empirical basis for these 
recommendations is limited (see Morgan et al, 1992). 
 
Verbal Characterisations of Uncertainty  
  
There has been much interest in, and use of, semantics (words) as a means of illustrating and 
characterise uncertainty in the complementary domains of expert judgement in risk 
assessment and in communicating the findings of assessments to lay audiences (see, in 
particular: Zwik, et al, 1989; Budescu et al, 1988; Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Wardekker et al, 
2008; Hinkel et al, 2011; Dietrick, 2012).  In part the affinity for semantic characterisations 
reflects the widely held belief within scientific and public policy domains (backed up by some 
research findings, see, for example, Budescu and Wallsten, 1985; Slovic, 1995) that lay 
audiences experience difficulty in interpreting numbers, in particular statistical probabilities, 
but likely also reflects unease within public policy science over ascribing numerical values to 
expert judgements, in the context of limited evidence and limited certainty.   
 
A salient issue is that, culturally, numbers are not only considered more precise than words, 
but once numbers are attached to entities, even where they represent best guesses, as time 
passes there is a tendency to treat them as fact, partly because users (people and 
institutions) are unsighted regarding their foundation.   
 
It seems likely that recognition of this and its potential consequences18 may go some way 
towards explaining the apparent affinity for the use of language, rather than numbers, to 
                                                     
18 Consequences: for users of risk assessment information; and, personal and institutional reputational impacts on 
scientists as providers of such information 
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express risk and uncertainty in institutional risk assessment systems.  Words perhaps also 
seem more closely aligned with the frequently vague and imprecise task of assessing risk, 
particularly in the context of deep uncertainty (Budescu et al, 1988).   
 
A number of studies point to potential pitfalls arising from the use of semantics to express 
probabilities, which apply to their use by experts in formal risk assessment procedures and as 
a component of communications with lay audiences.  Notably: 
 Context has been found to impact on how verbal probabilities are interpreted. 
 People are prone to be over-optimistic in assuming that others share their 
interpretation of a given verbal expression of amount. 
 People are prone to select more serious sounding words as expressions of probability 
that are 'contaminated' by their perceptions of the seriousness of consequences.  
 In the case of scales used to elicit adjustments of amount for plural risks, within 
assessor consistency tends to be significant greater than concordance between 
assessors, i.e. people tend to use scales consistently, but in different ways to each 
other (see Bryant and Norman, 1980; Brun and Teigen, 1988; Budescu et al, 1988; Patt 
and Schlagg, 2003 - cited in Hinkel et al 2011; EFSA, 2014). 
 
Semantics in Risk Assessment 
 
Use of semantics in risk assessment represents a dual challenge in public policy contexts.  
Words used to characterise different degrees of risk and uncertainty must make sense to 
experts, such that they use them in a consistent and reliable manner, but their meaning and 
impacts on decision making also need to be transparent to stakeholders.  A difficulty here is 
that the types of semantics commonly used in risk assessment may not readily reflect or map 
onto the semantics of how people describe magnitudes of risk and uncertainty in everyday 
language.  Thus, the semantics used in risk assessment scales may not be appropriate for 
expressing risk and uncertainty to stakeholders.  
 
There is a long history of semantic scales, which pre-dates empirical interest amongst 
psychologists and other social scientists. The Beaufort scale, for example, is designed to to 
93 | P a g e  
 
characterise different physical intensities of wind, i.e. a psychophysical scale of intensity based 
on 'just noticeable (or greater) difference' (see Fechner, 1860) (although current authors have 
no knowledge of empirical demonstration of this).  Early psychophysics experiments with light 
intensity and similar reflect the same principles (see Gescheider, 1997).  However, judgement 
of a psychical entity is quite different, psychologically, to the judgement of a subjective entity 
that does not benefit from any readily observable features.  Also the Beaufort scale (and 
similar) is essentially finite, with a knowable maximum.  The same cannot be said about 
entities that have unknown / unknowable maximal properties.  
 
The Canadian NPPO risk scales system uses vignettes (rather than words) to characterise 
successive magnitudes.  The method reflects an approach used in some experimental Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) research aimed at characterising the status of risk control: a 
different focus but essentially following the same principles. The semantics of amount used in 
the HSE scales were drawn from empirical findings on judgements of amount.  A fundamental 
difficulty with risk assessment is that it requires assessors to take account of multiple inter-
related criteria for judgement multifaceted entities. The difficulties surrounding this are 
reflected in the thinking behind the HSE scale.  It was also the reason why techniques such as 
paired comparisons have been found to perform better than alternative ranking techniques 
when attempting to produce relative rankings of multiple risks (see Cromer et al, 1984). 
 
Apples Xs oranges 
 
A routinely encountered approach in institutional risk assessment is the use of subjective 
scales to produce ratings of magnitudes or likelihood of harm and to combine the product.  A 
fundamental issue generally accepted by those familiar with contemporary risk assessment 
practices is that the process involves the mathematical corruption of combining nominal 
elements.  An arising issue is that the superficially straight-forward task of combining 
judgements of likelihood and consequences (and similar) embodies potential pitfalls of the 
type outlined below, if applied in an unsophisticated manner.  Unfortunately, the use of 
weightings and arbitrary decision rules to address such issues have the effect of making this 
institutively simple process appear opaque and subjective to outsiders. 
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Assuming a simple High / Medium / Low (H / M / L) representation, combination rules tend to 
take the form of (Probability) High X (Consequences) High, or (P) Low X (c) Low = Low.  
Typically, numerical values are, e.g. Low = 1; Medium = 2 and High = 3 are applied (in some 
systems these values are weighted), such that (P) Low x (C) Medium = 2.  However, a key 
limitation of simple multiplication is that (P) Low X (C) High = 3, produces the same numerical 
value as (P) High X (C) Low = 3, which under most circumstances cannot be considered 
equivalent.  This can be problematic where the product is used to inform decisions over 
prioritising risks for intervention and control (see Weyman and Anderson, 1998; Gadd et al, 
2003).  For example, in recent years the UK Railways sector, using such as a system to produce 
a ranking of its top 10 hazards, led to spillage of hot beverage being ascribed the highest rank, 
i.e. it happens every day and passengers often sustain an injury as a result.  Whereas, high 
speed train collision was ascribed relatively low rank, due to being a rare high consequence 
event.   
 
It has also been claimed that scientists are prone to experience discomfort and unease when 
required to perform risk assessments where there is a need to reduce complex multifaceted 
phenomena to a single value / rating, such as 'high', 'medium or low': impact; or 'likely', 'very 
likely' or 'almost certain': probability.  Scientists tend to be more comfortable with studying 
individual components of a problem and casting their findings in ways that avoid accusations 
of having drawn conclusions that go beyond defensible evidence (Moss & Schneider, 1997). 
 
The limits of simple H / M / L classifications are also reached where there is a need to 
describe very low probabilities, or a high level of certainty.  This is reflected in the 
development of systems with a greater array of anchors.  However, increasing the number of 
anchors can bring its own challenges in terms of the selection of appropriate semantics and 
cognitive capacity (see below).  Additionally, all bidirectional balanced low-high scales with an 
uneven number of anchors tend to suffer from ambiguity over the semantic ascribed to the 
mid-point, e.g. see there have been debates over the characterisation of mid-point 'medium 
likelihood' used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), leading to its 
substitution with 'about as likely as not' - see Wardekker, 2008 and MacLeod, 2010).   
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Inter-assessor concordance 
 
The central claim of advocates of semantic scales is that people (in particular lay audiences) 
are more familiar with verbal descriptions than statistical / numerical characterisations, 
because they are aligned with how people talk about probability and magnitude in day-to-day 
discourse.  It has also been suggested that semantic anchors may resolve the recognised 
tendency for experts to be overly precise when producing numerical estimates (and the 
associated risk of over-precision sponsoring overconfidence in estimates amongst policy 
makers and other stakeholders who use such information to inform their decision making).    
 
Conversely, detractors hold that "It is important to realise the limitations of using verbal terms 
rather than providing numerical values. The main problem is that people have different 
linguistic probability lexicons‘, which is to say they possess different understandings of 
different verbal terms, such as likely" (EFSA, 2014; P.32) 
 
Principal arguments against the use of semantic anchors surround: 
i. their lack of precision;  
ii. tendency to be interpreted differently by assessors (and lay people); 
iii. tendency to make the process of risk assessment appear vague and subjective to 
outsiders.  
(Budescu et al, 1988; Wardekker et al, 2008; Hinkel et al, 2011). 
 
The later (iii) may owe something to the degree of sophistication applied to the naming of 
anchors.  However, the use of semantic characterisations and expressions of amount are 
widely applied in contentment risk assessment procedures (Gadd et al, 2003).   
 
An observation of the EFSA's forthright condemnation of the use of semantics in risk 
assessment scales,  
"....they are inferior to a well conducted elicitation of probability 
distributions and can lead to less accurate risk assessment.... qualitative 
estimates are particularly deficient. (EFSA Guidance on expert knowledge 
elicitation, 2014 P.20) 
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is that, paradoxically, the authors of this report advocate their use for the more fundamental 
issue of selecting risk assessors; using self-assessed questions that include:  'How would you 
rate the ease of making good judgements in your work?' (seven point Likert scale, ranging 
from 'very difficult' to 'very easy'); similarly, 'Do you make use of a formal model for making 
your work judgements?' (range 'never' to 'always').  Beyond the paradox, questions of this 
type are also prone to elicit a range of unhelpful self-serving attribution biases (see Shepperd 
et al, 2008).  
 
Evidence of low levels of inter-assessor concordance using semantic scales has given rise to at 
least two conclusions:  
i. more appropriate semantics should be selected for the anchors;  
ii. the inherently subjectivity represents grounds for their abandonment and substitution 
with numbers, in particular probability estimates.   
The issue of choice of semantics is potentially resolvable, in so far as recognised techniques 
exist for determining expressions of amount that are shared by the majority of individuals.   
 
At this point it is perhaps useful to reflect upon the aims of the judgement task.  Specifically, it 
is to indicate some linear change in magnitude (of some degree greater than just noticeable 
difference) between each anchor and the next.  The semantic distance between anchors is 
therefore important, i.e. in extremis, a scale with a set of anchors of the type 'almost zero 
chance', 'very little chance', a' small chance', 'quite likely', 'almost certain 'is clearly 
unbalanced.   The distance between the anchors in terms of meaning is compressed at one 
end - and extended at the other, i.e. the semantics are negatively skewed.  What is less clear is 
the extent to which widely used risk assessment scales suffer from equivalent, but likely more 
subtle, effects.  
 
A substantial body of research has been dedicated to defining the semantics of judgements of 
amount that are: meaningful to people; have equidistant intervals of meaning equidistant 
(the 'distance' between one and the next is equivalent in psychophysical space); elicit reliable 
(reproducible) responses; and can be demonstrated to elicit high concordance between 
assessors, for the assessment of a given stimulus/ 
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With regard to methods for achieving this, a range of ranking and sorting options are 
available.  Of particular note is the method of paired comparisons (Thurstone, 1927; 1959, 
also see Bock and Jones, 1968), which has been found to perform well in judgements of risk 
and uncertainty (see Sjoberg, 1967, Cromer et al, 1984; Wallsten et al, 1986).   
 
General guidelines on the choice of semantics and design of scales is widely available, see for 
example Bass and Cascio, 1974; Oppenheim (1966).  An observation is that choices over the 
semantics and number of anchors commonly encountered in risk assessment scales do not 
appear to draw upon, or benefit from, these insights in large part.  This is likely of limited 
consequence for simple scales of the High Medium and Low variety, but becomes more 
salient when attempting to derive a higher level of granularity.  Evidence of the development 
of scales of six, seven, nine 10 and even 12 anchors are encountered in the risk assessment 
literature.  For example, the scale advanced by Kraus et al (2004) has 10; the Weiss scale 
(cited Wardeckker and van der Sluijs, 2005) has 12 and the EPPO scale, nine (source, McLeod, 
2010).  This contrasts with a recommended maximum of seven anchors in most guides to 
effective question / scale design. 
 
As MacLeod (2010) notes, the larger the number of anchors used in semantic scales the 
greater the scope for and potential magnitude of differences between assessors. This is not 
just because of the greater scope for choice but, more fundamentally, where expressions of 
amount reflect too high a degree of granularity the distinction between one anchor and the 
next is insufficient to elect reliable (reproducible) discrimination, i.e. the signal to noise ratio 
is too weak.  MacLeod concludes that reducing the number of anchors has the effect of 
reducing the sensitivity of the scale; which is true, but needs to be considered against the 
potential for adding noise to ratings.  
 
The claim that low inter-assessor concordance reflects some inherent shortcoming of 
semantic scales rests upon the assumption that the fault lies with the concept rather than 
variability between assessors.  The assumption (see EFSA 2014) that expert risk assessors 
share a common view / perspective, such that variability in their assessments is due to 
shortcomings in the systems used to express their judgement, may represent a leap of faith.   
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As Walsten et al note, issues with semantic scales are not limited to the rigorous selection of 
the optimal set of anchors to achieve high consistency and high concordance.  Contextual 
effects can lead to scales being applied differently to one issue compared with another.  As 
Walsten et al note: "The meanings of non-numerical probability phrases, even to an individual, 
are almost assuredly not fixed over contexts." (Walsten et al, 1986).   
 
These authors identify a range of context sponsored sources of variability between assessors 
(also see Cohen et al, 1958; Pepper and Prytulak, 1974; Zimmer, 1984, cited in: Wallsten et al, 
1986):  
 Phrases relating to periodicity of occurrence e.g. frequency, tend to be referenced to 
background knowledge of the context, i.e. availability and anchoring effects (see 
section 8).   
 Judgements of amount e.g. some can be moderated by knowledge of the available 
quantity.   
 Knowledge of base rates. 
 Differences in knowledge domains.  
 
In short, differences in the nature of specialist knowledge and degree of sophistication of 
assessors' mental models will inevitably, in some degree, operate as a filter and may 
represent a more fundamental source of variability in ratings than shortcomings (of there are 
numerous examples) in the scales used (also see McLeod, 2010). 
 
As noted above, it can be important to take account the mental models of assessors.  In 
particular, to ensure that the variables they are considering under the different headings are 
meaningful to them and that they apply a common set of criteria / references.  There is also a 
risk that assessors will stray beyond the boundaries of what is intended by, for example, by 
severity and conflate this with magnitude.  Also we know from cognitive bias insights that 
magnitude tends to impact on perceived likelihood.  The most profitable perspective on 
resolution of this may lie in amending the assessment criteria to reflect assessor judgement 
processing / behaviour - rather than attempting to educate assessors to use scales 'properly'.  
Additionally, while potentially enhancing concordance over risk components and surrounding 
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uncertainties, applying assessor selection criteria designed to increase homogeneity of 
knowledge and shared world view may produce undesirable perspective effects that 
engender a shared bounded rationality and group think (see Simon, 1957; Janis; 1972; 
Gigrenzer and Selten, 2002).  
 
Note: The issue of defining appropriate expertise to conduct risk assessments comes into sharp relief in 
considering uncertainties over the impact of mitigation measures, as this requires the incorporation of 
insight and expertise that extends beyond the natural sciences.  While the choice of control is a technical 
issue, options are constrained by relative costs and benefits, and there is routinely a need to motivate 
change in the behaviour of others, e.g. importers, producers, landowners, of sufficient magnitude to achieve 
the necessary metrics of impact.  The assessment of mitigated risk cannot be divorced from consideration of 
the logistics of intervention.  Relevant supplementary expertise includes, economics, behavioural science and 
communication science. 
 
Citing findings form the evaluation of scales used in the EPPO Pest risk analyses scheme 
(2001), MacLeod (2010) notes higher inter-assessor concordance over pests judged as posing 
high and low risks, but lower concordance for those occupying the mid-range.  This finding is 
predictable, in so far as: 
i. where bi-directional scales are used, as is the case with the EPPO likelihood scale 
(cited in McLeod, 2010), ratings at the mid-point embody not just risk ratings that are 
ascribed to the mid-range in a linear sense, but are also prone to be contaminated 
with 'don't know' / 'uncertain' responses. 
ii. Pests judged to be at the higher end of the scale are likely to have a higher profile in 
the scientific community and the scientific literature, which will tend to increase their 
salience amongst assessors who share this experience (shared world view).  Where 
they embody unknown elements and / or are widely viewed as high consequence this 
may give rise to shared availability bias (see section 8).  Broadly equivalent, but 
opposite, effects can be predicted for the low end of the scale - sponsoring 
attenuation. 
 
With regard to the design of scales, care should be taken to avoid situations where 
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assessment involves combining the product of unidirectional19 and bidirectional20 scales (see 
Oppenheim, 1966).  If their product is to be combined, all should consistently be either one 
or the other.  The anchors should also, as far as possible, share a common distribution, i.e. 
avoiding skew.  The EPPO system (cited in McLeod, 2010) is a mix, e.g. the Adaptability index 
is a skewed bidirectional scale, the Extent and Frequency scales are uni directional.  Also the 
degree of skew in the scales is not consistent, e.g. similarity has only one negative, and four 
graduations of positive.   
 
At one level it might be tempting to conclude that a mixed-bag of scales amounts to a source 
of common error - across assessors.  However, the manner in which the products of scales are 
combined operate might have the effect of amplifying differences in systematic ways.  A 
common, uni or bi-directional, format that avoids varying degrees of skew would be better. 
 
Relating semantics to numbers 
 
A conclusion within Annex 3 of 'Methods for prioritising tree and plant pests and pathogens'  
was "...although the RR1 risk ratings do not have a defined quantitative meaning, they are 
consistent with experts' expectation that users of the RR1 have developed a good 
understanding of what levels of risk imply.  If so, a further option for making the risk register 
more quantitative may be to elicit a quantitative description of this relationship from users, so 
that it can be used to convert ratings produced by RR1 into a quantitative measure of risk." 
(Hart, 2012; Annex 3, p. 41).  
 
There are numerous examples of semantic systems used for risk assessment in which scale 
anchors are claimed to relate to defined numerical values, e.g. probability ranges or 
percentages.  "The overwhelming result is great variability in the values associated to words 
and large overlap among the ranges associated to various expressions." (Budescu et al, 1988.  
The IPCC system, for example has a seven point scale for eliciting judgements that a particular 
statement is true (see Table 9).  Reportedly, similar types of scale are used to assess 
                                                     
19 Unidirectional scale - an incremental scale of amount e.g. none, several, many... all 
20 Bi-directional (balanced) scale - e.g. very unlikely, unlikely, neither, likely, very likely. 
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confidence in ratings, degree of consensus and amount of evidence (see Wardekker et al, 
2008).    
Table 9: IPCC 2007 - Judgement of uncertainty scale 
extremely unlikely <1% 
very unlikely 1-10% 
unlikely  10-33% 
medium likelihood 33-66% 
likely 66-90% 
very unlikely 90-99% 
virtually certain >99% 
 
A characteristic of many scales of this type is that it is not clear what decision criteria were 
applied to ascribing the mapping of numerical values onto the chosen semantics; or for that 
matter the criteria for the selection of the semantics for the scale anchors.   
 
Returning to the IPCC scale, and similar instruments that attempt to map probabilities or 
proportions onto semantics.  At initial encounter, it is not immediately apparent what the 
purpose of this is.  If intended as a guide to assessors such that they can relate the semantics 
to a numerical value, it begs the question why not stick with the numerical ranges and 
dispense with the semantics? (see EFSA, 2014).  Casting light on the thinking behind this 
Budescu reports that, the decision to use semantic anchors referenced to corresponding 
numerical (probability) anchors in the IPCC scale reflected the view that, because some of the 
phenomena to be assessed are hard to specify and quantify, "...being vague and 
elastic..[semantics] ...are consistent with wide ranges of numerical probabilities" (Budescu et 
al, 2009).   
 
However, the vagueness and imprecision of semantic terms is widely recognised as their 
primary weakness (Wardekker, 2008; Budescu et al, 2009).  It has been suggested that IPCC 
thinking here reflected the desire to enhance consistency in the way scales were used by 
assessors, summarisable as  'fixing' probability terms to semantic anchors  "...makes it easier 
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to remember and consistent messages are perceived as more credible" (Wardekker et al, 
2008).   
 
However, if the probabilities / proportions in the IPCC are intended to reflect the semantics, 
and vice versa, this begs some justification, i.e. some empirical demonstration that very 
unlikely, for example, is interpreted as a 90-99% judgement of likelihood, and that multiple 
assessors interpret this is a common manner.  In the case of the IPCC scale it is also unclear 
why the selected numerical ranges approximate to a normal distribution, whereas the 
semantics at face value very likely do not (see Bass et al, 1974).    
 
Commenting on the potential for differences in how the semantics used in the IPCC scale map 
onto lay terminology for charactering risk and uncertainty, only time will tell whether 
Wardekker et al's claim (citing Pratt and Dessai, 2005) that resolution might lie in reminding 
readers of risk assessment output "...that the scale doesn't necessity match peoples' intuitive 
use of language, continually reminding readers of the definitions of probability terms and 
comparing probabilities of different risks where appropriate" (Wardekker et al, 2008) will 
prove effective in this regard. 
 
Additionally, Wallsten takes issue with risk assessment systems that seek to supplement 
judgements of uncertainty with ratings of confidence in such ratings (see, for example, Hart, 
2014), claiming that the former will, naturally, embody elements of the latter:  "Undoubtedly, 
people select and understand probability phrases not only as representing accounts of 
uncertainty but also as represented degree of confidence in that uncertainty...." (Wallsten, et 
al, 1986). 
 
Selecting empirically informed anchor words does not address the full range of objections to, 
or limitations of, the use of semantics scales.  However, there is likely scope to enhance the 
degree to which they elicit consistent judgements between raters.  Additionally, it may be 
possible to configure more defensible linkages to numerical representations of probability.  
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Prioritising risks and uncertainties 
 
A core objective of risk registers is to provide a prioritisation of threats and associated risks 
that informs strategic thinking over intervention choices.  While the focus will tend to be on 
threats judged as higher, as Hart appropriately notes "...allocation of resources for further 
assessment and risk management should be targeted not [necessarily] on the highest risks but 
on the actions that offer the best return on investment (benefit / cost ratios)" (Hart, 2014; 
Annex 3, P.41).  In this context, "...it has been argued that RR1 is used only to prioritise further 
consideration of risk and actions..." (Hart, 2014; Annex 3, p.29), i.e. RR1 should operate a 
primary filter, to identify a sub-set of pests / diseases that should be subjected to deeper 
consideration / assessment in Risk Register 2 (RR2).   
 
For RR2, while uncertainties regarding inherent risk remain, it is foreseeable that there will be 
an intensified, and relatively greater, focus on uncertainties surrounding mitigation / 
intervention options.  The range of uncertainties over intervention choices include, but are 
likely not limited to:  
 their relative effectiveness;  
 financial costs and benefits; 
 interactions with and impacts upon other species; 
 the reactions of stakeholders, 
 the capacity to propagate adoption of sufficient magnitude to achieve necessary 
metrics of impact.   
 
As noted elsewhere, the range of relevant expertise for assessing risk and uncertainty in this 
domain extends beyond the natural and engineering sciences.   
 
A criticism of RR1 is that its product is ordinal data. "If these were accurate, they would rank 
risks in order of expected value but not provide information on the magnitude of difference 
between risks.  For example, if one pest has a rating twice that of another pest, it does not 
mean the risk (expected value) is twice at [as] large.  Similarly, if two pests are close together 
on the rating scale, this does not necessity imply a small difference in risk." (Hart 2014; Annex 
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3, P.29).   
 
A recognised limitation of subjective rating scales is that they provide no indication of the 
interval ('distance') between the entities under consideration.  Additionally, as discussed 
elsewhere, it is important to derive insight into the degree of agreement between assessors.   
 
Section 8 highlighted the method paired comparisons in the context of identifying suitable 
anchors for semantic scales (Thustone, 1927; 1959).  This technique has also been applied to 
producing interval scales, of relative magnitude, in the risk assessment domain (see, for 
example, Sjoberg, 1967; Ostberg, 1980; Cromer et al, 1984 and O'Hara et al, 2014).  A notable 
strength of the method is its capacity to be applied to a wide range of risk management 
related issues, including (but not limited to): global judgements of risk for set threats, e.g. 
pests / diseases; their relative probability / likelihood of causing harm; their relative 
magnitude of harm; uncertainty over relative likelihood or magnitudes of harm; relative 
impacts on stakeholders; effectiveness of alternative mitigation measures; costs and benefits 
of alternative mitigation options, and more.   
 
The technique is well suited to the consideration of uncertainty as it is designed to deal with 
judgements where the intensity of the stimulus is not known or measurable in any objective 
sense, i.e. unlike traditional psychophysical scales, such as the Beaufort scale where the 
stimulus values are known, the method is designed to deal with situations in which "We are 
seeking to determine the stimulus values themselves." (Thurstone, 1959, p.69). 
 
Within the risk assessment / risk management domain, the technique has been applied in the 
nuclear sector, forestry, mining, emergency health service and elsewhere.  It is best suited to 
dealing with the consideration of a relative small number of entities (<10); e.g. top-tier 
pests/diseases, but can be extended to larger numbers.  The task for assessors is procedurally 
very simple and involves performing a set of paired judgements, for all permutations of 
pairings of elements under consideration.  It can be performed on paper, or electronically.  It 
could be used to capture consensus ratings produced by groups of experts, but is more 
routinely completed by individuals for subsequent combination.  
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Its strengths can be summarised as: 
i. it produces an interval scale of relative values, i.e. differences in magnitude; 
ii. it provides a coefficient of consistency (i.e. a numerical measure to check that 
individual assessors are making consistent judgements); 
iii. it produces more consistent within-assessor results (reproducability reliability) than 
direct ranking or subjective scales (see Cromer et al, 1984); 
iv. it provides a coefficient of concordance (i.e. a numerical measure of the degree of 
agreement between assessors); 
v. its product can be used to formally test differences (using parametric statistical tests) 
between different groups of assessors,  e.g. different groups risk assessors, experts, 
different stakeholders, different segments of the public, etc. 
vi. it is less onerous / labour intensive than alternatives, e.g. Q sort or Delphi. 
 
By way of example, Figure 4 summarises the output arising from the use of paired 
comparisons to establish relative ratings of trust in a set of UK risk management stakeholders; 
expressed as standard scores (Pidgeon et al, 2003).  Alternative, more spatially intuitive, 
formats for expressing results are possible.    
 
 
Figure 4: Relative Public Trust in Risk Management Stakeholders 
 
Although the product of paired comparisons is an interval scale, which embodies a 
quantifiable metric of concordance (consensus), the intent is quite different from techniques 
which set out with the objective of establishing consensus, e.g. Delphi.  Core limitations of 
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Delphi, and similar techniques relate to group process effects, some of which may be 
undesirable, e.g. suppression of dissent, unrealistic optimism regarding selected options (see 
section 7) and the tendency to mask / underplay elements over which there is uncertainty 
(see Yousuf, 2007).   
 
Communicating uncertainty to stakeholders 
As a number of authors have noted, the area of translating the product of risk assessments 
and issues over which there is uncertainty into forms and formats that are accessible to lay 
audiences has received modest attention.   
 
Based on a review of empirical findings and their own empirical work Budescu et al (2009) 
have produced the recommendations summarised in Table 10. 
Table 10 Summary of Recommendations to IPCC on Communicating Uncertainty in Risk 
Assessments to Lay audiences Source Buddescu et al, 2009 
 
Make every effort to differentiate between the 
ambiguity of the target and underling uncertainty. 
e.g. "it is very unlikely that this species will undergo a 
large, abrupt extinction over the next decade..." 
People may disagree with the risk statement due to 
different interpretation of unlikely and / or over the 
magnitude of change characterisable as large and 
abrupt. 
As far as possible, specify  the range of sources of 
uncertainty relating to key events; their nature; 
magnitude as far as  
E.g., clarify whether uncertainty is due to incomplete 
knowledge of pathway to harm, unreliability of 
measurement, and magnitude of impact. 
Use both verbal and numerical values Semantics should rely on a common stem e.g. likely*, 
using seven anchors. 
Adjust the width of numerical ranges to match the 
uncertainty of target events e.g. "likely (60-80%)" or 
"likely (80-90%)", 
Communication of uncertainty should be refined by 
conveying differential levels uncertainty that reflect 
the decree of consensus (or lack of) about the 
reliability and quality of available evidence. 
 * Plausibly this recommendation is limited to the IPCC scale, 
rather than being a generic recommendation 
 
The need to specify the nature and range, uncertainties i.e. over what and why, is underlined 
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which cautions; "It is usually dangerous for 
messages to characterize the overall level of uncertainty quantitatively, as might be done by 
describing statistical confidence intervals. In most situations expert assessments have multiple 
sources of uncertainty, and statistical measures do not adequately represent the complexity of 
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the analysis." (NUREG BR-0308, 2008; p.171). 
   
Use of Graphics to Represent Uncertainty  
 
Headline findings 
 
 Most forms of graphic presentation were not configured with lay audiences in mind. 
 
 Familiarity within scientific graphic representations of probabilities can sponsor an under-
appreciation of the difficulties laypeople may experience in interpreting them. 
 
 Kite diagrams, radar diagrams and pedigree charts are used to express probabilities and 
uncertainties in other risk assessment/management domains. 
 
 A number of the widely used graphic representations can sponsor an array of interpretation errors / 
biases. 
 
 Box plots offer a simple intuitive format - and should represent a default choice where the 
limitations of the format permits.  
 
 PDFs and CDF's are unfamiliar to laypeople and are conceptually unintuitive. 
 
 Risk maps offer an intuitive spatial display of risk and associated uncertainties.  Types of map are 
characterisable as: difference maps, scenario maps, ensemble maps and grid maps. 
 
 The area of graphics as a measure of uncertainty would benefit for further, more extensive and 
comprehensive, empirical investigation. 
 
 
The use of graphical presentations as a means of conveying uncertainty to lay audiences is 
widespread, yet as a number of authors comment the literature on best practice in this area 
is notably sparse (Lipkus and Hollands 1999; Hinkel et al, 2005; Wadekker et al 2007).  
However, almost all commentators emphasise the pitfalls of attempting to convey too much 
information and failing to configure information in ways that take account of target audience 
needs and capacities. This situation is potentially complicated by the fact that most forms of 
graphic presentation were not configured with lay audiences in mind, i.e. most types have 
been developed for use within scientific and technical disciplines to convey meaning to 
individuals schooled in their interpretation.  Moreover, as with numerical expressions, the 
arising familiarity within scientific and technical disciplines risks under-appreciation of the 
difficulties others might experience in interpreting them.   
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Less than helpfully, most communication guides make rather shallow recommendations of 
the type 'Information should be presented in a format that is accessible and meaningful to the 
target audience.'  While it is important to take account of preferences over format, Wardekker 
et al for example claim that policy makers have a preference for probability density functions 
and tables, rather than more complex representations, preferences for style of graphic are 
only part of the issue, representations most pertinently need to be of close fit with the 
questions the target audience wants answer to. 
 
When attempting to communicate with both expert and lay audiences21, visual displays, such 
as graphs and maps embody the potential to enhance conceptual understanding (which 
variables are important, how they interact, or proliferate) and numerical understanding of the 
properties of sources of harm, risk and associated uncertainties.   
 
As Lipkus and Hollands note, while there are exceptions, most research in this area is 
atheoretical (Lipkus and Hollands, 1999).  Most studies set out to address ostensibly simple 
questions of the type, 'do graphs produce more accurate interpretations than better than 
numerical representations', 'are graphs a useful supplement to numerical representations', 
'are some graphical protestations more accurately interpreted than others'.  Few provide any 
rationale for the types of graphics selected for evaluation, with little or no articulation of the 
potential for intervening variables, e.g. quality of graphic representation, quality of 
supplementary information or choice of numerical representation of probability.   
 
 
Kite diagrams, radar diagrams and Pedigree Charts 
 
The NUSAP evaluation workshop on characterising uncertainty (van der Sluijs et al, 2000) 
explored the use of range of graphical displays to express uncertainty.  Notable formats 
included kite diagrams, radar diagrams and pedigree charts, as well as supplementary displays 
such as box and whisker plots.  The evaluation centred on lay interpretations of 
                                                     
21 Recognising that the needs of each may be different. 
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representations of expert judgement relating to the quality of science on an issue, using a five 
point scale (ranging from 0 = weak; to 4 strong), with semantic descriptors for each scale 
anchor.  A core objective was to identify representations that would be effective for 
addressing a wide range of domains of uncertainty, e.g. empirical basis, theoretical 
understanding, methodological grounds, quality of proxy, value-ladenness, or validation.   
 
The use of radar graphs and box plots, combined with the intent to use a common set of tools 
to assess a wide range of issues of uncertainty mirrors the remit for the Risk Gauging Tool 
discussed below.   
 
The NUSAP Kite diagrams involve the use of colour (red amber green) to indicate the range of 
ratings given by experts (Figure 5).  Wardekker, et al (2008) record that green was used to 
depict minimum score and red high score.  If this was the case, this choice seems rather 
counter-intuitive, i.e. green as indicator positive / safe and red for danger is strongly culturally 
normed (see BS EN 61310-2:2008).   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Example NUSAP Radar and Kite diagrams 
Source: https://proxy.eplanete.net/galleries/broceliande7/nusap-analysis-timer-energy-model 
 
Wardekker et al's (2008) conclusion that radar diagrams may be less suitable for non-
scientists, does not chime with findings from the applications of the Risk Gauging Tool 
developed by the HSE (Weyman and Bibby, 2005; Weyman and Williamson, 2007), where the 
radar display format (supplemented by box plots and summary text) where liked and 
interpreted accurately by policy makers.  An example of the radar diagram output from the 
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HSE Risk Gauging Tool is provided in Figure 6.  An issue with radar diagrams is that the shape 
of the plot will vary depending on the order chosen for the variables.  Therefore, it is 
important to keep this consistent when comparisons are made 
         
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example Radar Graph Source Risk Gauging Tool (Weyman and Bibby, 2005) 
 
An alternative form of pedigree chart reported to have been trailed in IPCC workshops (Figure 
7) depicts an average of expert scores using a coloured gradient from green to red (but in this 
instance appropriately using red to indicate a low score - negative, and green for high - 
positive). This display includes an option to use error bars to represent the range of 
aggregated expert point scores.  Wardekker et al claim that this format is easier to interpret 
than radar diagrams and the manner in which colour is used is less likely to mislead the 
viewer than kite diagrams. Policy advisers were said to be "...very enthusiastic about this 
chart." (Wardekker et al, 2008). 
 
Graphics and schematic representations embody the promise of providing intuitive 
economically efficient (time to process) ways of presenting numerical values and variable 
relationship information on risk and uncertainty.  Lupkas and Hollands claim that graphics 
possess at least three desirable properties:  
 they can reveal patterns that may otherwise go undetected e.g. line graphs are useful 
for portraying trends; pie charts and divided bar graphs proportions are well suited for 
depicting proportions; maps for spacial elements; 
 they can speed up time taken to make process information e.g. comparison of the 
impact of alternative risk control / mitigation options; 
Non disclosure
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 they can attract and hold more attention than text. 
 
To the above might reasonably be added, if well designed they have the potential to enhance 
conceptual understandings of issues, variables and associated uncertainties, e.g. a spatial 
schematic adjunct to numbers potentially enhances pattern perception / recognition. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Example IPCC pedigree chart 
Source: https://proxy.eplanete.net/galleries/broceliande7/uncertainty-communication 
  
An observation is that these features may not be desirable under all circumstances, e.g. they 
can channel attention, such that important information in accompanying text may be missed.  
Additionally, people may focus on relative rather than absolute differences.  Lipkas and 
Hollands' underline the importance of ensuring (empirically) that the interpretation placed on 
graphics by target audience reflects the intention of the architects, rather than taking this as a 
given. 
 
Representing probability distributions 
 
Conventional options for presenting probability distributions for a uni-dimensional uncertain 
entity are essentially limited to three choices: a probability density function (PDF), a 
cumulative density function (CDF) or as a Tukey box plot, although alternative formats have 
been trialed. 
 
Although each contain broadly equivalent information, the graphics emphasise different 
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aspects of the probability distribution.  The box plot emphasises the median and confidence 
intervals. The density function shows the relative probabilities of different values.  Morgan 
and Henrion (1990) conclude that the greater sensitivity of the PDF to displaying small 
variations may be both a strength and a weakness, depending on the message that the 
communicator wishes to convey.  Additionally, as a rule of thumb these authors advocate the 
use of the box plots, in preference to PDF's or CDF's, on grounds of simplicity, provided they 
provide sufficient information to capture and convey the key message. 
 
With regard to choices over when to use a PDF or a CDF, Morgan and Henrion suggest 
application of the criteria summarised in Table 11, but go on to note that this should not be 
interpreted as privileging the use of one over another, rather they advocate the simultaneous 
display of both (one above the other) sharing a common horizontal axis.    Possibly, somewhat 
optimistically in view of other evidence, these authors conclude that "...looking at both 
together can help educate viewers about meaning and properties of probability distributions." 
Morgan and Henrion, 1990). 
Table 11: Relative strengths of PDF and CDF's 
The probability density function is best for displaying  
the relative probability of values 
the most likely values (modes) 
the shape of the distribution (e.g. skew and kurtosis) 
small changes in probability density 
 
The cumulative density function is best for displaying 
fractiles, including the median 
probability of intervals, including confidence intervals 
stochastic dominance 
mixed, continuous and discrete distributions. 
Source  Morgan and Henrion 1990 
 
Morgan and Henrion's conclusions in this area draw heavily upon findings earlier empirical 
work on lay interpretations of alternative graphical reorientations of uncertainty (Ibrekk and 
Morgan, 1987).  
 
Ibrekk and Morgan (1987) set out to compare (refer to Figure 8): 
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 A traditional box plot point estimate (with error bar) that spanned the 95% confidence 
interval (picture 1).  
 A discretised version the PDF (picture 2); 
 A second representation of the discretised PDF, which used a pie chart to 
communicate probability, where the segments span equal intervals in the uncertain 
quantity (picture 3);   
 A conventional PDF (picture 4);  
 A PDF of half its regular height, together with its mirror image (picture 5);  
 A PDFs using bars of constant width that were shaded using dots (display 6) and 
vertical (picture 7) to display probability density. 
 A Tukey box plot modified to display the mean as a fixed point and exclude maximum 
and minimum  values (picture 8)  
 A conventional CDF (picture 9). 
 
Note:  In the interests of clarity the graphical representations used by Ibrekk and Morgan as 
presented in this document have been re-drawn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1 
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       Picture 3 
 
 
Picture 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Alternative Representations of Probability - Ibrekk and Morgan 1987. 
 
A summary of key findings from empirical work by these authors is provided in Table 12. 
Picture 5 
Picture 5 
Picture 7 Picture 8 
Picture 3 
i t re 5 
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Table 12: Morgan & Henrion 1990 - Summary of findings 
 Graphs 1 & 8 which explicitly marked the mean resulted in the most accurate estimate of the mean 
 Box plots and error bars are preferable (due to ease of interpretation), where means are the focus 
for communication, but are less effective for commutating probability intervals when PD is not 
unformed along he horizontal axis.  
 The strategy participants used to produce a "best estimate" for graphs 2, 4, and 5 was to select the 
point where the curve was highest.  For displays 6 and & they selected the point of maximum 
probability density. 
 Accuracy was poorest for the CDF.  21/45 respondents produced inflated estimates of the mean. Of 
these 17 produced estimates that corresponded to the maximum possible value, i.e. they selected 
the top of the curve. 
 The pie chart was found to sponsor confusion and misinterpretation. 
 In displays that do not provide a strong graphical indication of density people are prone to apply a 
leaner proportion strategy. 
 People show a tendency to select the mode rather than the mean in representations of PDF's 
 The simplified PDF's (graphs 5, 6, & 7) elicited broadly equivalent accuracy, despite varying 
popularity, leading the authors to conclude that they can be used interchangeably. 
 For CDF's, there are suspicions that unless clearly marked people are prone to confuse the mean 
with the median.  
 PDF's should be used to support interpretations of CDF's, e.g. plotting one above the other, sharing 
a common horizontal scale - with the mean clearly marked on each curve22. 
 
A complementary finding is the claim that probability density functions can lead people to 
focus on the tails of the display.  A net result of this is said to be that the magnitude of 
perceived risk tends to be greater, leading to enhanced potential to elicit a disproportionately 
risk averse reactions (Krupnick et al, 2006). 
 
Morgan and Ibrekk also asked their participants to provide an indication of their confidence in 
the accuracy of their estimates, as well as their familiarity with each type of display.  This 
revealed highest confidence for pictures 1 and 2, and least for 5 and 9.  The authors contend 
that high confidence for picture 2 is significant, in view of evidence of the inaccuracy of its 
interpretation.  With regard to familiarity with the displays, in descending order participants 
indicated they had seen: 2 & 3 many times before, 1, 4 & 9, less frequently, 5, 6, 7 & 8 few or 
no times before.  A second iteration of the study invoked the addition of written explanations 
                                                     
22 Lupkas and Hollands (1999) endorse the benefits of adding data points and decision point to graphics. 
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for each graph.  The authors concluded that this produced only weak improvements23.   
 
These authors conclude that the performance of different displays depends upon the 
information that the reader is aiming to extract.  At first sight their conclusion: "Displays that 
explicitly contain the information that people want shows the best performance," (Ibrekk and 
Morgan, 1987) presents as no great cause for celebration.  However, the authors intent is to 
highlight the need for communicators to have a clear appreciation of audience needs / 
preferences, and to supplement graphical displays with suitable text and anchors, e.g. clearly 
marking best estimate values, maximum and minimum and range, and similar.    
 
Reflecting on the limited findings in this area Dessai (cited in Wardekker et al, 2005) has 
suggested a series of potentially useful further experiments: 
vii. A comparison of text only with text plus graphics based communication material, to 
establish the added value produced graphics. 
viii. Adopt a more organic approach to the selection of graphic representations adopted 
by Ibrekk and Morgan, though public engagement to establish display preferences, i.e. 
methodological a bottom-up, rather than a top down (researcher configured) 
approach to selecting a set of formats. 
ix. Experiment with their use as a component of scenarios, essentially characterisations 
of alternative futures, particularly in contexts of deep uncertainty. 
 
A not easily resolved issue, alluded to earlier, with respect to configuring experiments to 
address (i) and (iii), relates to comparing two mediums (e.g. text and graphics).  The 
deception of both will unavoidable embody variability in terms of the quality of their 
depiction, most acutely with regard to the configuration of text, e.g. understanding of an 
unintentionally poor textual characterisation may not be significantly enhanced by the best 
configured graphic (and vice versa).  
    
                                                     
23 Ibrekk and Morgan provide no explanation of how they contorted for effects associated with the quality of these 
descriptions. 
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Alternative graphics for representing risk and uncertainty 
 
Although focused on the communication of risk, rather than uncertainty per se, Lipkus and 
Hollands (1999) provide a useful review of alternative graphical displays, including risk 
ladders, line graphs, pie charts, histograms, dots and similar to indicate proportions.  Two of 
the more relevant and novel24 formats for to expressing uncertainty: risk ladder and dots are 
presented in Figures 9 and 10.   
 
Note: The reader is reminded that the volition behind Lupkas and Hollands' work was not to convey 
uncertainty, but to discover whether different forms of presentation impact on peoples sense of personal 
vulnerability to harm, i.e. it reflected a core assumption of value expectancy models of behaviour change 
(See Darnton, 2008) that amplifying an individual’s sense of vulnerability will increase their motivation to 
take precautionary action, e.g. over lifestyle choices, such as smoking cessation, adopting a low fat diet and 
similar.  However, Lupkas and Hollands (1999) do engage briefly with the commutation of uncertainty; 
additionally some of the evidence they cite relates to environmental issues. 
 
Risk ladders - are widely used to depict environmental risks.  Typically, they are applied to 
depict a range of magnitudes, such that greater risk is depicted at higher 'rungs' on the 
ladder.  Plural risk ladders can be used depict to indicate relative risk, or relative uncertainty, 
e.g. relating to best and worst case scenarios.  They can also be used to engender anchoring, 
e.g. where the position of a novel risk is referenced to a risk already known to target 
audiences e.g. smoking versus radon exposure (see Weinstein, et al, 1993).  Used in this 
manner they can be used to arouse concern, by conveying the message that a new threat is 
equivalent to or higher than other risks on which public policy action has been taken.  
Alternatively, this format can be used to indicate that a new threat is lower than a currently 
tolerated risk. There are options to enhance risk ladders with potentially useful 
supplementary information e.g. critical values above at which serious harm may occur, or at 
which mitigation measures will be applied. 
 
Line graphs - are very widely applied as a means of indicating change over time and trend 
information, and benefit from an intuitive format where they relate to change over time.  As 
with risk ladders, the format lends itself to the inclusion of relevant supplementary 
                                                     
24 Pie chart, trend line and histogram are not included due to their lack of novelty. 
118 | P a g e  
 
information e.g. action values / points.  Arguably their core strength, indicating change over 
time, can also be a weakness in instances where the depiction sponsors inferences of a trend 
based on too few data points. 
 
Cancer Risk from Lifetime Radon Exposure 
Radon level 
(pCi/L) 
Extra Cancer Deaths 
(out of 1000 people) 
100 
 
40 
 
20 
 
10 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0.5 
 
0.1 
500 in 1000 
 
200 in 1000 
 
100 in 1000 
 
50 in 1000 
 
20 in 1000 
 
10 in 1000 
 
5 in 1000 
 
2.5 in 1000 
 
0.5 in 1000 
Source: Lipkus and Hollands 1999. 
 
Figure 9 - Example Risk Ladder 
 
Dots & related formats - a number of experiential studies have used highlighted dots, (and 
similar, e.g. depictions of marbles in a jar), embedded in an array of dots, generally as a 
supplement numerical representations of probability.  The idea is that the higher the relative 
proportion of highlighted dots (in this instance) to non-highlighted dots, the higher the 
perceived probability of an entity.  Lipkus and Hollands cite claims that presentation in this 
format has tends to sponsor a perception of greater vulnerability (perceived threat) than 
numerical information alone.  A series of representations of this type have also been used to 
convey an indication of change in probability over a defined time period. 
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Figure 10 - X's represent 1:10 probability affected by the risk 
 
 
Pie charts - are widely used, with the intent of conveying relative proportion.  A strength of pie 
charts is that, like histograms, they represent one of the simplest, most intuitive forms of 
graphic representation, which most people encounter during formative education.  Within 
the risk domain, known applications include the intent to convey comparisons between 
different risks, in a single chart e.g. public transport versus cars.  Similarly, multiple pie charts 
have been used to indicate an essentially equivalent message (however, Ibrekk and Morgan 
(1987) caution against their use). 
 
Histograms - like pie charts, histograms represent one of the most basic forms of graphic 
representation of quantity and can be considered all-but universally familiar to lay audiences.  
This format provides both absolute and relative values.  It is foreseeable that the depiction of 
relative values may engender anchoring effects. 
 
Headline findings from Lipkus and Holland (1999) are summarised in Table 13 
 
Table 13:  Lipkus and Hollands 1999 - Key findings 
Risk ladders  People’s perceptions of threat are influenced by the location of the risk on the ladder - 
in particular people saw threat as greater for risks that were placed at the top of the 
ladder.  
Highlighting the exposure of different groups (or regions and other relevant 
demographics) on the ladder provides an indication of relative risk.  The 
characterisation depends on whether the intent is to stimulate or attenuate concern.   
The inclusion of probabilities, e.g. number of losses arising from different levels of 
exposure, seems to help people understand different impacts associated with different 
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levels of exposure. 
Can be configured to convey an intuitive indication of dose - response relationships.  
Helps people to anchor risk to upper and lower- bound reference points.  
Unanswered questions surround wherever the scales should be linear or algorithmic; 
and the range of depicted values. 
Line graphs There is evidence that some people focus on the first and last years depicted. 
There is evidence that some people are influenced by the physical size of the area 
under the curve.  
Dots & related 
formats 
Findings are mixed, some sources reporting that this form of density plot was a useful 
supplement to written information on probability, others report no enhanced effect. 
Pie charts  There are reports of people misinterpreting pie charts and finding them confusing as 
an indicator of risk* (this finding is corroborated by Morgan Henrion, 1990; Krupnick et 
al, 2006).  
A pie chart displaying relative probabilities for two, or more, risks is more effective than 
using multiple pie charts to convey the same meaning. 
Histograms While rarely used to convey risk information, it is reported that people find this format 
helpful.  However, evidence that they add value as a supplement to numerical risk 
information is inconclusive, i.e. it is not clear whether people are reacting to the 
quoted probability value or the height of the columns.  
 * this finding is corroborated by Morgan Henrion, 1990; Krupnick et al, 2006.  
 
 
Maps and Mapping 
The use of maps when presenting information on known and potential infestations in a given 
county or region has strong intuitive appeal. The principal strengths of maps as a 
representation of infestation can be summarised as: 
 
 Format that everyone is familiar with. 
 They appear authoritative. 
 Demonstrate differential impacts, e.g. 
◦ prevalence rates; 
◦ rate / speed of infestation;  
◦ effectiveness of mitigation measures; 
◦ rates of stakeholder adoption of mitigation measures. 
 Plotted against time they can indicate change over time, e.g.  
◦ pattern of spread of infestation;  
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◦ rate of spread of infestation. 
 Demonstrating alternative futures; 
◦ different scenarios of infestation (e.g. with and without mitigation; or based on 
alternative assumptions being true, or best versus worse case; 
◦ alternative mitigation measures.  
 Characterising regional or seasonal differences etc. in relation to (iii) - (v) above. 
 And more... 
 
The use of colour and clear marking of key parameters helps to characterise the issue 
spatially.  However, in common with other displays of system status, the number of colours 
should be kept to a minimum.  Where the use of colour is intended to indicate level of threat, 
e.g. risk of infestation, or evidence of effectiveness of mitigation measures, the colours 
chosen should conform to established cultural norms e.g. red (danger / unsafe / serious / 
negative), yellow (caution), green (safe / stable / positive); possibly, with care, extending to 
varying shades (see BS EN 61310-2:2008). 
 
However, some of the strengths of maps also embody their potential to introduce bias.  
Perhaps most fundamentally, because of their intuitive appeal, once cast, even if based on 
only the flimsiest of data, they can channel thought, such that those who view them find it 
difficult to think of alternatives, once presented with what may be interpreted as a definitive 
account.  Mapped depictions of prevalence / infestation can also potentially produce 
undesirable anchoring effects (as well as desirable ones).  It is also foreseeable that people 
may get drawn into the detail of the depiction, possibly at the expense of losing sight of the 
big picture, and / or the strength of underpinning evidence.   
 
Of the range of different methods for representing uncertainty in maps, Visser et al (2006) 
characterise these using the typology presented in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Typology of maps for representing uncertainty 
 
Difference maps Useful for demonstrating aspects such as impacts / prevalence rates and similar on 
different regions, or a map that is based on field measurements versus a map based 
on a theoretically based model (e.g. of infestation)l change over time etc. 
Scenario maps Useful to characterise alternative futures, e.g. status-quo v's intervention; predicted 
effectiveness of alternative mitigation measures, the consequences associated with 
different assumptions about how variables will interact.  There may be benefits from 
presenting maps of different scenarios simultaneously, e.g. to demonstrate the 
relative superiority of one choice of mitigation measures over another. 
Ensemble maps Useful to represent uncertainties, e.g. maps produced using the same model but 
populated with different parameter values, i.e. variables over which there may be 
uncertainty or a range of predicted values. 
Grid maps Useful to provide statics relating to how certain / certain data is in each grid, e.g. that 
a given probability has been exceeded, aluminium or maximum values, mean and 
standard deviation etc. 
Source:  Visser et al (2006) 
 
Echoing a live public policy debate in the UK, Visser et al, 2006 offer the useful example of 
ambulance response times, to illustrate how maps can be used to inform public policy 
decision making over the impact of alternatives scenarios and associated uncertainties; see 
Box 2.   
 
Box 2 
Policy question: 'Explore the impact of reducing the number of A&E departments from 110 to 103'.   
 
To inform the process a 500x500m grid map was used to plot the time needed to drive from the nearest 
ambulance station, collect the patient and transfer them to the nearest A&E department (by extension, 
plausible uncertainties might surround variations in traffic densities; time taken to process admissions on 
arrival at different A&E departments; geographical differences in health needs prevalence rates by type).   
 
A component of the mapping used to answer this question is said to have involved the production of two 
difference maps: (i) depicting the ratio of the driving times per grid cell, and (ii) the difference in driving time 
per grid cell.   
 
 
Visser et al, (2006) offer a number of detailed recommendations with respect to charactering 
different types of uncertainty information using maps (also see Wardekker, 2012). 
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9. Consideration of alternative representations of uncertainty 
surrounding PHRR pest/disease ratings 
 
 
Headline Conclusions 
 
Risk Register Point Value plus Uncertainty Proxy Score (all pests in Register) 
Strengths 
Effort to develop is proportionate to the aims of the Risk Register. 
Conveys an impression of objectivity through reference to underpinning science 
Stakeholder involvement in selecting proxy measures might enhance ownership and 
acceptance. 
Weaknesses 
Assumes weight of knowledge diminishes uncertainty - the converse can also be the case. 
Risks underplaying unknown unknowns 
Subject to publication bias; funding bias and time lags between empirical work and 
publication date 
Risks underplaying context, e.g. local conditions / practices 
Not directly related to the uncertainty around risk point estimates - may inadvertently lend 
more credence to the point estimates than is justifiable.  
Uncertainty Range Based on Estimates of Monetised Impact 
Strengths 
Reflects potentially strong alignment with decision making criteria applied within the policy 
domain, e.g. intervention choices and research investment 
May chime with interests of certain stakeholders 
Weaknesses 
Labour intensive for retrospective application to all pests within the Risk Register - may be 
disproportionate / unnecessary for all pests. 
Assessment of monetised values requires expertise beyond plant-pest science. 
124 | P a g e  
 
Explicit link between cost and priorities invites media attention. 
May sponsor debate over values and their bases 
Prone to sponsor public suspicion of partisan interests 
Calculation of externalities can be unintuitive to non-experts. 
Cost as a justification for non-intervention may arouse stakeholder concern. 
 
Uncertainty range for Risk Register rating 
Strengths 
Focus presents as being on scientific estimates of threat. 
Emphasis on natural science portrays as more neutral than when based on market costs. 
Direct relationship to point estimates. 
Good fit with expertise of assessors. 
Weaknesses 
Labour intensive for retrospective application to all pests within the Risk Register - may be 
disproportionate / unnecessary for all pests. 
Post mitigation estimates will tend to be partial where assessor expertise is restricted to 
biological / technical domains - risk of underplaying wider considerations. 
Potential variability in references applied by assessors to the consideration of mitigated risk. 
 
A potentially important, and often underplayed, element in risk communication relates to 
what has been termed corporate body language.  Routinely, stakeholder, in particular public, 
perceptions of risk regulatory bodies and government Departments and Agencies is 
fundamentally vague and impressionistic.  Inferences drawn tend to be based on ad hoc / 
incidental acquisition of knowledge of their role, remit and track record.  Most people only 
engage with the detail at the point where controversy emerges.  The manner in which risk 
and uncertainty are portrayed has the potential to have impacts in this more subtle 
ephemeral domain of communication.  
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Worries that highlighting uncertainty may sponsor stakeholder concern may have some 
grounds, i.e. people may prefer certainty and under some circumstances are prone to being 
irked by uncertainty.  However, the whole area of natural disease control is underpinned by 
its inherent uncertainty, and most people recognise this.  Thus, stakeholders may be more 
accepting of uncertainty in this domain and its expression may serve to enhance trust.  A 
caveat here, however, is that they will likely be less accepting of uncertainty over the 
adoption of mitigation measures and their effectiveness. 
 
The following relates to the consideration of the relative merits of three alternative forms of 
representing uncertainty within the Risk Register, referenced to insights from social and risk 
management science.  The alternatives considered were:  
• Risk Register supplemented by an uncertainty proxy rating derived from published 
findings and related scientific insights. 
• An uncertainty range based on monetised impacts. 
• An uncertainty range referenced to the Risk Register rating. 
Each is discussed in terms of its relative strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Risk Register rating plus Uncertainty Proxy rating (all pests within the Register) 
 
The Proxy 'score' is designed to indicate how well known the pest is, rather than assessing 
the uncertainty associated with point estimates in the Risk Register.  Essentially, the more 
that is known about a pest the lower the level of judged uncertainty surrounding its impact 
and the probability of harm.  
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Figure 9: Graphic representation of uncertainty proxy score  
 
Strengths 
The primary strength of this method is considered to be that the effort to produce this 
characterisation of uncertainty for all ~700 pests might be considered proportionate to the 
aims and role of the Risk Register.   Additionally, the fact that the product is based on 
published findings (in particular peer reviewed findings) may lend weight to the impression of 
objectivity.  A solid grounding in empirical findings also reflects alignment with evidence-
based approaches in other government Departments and Agencies.  There is, perhaps, also 
scope for involving key stakeholders in the selection and review of underpinning evidence; 
which may bring benefits in terms of its acceptance / judged credibility. 
 
Weaknesses  
A central assumption is that uncertainty is associated with limited evidence and, by 
implication, more 'knowledge' will sponsor greater insight / precision, i.e. reduce uncertainty.  
In some instances this may be the case, however, as a number of authors have commented, 
more knowledge can increase uncertainty (see, for example Wardekker, et al, 2008).  
Additionally, there is a risk of underplaying unknown unknowns.  Although this is essentially 
common to all three options, effects may be greater in so far as the scope may be greater 
due to the time-lag between discovery / empirical work and publication.  Further limitations 
relate to the scope for a range of publication biases: notably disproportionate publication of 
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positive effects / relationships, particularly those that are testable in quantitative terms and 
achieve statistical significance (Dickersin et al, 1987 suggest a 3:1 bias), and more 
fundamentally those that chime with / do not contradict existing models and perspectives 
(see Kuhn, 1970).  Relatedly, funding biases will impact on what research is commissioned, 
such that certain pests may attract greater empirical attention than others.  Funding 
considerations are prone to embody reflect a broader range of considerations than the 
potential for biological harm, e.g. allaying stakeholder concern, economic impacts, as well as 
cognitive biases relating to the features of the source of harm.  
 
A more fundamental issue, particularly when considering pests that are not currently 
established in the UK, relates to translating findings from other countries to the UK context, 
e.g. differences attributable to local climatic conditions, presence of other species, as well as 
man-made components, such transport / distribution differences, arboricultural, horticultural 
and agricultural practices, etc. i.e. there is a risk of underplaying contextual components 
(local conditions / practices).  Implications range from drawing excessively risk averse 
conclusions, to unrealistic optimism.  
 
While reference to published evidence may lend credibility to this method, its relationship to 
point estimates is not as intuitive as alternatives, particularity for lay audiences, i.e. it would 
require explanation and justification.  It may also invite debate, particularly amongst 
organised interest groups and the media over the selection of evidence.  However, this is 
more likely restricted to high profile / high-consequence pests over which the evidence 
conflicts in fundamental ways and / or chimes with established disparate discourses, e.g. 
tensions between mainstream and alternative science. 
 
In terms of presentation, there is a risk of misinterpretation of proxy uncertainties, as relating 
to the more intuitive concept of confidence bounds surrounding point estimates.  
Additionally, where stakeholders recognise that the proxy uncertainties do not relate to point 
estimates, this seems likely to sponsor a stronger focus on point estimates, which may result 
in underplaying the uncertainty surrounding these ratings, i.e. the use of proxy measures, in 
the absence of an expression of point estimate uncertainty may lend more credence to the 
point estimate than is justifiable.   
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Conclusions 
The proxy measure offers a potentially useful supplement to Risk Register point estimates, 
but if used in isolation appears to be problematic from the perspective of nuancing point 
estimates, through highlighting bounds of uncertainty, to inform strategic thinking over risk 
prioritisation.  A strength would seem to be its role in highlighting evidence-gaps and issues 
that would benefit from further research.  
 
Uncertainty Range Based on Monetised Impact 
 
The use of monetised values to characterise the judgements of uncertainty associated with 
point estimates in the Risk Register essentially relate to the translation of uncertainty 
estimates to quantifiable estimates of financial valuation of impact. 
   
Figure 10: Graphic representation of range of uncertainty over monetised value of impacts 
 
Strengths 
Expressing uncertainty as monetised impact values has the potential to produce strong 
alignment with decision making criteria in policy domains, notably with regard to the 
consideration of intervention choices and research investment.  Additionally, a transparent 
focus on economic impact, and intuitive linkages with this acting as a fillip for action / 
intervention, may chime with the interests of certain stakeholders, e.g. those whose 
businesses will be affected by the disease.   
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Weaknesses 
A notable practical issue in producing cost estimates seems to be that this requires expertise 
beyond plant disease / pest science, i.e. the range of expertise needed to perform Risk 
Register assessments might need to be broadened.  The calculation of externalities can be 
unintuitive to non-experts.  This can be problematic in instances where the impact of pest / 
diseases have large scale highly visible detrimental impacts on the natural environment, i.e. 
situations which are prone to elicit strong affective responses, particularly amongst the 
public.  
 
A central difficulty with monetised values is that they tend to be perceived as value laden.  
Specifically, they risk shifting the emphasis from the risk posed by a pest / disease (an 
ostensibly neutral issue rooted in science), to what tends to be seen as politically charged 
choices over what action should be taken.  This can be particularly problematic in areas 
where inaction (on the part of government and its Agencies) is justified on the basis of costs 
being disproportionate to benefits.  Monetised values are prone to sponsor suspicion of 
sectional interest.  The public, in particular, tend to be unwilling to trade costs and benefits, 
tending to be hold more 'binary' perspectives on when government 'should' / 'should not 
take action'. 
 
An explicit link between cost and priorities invites media attention, particularly if this 
sponsors suspicions of inequity or serving sectional interests.  It is probably reasonable to 
conclude that a significant proportion of the public(s) and many interest groups exhibit a 
suspicious disposition in relation to the actions of g/Government and / or large scale 
commercial interests, such that being presented with a relatively small amount of 
information that reinforces this tends to amplify its salience.   
 
Monetised values can sponsor media and organised interest group debate over values and 
their basis.  Where such debates take root, there is a risk that they may attract organised 
interest groups who may see such instances as an opportunity to propagate wider political 
agendas (world views).  The ascribed values may also provide an opportunity for debate, 
particularly when creating estimates for non-market values.  Relatedly, monetised values 
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imply a degree of precision which may be disproportionate to their basis and degree of 
consideration possible within the context of the Risk Register.   
 
Producing monetised uncertainty estimates for all >800 plant pests / diseases within the Risk 
Register is labour intensive and may be considered disproportionate & unnecessary for all 
cases.  This degree of nuancing of point estimates may be more appropriate for a sub-set of 
higher impact / higher profile / potentially more mitigable pests. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Monetised values and cost-benefit considerations will inevitably, and necessarily, play a part 
in the decision making process over priories and choices regarding (in)action and 
intervention.  However, monetised values are known to be prone to sponsoring partisan 
interest amongst stakeholders and the media.  It may be prudent to express such values after 
deeper deliberation and consideration of communication issues than is possible within the 
practicalities of producing and maintaining the Risk Register. 
 
Uncertainty range for Risk Register score 
 
Uncertainty ratings produced by risk assessors to indicate the bounds of uncertainty 
associated with point estimates within the Risk Register. 
 
Strengths 
The principal strengths of producing uncertainty bounds that relate to point estimates are 
considered to be that the values relate directly to the point estimates.  The inherent 
uncertainty surrounding pest and diseases (where they are viewed as natural phenomena 
rather than as the product of some man-made component), leads to strong intuitive 
associations with some degree of uncertainty, i.e. few will be surprised that estimates relate 
to a range of outcomes.   
 
The focus on biological components, rather than broader policy considerations e.g. 
monetised values, potentially presents as more neutral and less likely to sponsor inferences 
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of partisan perspectives.  In corporate body language / impression management terms, 
where government Departments and Agencies are perceived as raising concern / highlighting 
the need for action, this tends to be viewed as reflecting fundamentally altruistic (harm 
prevention) motives; which may represent a positive contribution to institutional trust 
profile. 
 
 
Figure 11: Graphic representation of range of uncertainty referenced to point estimates 
 
Weaknesses 
Producing uncertainty estimates for all ~700 plant pests / diseases within the Risk Register is 
potentially labour intensive, and there may be grounds for considering it to impractical, 
disproportionate & unnecessary for all cases.   
 
Uncertainty regarding the monetised impact of mitigation estimates may be problematic as 
relevant considerations may lie beyond the technical expertise and influence of assessors, 
where this is limited to plant / pest science knowledge, i.e. options may be moderated by 
broader policy considerations.  Implications here may range from sponsoring unreasonably 
optimistic to unreasonably pessimistic judgements.  Differences in assessor knowledge and 
expertise may sponsor wide variations in estimates of uncertainty of risk and its mitigation.  
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Conclusions 
The relationship between point estimates and uncertainty is more direct, intuitive and 
simpler to explain / justify than the alternatives.  It is also of good fit with the expertise of risk 
assessors, with specialist knowledge in plant pests and diseases.  This degree of nuancing of 
point estimates may be more appropriate for the deeper consideration of a sub-set of higher 
impact / higher profile / potentially more mitigable pests than the complete set of pests 
within the Register. 
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